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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
1. The Problem of the Thesis; 
The problem of this thesis is twofold: first, it is an 
attemp~ to understand and critically evaluate Bergson's doctrine 
of intuition;~ second, it is an attempt to determine of what 
value Bergson's intuitional method is to philosophy. If 
Bergson's doctrine of intuition is rejected, then intuition as 
a philosophical method must also be rejected. 
The difficulty of arriving at an adequate understanding of 
Bergpnnian intuition must lie either with the abst~usenes$ of 
intuition or ~rlth Bergson's exposition of intu ition. It Will 
be the contention of this thesis that t he difficulty lies in 
both areas • . For e:xample, Bergson states that more than a fe'<~ 
interpretations of the meaning of intuition are possible ,l and 
that if one \'Te.re to ask of him a precis_e definition, he, Bergson, 
could not give one. On the other hand, Bergson offers- many 
descriptions~ of intuition. In Creative Mind, Bergs.on tells us 
that intuition is t he vision which arises within i nmediate 
consciousness.2 It is also consciousnes~ extended.3 Further, 
11 i t is a direct vision of the mind by the mind. rr4 A "fundamental 
1 . Henri Bergson, Creative Mind, trans . by H. Andison (New York: 
Philosophical Library, 1946), p. 38. Note: After the first 
citation of each of Bergson's vrorks_, they rrlll be referred to 
in abbreviated form. 
J 
2. ~., p . 36. 4. ~., p. 35. 
1 
meaning tt oi' intuition is also offered in this s.:une ·Hork: "to 
think intuitively is to thinlt duration. 111 And lastly, ttintuition 
is reflection."2 
In Creative Evolution, however, Bergson tells us that it is 
impossible to "think real tiBe," that in order to understand 
life, for example, the intellect nust be transcende~ and the 
immediacy of experience must be felt and lived . 3 The question, 
then, is : is intuition a felt immediacy? or is it reflection? or· 
is_ it both? This same problem reappears in An Introduction to 
Netaphysics. On the one hand intuition is defined as an 
"intellectual auscu1tation, "4 and on the other hand, intuition 
is a result of ua long fellowship with ••• [thi/ superficial 
manifestations "5 of reality . At the same time intuition is 
referred to as a "kind of intellectual syr.1pathy. n6 
In Creative Evolution, Bergson refers to intuition as a 
11faculty ,"7 "Vlhile in 1m Introduction, he refers to it as "an 
indefinite series of acts . 118 In Matter and 11emory, Bergson 
1. Ibid ., p . 38 . 
2. Ibid., p . 103 . 
3. Bergson, Creative Evolutiolf trans . by Arthur Nitchell (New 
Yorlr : The Hodern Library, 9117' 1944), p . 5'3 . 
4. Bergson, An Introduction to Hetaph~sics ? trans . by T. E. Hulme 
(He\·T York : The Liberal Arts Press, 19 J , p . 37 . 
5' . Ibid ., p . 61 . 
6 . Ibid ., p . 23. 
7. Bergson, CE, p. 259 . 
-
8 . Bergson, Hi, p . 46 . 
refers to an "instantaneous intuition111 and to a "simple 
intuition. 11 2 The forr..1er is theoretical in that ner10ry is not 
present , ' ·rhilc the latter doe s contain menory . Bergson can 
state that t he intuition he refers to 11bears above all upon 
internal duration , 113 but internal duration may apply to the 
s~lf, to life and to matter . Pnd , last, intuition is related 
to instinct: intuition is "instinct that has become disinterested, 
self conscious, capable of reflecting upon its object and of 
enlarging it indefinitely."lt 
The main tas"c, then, of this thesis is to relate all of 
these varieties of intuition into a coherent scheBe . This , 
Bergson does not do . Perhaps the reason for this results from 
Bergson r·s extreme distrust for precise philosophical analyses 
and his distrust of the intellect in general . I~evertheless , 
if an atter1pt. to arrive at a clear understanding of Bergson' s-
doctrine of intuition i~ to be made , a clear analysis must be 
undertaken. A doctrine of intuition must stand the test of 
analysis if it is to ne&~ anything , let alone if it is to be 
accepted. 
Profess_or Luce states that "the inability of the conceptual_ 
mode of t hinking to express dUl,ation is the starting-point of 
----------------
1 . Bergson, Natter and Hemory , trans , by N. Paul and vl. S. 
Palmer (r ew York: Doubleday Anchor Books , 1959), p . 53 . 
2. Ibid., p . 56 
3 . Bergson , CH, p . 35. 
lt . Ibid ., p . 19t1- . 
Bergsonianism. "1 This statement may be readily accepted . In 
Creative Evolution, for example, Bergson states that "the intellect 
is characterized by a natural inability tn comprehend life . 112 
That \·lhich characterizes life is its underlying principle (the 
elan vi tal)' \'lhich is "true continuity' real mobility' !:ani/ 
reciprocal penetration .. "3 In short, real process or duration 
escapes the intellect . Because of Bergson's belief that intuition 
and not the intellect . is the means of obtaining a knowledge of 
duration, his critique of the intellect must be criticall y ex-
amined . Indeed, a large part of this thesis vdll be devoted t o 
Bergson ' s critique of the intellect . 
Bergson 1 s development of the critique of the intellect falls. 
into t\·lO main stages: (1) prior to the appearance of Creative 
Evoluti on, Bergson more or less ass~unes that our mental functions . 
are utilitarian and rtare essentially turned towards action; 114 
(2) positive proof that this is so is put forward in Creative 
Evolution vrr1ere Bergson traces t he genesis of the intellect . In 
the first stage, it is Bergson ' s contention that the form of the 
intellect ne.y be deduced from its function. ucertain necessities" 
of bodily life denand that man be able to structure matter in 
order t hat his vrants may be satisfied. 5 Man ' s knowledge of 
4 
matter is the end result of his wants, and, therefore, the intellect 
1 . A. A. Luce Bergson ' s . Doctrine of Intuition (London: The 
Hacmillan Co . , 1922) , p . 3. 
2. Bergson, CE, p . 182. 3. Ibid . , p. 178. 
4. Bergson , NM, P• xviii. 5. Ibid . , p . 179 . 
is structured accordingly . But in the second stage , '11Th ere Bergson 
traces the genesis of the intellect , intellect and instinct are 
essentially tied together in their evolutionary development . 
It is out ·of the ins~inctive faculty that intuition in man 
arises; when consciousness is introduced into the instinctive 
faculty, the potentialities of an intuitive faculty are actual-
. d 1 ~ze • In this stage of Bergs.on ' s development, positive proof 
of the intellect ' s structure is offered . 
If Bergson ' s conception of the intellect is rejected, must 
his doctrine of intuition also be rejected? The intellect, in 
contradistinction to instinct , is characteri~ed by Bergson as an 
opposite but complementary way of knowing . 2 If Bergson ' s vie'\<T 
of the intellect is rejected, then the collateral development 
of instinct and , therefore , intuition may also be rejected . 
Hmvever , the assumption in this thesis '\·lill be that Bergson' s 
doctrine of intuition may be examined on its ovm merits even if 
his vievr of the intellect is rejected . In conclusion, if 
Bergson ' s critique of the intellect is rejected and if his 
doctrine of intuition is found lacking, then his intuitive 
method must be rejected . 
2. Hethodology of the Thesis 
The follovring three chapters of t his thesis '\·rill contain 
an exposition of those aspects of Bergson ' s philosophy which are 
deemed relevant to his doctrine of intuition. The la.st chapter , 
1 . Bergson , CE, p . I94 . 
2. Ibid., p . 149 . 
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Chapter V, \·rill be a critical analysis of the preceding chapters . 
Chapter II of this thesis will begin with an exposition of 
duration, primarily as it relates to the self . The object of 
intuition, it ,,ras stated, bears above all else upon duration . 
The self endures . The intuition of the self is the primary 
intuition for it is the one intuition vrhich '\.Ve may seize from 
within . If there is one thing we may intellectually sympathize 
vrith, for Bergson, it is our own selves . 1 This exposition will 
draw chiefly on Time and Free Will and the Introduction. 
This vrill be follm,red by a preliminary definition of intuition. 
Chapter II vrill conclude vrith Bergson 1 s rejection of systematic 
positions in philosophy and a description of his intuitive 
method . 
Besides the intuition of the self, there is also the 
intuition of life and matter . They too endure . Chapter III 
will deal with the intuition of life . Here, intuition must be 
related to the instinctive faculty for it is out of this faculty 
that t he potentialities of intuition may be actualized . Howaver, 
in order to characterize instinct, it is necessary to offset 
it by a discussion of the intellect-- both faculties are intri-
cately related to each other in their evolutionary development . 
Chapter III, then, will deal with instinct, intelligence and life, 
the exposition this time taken largely from Creative Evolution. 
It may be noted that the intellect, in part, had to be dealt 
'I:Iith in a cursory manner in Chapter II . This \vas done in order 
1 . Bergson, D· , p . 25. 
6 
that the intuition of the self could be clearly delineated from 
the self of intellectual analysis , and, at the same time, in 
order to put forth Bergson 's intuitive nethod . This has necessi-
tated some repetition.l 
Chapter IV of this thesis \Ull deal al111ost exclusively vrith 
the intuition of matter , pa~ticularly as it is presented in 
Hatter and }!emory. This chapter--perhaps in unique fashion--
'vill underta1ce the problen of relating intuition, matter, 
duration , consciousness and perception. 2 Chapter IV will conclude 
with the relationship bet-v;een intelligence and intuition. This 
last section will be an attempt to argue Bergson's position 
that his philosophy is not anti-intellectual, and that, above all, 
by intuition, Bergson means reflection.3 
1 . Professor Kallen believes that it is difficult to iscuss 
one aspect of Bergson's philosophy \ ·Ti thout bringing into 
consideration nany other aspects . He states, for example, 
that "Bergson has a systen in vrhich there i 's a logical 
relation bet,.,reen premise and conclusion, a relation so 
complete and integrative, indeed, that it is difficult to 
state one single opinion of Bergson•·s philosophy "Vrithout-
becoming involved at once in a restateuent of the vniole 
system. His doctrines literally 1 interpenetrate.'"--Horace 
M. Kallen, William James and Henri Ber son (Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 191 
2. In none of Bergson t:s commentators: listed in the bibliography 
of this thesis is such an exposition to be found . Othe.r 
sources, not used in this thesis, were also checked, but no 
such exposition was found . 
3 . Bergson, ~1, p . 103 . 
7 
Chapter V, the concluding chapter of' this thesis, vlill 
contain a critical analysis of Bergson 1·s doctrine of intuition. 
This chapter is divided into three main parts: first, a critique 
of' Bergson 1's critique of the intellect; second, a criticail 
analysis of Bergsonian intuition; and third, a critical evalu-
ation of' the intuitive nethod. The third part- vnll depend 
upon the acceptance or rejection of the previous t·Ho parts . 
Intuition may still be of sone \mrth even if Bergson 1·s critique 
of the intellect is rejected; hovrever, if' both are rejected, 
t hen intuition as a method will also have to be rejected . 
CliAF.rK II 
IlJTUITION OF THE SELF 
1 . Psychological Perspective 
In a letter to Harald {offding , Ber gson notes that-
"I:Thile developing his philosopli.y, the point from which he 
started and the point to ,dhich he continually returned vras 
rrthe intuition of duration . u1 In the Sa.rJe letter·, Bergson 
suggests to those 'lrrishing to interpret- his philosophy that 
this sane stnrting point should be kept in nind , and they 
uould do ·Hell to follow his lead . Em·iever , i.t vms noted 
in the introductory chapter of this thesis.that· the intuition 
of duration nay apply to the self, to natter and to life . 
vfuere , then , does one begin? 
In the Introduction, Bergson states that "there is one 
reality •• • 1-rh ich v-e all seize fron \-Tithin ••• our self' 
2. 
uhich endures . 11 He goes on to stc.te that 11we nay syr.1pathize 
intellectually 1rith nothing else, but 1·re certainly synpathize 
,,.;i th our ovm selves .• u3 !i'urther , in the opening lines of 
Creo.tive Evolution, Bergson states that uthe existence of 
Hhich vre are most assured and vrhich ue lQlm·r best is_ unq_uestiona-
L:-
bly our m·m . 11 It appears saSe to say t h at a good starting point 
1. Cited in Jacques Chevalier, IIenri Bergson, trans . by Lilian 
Clare (Nevr York: The Hac_illan Co . , 1928), p . 79 . 
2 . Bergson, Hf, p . 2.4. 
3. Ibid . , pp. 24-25. 
4. Bergson, CE, p. 3. 
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for the stu..:'y of 3ergsonian ph:i.:.oso:)!1y ber;ins 1:i th an e::a.'t':linc.tion 
of intuition and the durational sel f . 
It ·vm.s :1oted in the introductory c_1.apter of this thesis 
that this chapter , Chapter II , '\muld be concerned uith t ·wo 
ir..1portant <lreas 11i t hin Bergson 1 s philosophy -- i!ltuition 
of t e self and :Sergson 1 s intuitive net~1.od . ?ron lis c:"i tique 
of the intellect , his v i evr of duration and his Ci.octrine of 
intuition, 3ergson ' s intuitive method naturally evolved . 
In uhat follovis , it uill be seen th2.t the intuition of the 
self o.lready inplies the use o_ the intuitive nothod ~ \·.'hile 
it is i rplicitly cont~ined in the intuition of the self , its 
explicit statement uill be e:x:aDinec after an e::anination of 
the intuition of the s elf . 
i . Qualitative vs . l.uo.nti tati ve Psychic States 
Accorc.ing to Bergson , cocr:on sense dicte.tes that various 
states of cons ciousness -- fron superficial sensations to 
deep - seated psyc~i c states are subject to sone sort of 
quantitative desc:-iption . 1 I r:ay speak about en intense feeling 
of pleasure , but the diffi cu lty arises 1·rhen I rmintain that my 
feelinr; of pleasure is nm; tuice or three tines as intense as 
it was a no~ent aco . 
For 3er~ son , such a characterizo.tion of feeling results 
from a cor1fusion betueen l·:ha.t r:1ay be terr:1ed extensive non- psychic 
r:ag::lituci.es CJnc~ psychic intensities . 2 ·..Lhe forner apply to spCJ.tial 
1 . Derr;son , T:!?l.'l , p . 1 . 
2 • Ibid . , p • 2 • 
10 
1] 
:"elations nnd are measL."!.I'<?.ble , i·rhile the l atter are not open to 
measurenent . Ta adnit to the possibility of neasurable intensities 
or intensive r-agni tudes ( s.s did the psychophysicists of Ber§:son 1 s 
day ) vras , for 3ergso:J. , to acll: 1i t t 1at c. 1.1easurablo sensation of 
lesser intensity could be cont2..ined ilithin a similar sensation 
shmdng Greater intensity . Lccording to :Jer;:;son , suc.1. an hyyot _esi 
would be absul"d , l'or :rintensi tics . • • ce.rr.1ot be superposed on each 
othel' . nl 
'Jevertheless , Bergson fo;.;md ~he.t the_ e 1ras c:. persistency in 
vie"~.-Iinc c:uc::.li tc::ci ve conscious sta.tes o..s r.1easurable e:-::tensi ties . 
Throe ( if:::'el"ent :;:incls of ps:-c~lic inton.si ties are ::10teC:. by :3ert;so:::l: 
deep - seated psyc.~ic states , c.ff ";ct i vo scns2.tions , and rcpresentati v~ 
sensations . 7he first , doe:) -sen:~ed psycl.1ic states , r:c..y be c:.iscrin -
ir:ated fro:r.. the ot 1er tv;o in tho.t it is o.n intensity of a ;eelinz 
sto:ce c~ocs r:ot necesso.r::..::!_y bea.r an:r role::. "cions~:ip to p~:ysical 
stir:n;._i . Deep- seated states , such as joy , dis~)lay 2. :?ervasive 
character . ~his characteristic sto.ce is not localizec in a snc::.ll 
nortion of the psyche , nor does it then e;radue.lly spread; 3 rather , 
.::-.s the st2..te increo..sos in ::."iclmoss and depth , r.lore o.nd :::.1ore of our 
pcrce:Ycions and neL·.o:"ies becor.:e perr::eo.tecl "\·ii th its undefinable 
c_uali ty . There is a c_L'<:litati ve )regress , but such a progress 
1 . Ibid . 
2 . Ibid . , p . 7. 
3· Ibid . 
does not adni t to ne2.surenent. The r::istake usuc.lly made is to 
regard this. feeling as continuous \vhile its intensity changes . 
1 
vmen its intensity changes, its feeling also changes . 
Ther§ are sone 'eep- seated psychic states such as fear and 
anger vihich have a physiological effect . If t he ewotion is 
violent enough, it may be accompanied by an accelerated heart 
beat., clenched teeth and fists, anc various other nanifestations 
2 
12 
in \·Thich muscular activity becor.1es accentuated . We are conscious 
of these localized peripheral sensations, and an increa se or de-
crease in effort is nistakenly regarded as a raeasurable increase 
or decrease of the psychic state . It nay be noted that here inner 
feeling is confused for its outer manifestations, while above, 
there \•ras a ge:c.eral confusion of the qualitative progress itself . 
Affective sensations are directly related to external 
physical causes . As the quantity of the stir.mlus increases, the 
intensity of the sensation also increases . But \-That can there be 
in coilliJ.on beti.-reen extensive measurable amplitudes and the feeling 
of sensation "~:Thich is non- spatial? According to Bergson, -vre are 
conscious not of the stinulus itself; instead, vie are conscious of 
the physiological n over.1ents ·Hhich follm·r it .3 Indeed, in the 
early chapters of Hatter and 1-1emory, Bergson presents an ex-
tensive ruialysis of this . OUr consciousness of these autoDlatic 
1 . Ibid ., pp . 10- 11 . 
2 . Ibid. , p . 29 . 
3 • Ibid . , p . 3 5 . 
movencnt s i nvites us to l:lD.l:e a choic e ; in;:;tead of merely 
reacting to a stinulus 1:ithin a prescTibed p;:-_ttern , vre are 
able to choose sevsral possible courses of r eaction because 
of our consciousnes s of t hese noveuents . I t is our conscious -
ness of these invoh.mtary novenents , the rJov er..1en.t s t hemselves 
being spatial , that lead us to believe the sensation is itself 
a r2agni t udc . Thus , the intensity of pain uould be discernible 
only in a quo.li te,ti ve uay if vie did not localize and connect 
the various affected po.rts of t he po.rt icu l a r organ . 1 
ltepresentative sensations are sir-:.:. l a r to affective 
sens2.tions 1·;i th onl y one significant differen ce: as the 
sensat ion di minishes in its affective character , it becomes 
J... t• 2 repros ent.Ja J.Ve . I'he external obj oct, reg arc" ed 2.s the cause, 
is e::ctensi ve and IJ.easurable . • gain , t he intensity of t h e 
sensat;ion is jude;ed by the exter:'le.l cau s e . 1:·e a cquir e the 
l:nm'iledge of whc:.t it tal;:e'-=' to pro 'uce o. c ertain sensation due 
to a co:.. r espondine; a::lount of stinulation , 3 a.nd even if v;e ar e 
uncertain as to the pr ecis e qu<?..ntite.-cive cause of the resultant 
13 
sensat ion , l·ie are able , because of the intensity of the sensation , 
to postu l a te the 0-_uc::.ntity of the stiL:rul us . ':L'herofore , 11ue 
transfer the idea into tho scnsc.:.tion , t he q_ue.nti t y of the 
l.· cause into the qu2.li t y of t he effect . 11 r 
l . Ibid ., p . 37 · 
2 . Ibicl ., p . 42 . 
? 
..) • Ibid . 
4. Ibid . 
ii . 'I'he :Jurz.tion2.l Self . 
In tho above an<ll:,--sis , 3ert;son attcnpted to s ::.o"':.J ho"~:l an 
idea of a nec:.s;.:ra.ole , psychic intcnsi ty develops . \-Ie assune 
the existence of intensive Dc.cni tudes by borrm·:ring erroneously 
fron our perception of the external "i:orlcl distinctions uhich 
cannot be ayplied to an introspective viei:i of the self . "'his 
!'~ay be terrJed "inverte :antianisd . II Hhile r:c:..nt sought to 
deterninc the c::tent to uhich ue constructed (by the form of 
the sonsibili ty) , the externo.l \lorld. , Bergson sought the extent 
to Hhich ou:::- i:-.1P.~ination , by its cons tant contact ".:ith the 
e:::te ... ·nal \·m:.·l~ , colors our perception O.L the self and the 
i~nediate data of cons ciousness . 1 
Ac cording t o Bert;son , c:m introspective vim; of the self 
'\·.rill reveal that sensations , feolinr;s , volitions 8.nd i cleas fl.:re 
cont i nue.lly in the process of chang e ~ I:oHever , the cha.n.ge that 
is involved here is of a pc:.rticulo.r k ind . Lt first glance , i t 
appears that the psychic life of the self is conposed of separate 
states , each state givinr; uay to 2.::1other . ~ careful ez~ination 
liill reveal that each state itself 'Lmdergoes change . 
11Conscousness ncans :oer:10ry, 112 .<..~erg son states . Consciousness 
of ony present no::-Jent in:;_ilies that ny nG.st is brow;ht to bear 
upon tho :'resent . If ner:.~ory \·:ere :1ot present , the present '\'JOUld 
14 
die il:.rrn.ediately after its o.ppc<lrance; consciousness l·muld evaporate . 
1 . I:ilic cc~:)el: , 11Process and ?ersonali ty in Bergson ' s Thought" 
~he hiloso"Qhical ::•orur:1 , Vol . :cvii (1959-1960), p . 25 . 
2 . Bergson , n: , p . 26 . 
15 
The continuity indicative of psychical life is continuous 
~nd the transition from one monent to another is of an org~nic 
nature . Bergson defines duration a s 11 the continuous progress 
of the pa.st ,.,-hich gnaws into the future and s Hells as it advances . 11 
Therefore , if I am conscious of a :9rogressive sensation it is only 
because the sensation itself endures . The d istinctions usually 
prac t iced upon a durational nrocess c istort t he nature of such 
a nrocess . Instea , by the use of intuition , 
''ie can conceive of succession \·ii t hout Uls-clnc-clon, 
e.nd th · rD.:: of ~ t 2.s r:mtual penetration , an inter-
con:1exion and orga.niza tion of elements , each one 
of \Thich repres ents the \·Thole , and cannot be distin-
guished or isolated fron it except by abstract 
thought . 2 
Bergson notes b.io ldncls of r:ul tiplici ty: one is indeed 
measurable , \·Ihile the other doe s not adr.:i t to measurement . 
The farner , canx10t be applied to the life o:' the self , uhile 
the l at ter has little value for an intelle ct uhich seel~s urecise 
distinctions necessitated by the prac tical denands of life . 
For exam)le , cons i cier the con 1,:mtation of units \·rhich refer to 
a descrete nultiplicity . In oruor to rea ch a s ttm , it is necessary 
that I r etain one 11nit - -have it i:rait, so to speak-- until I perceive 
the ne:~t one . According to Ber 0 Son , "i:le hold the f orr.J.er unit ir.. an 
ideal space until \ ·.Je o.re able to obtain a synthesis betueen that 
1 . Ber gson , p . 7. 
2 . Be_ gsorr , '"7H , p . 101 . 
1..mi t and the one that v:ill be added to it . 1 Eo·vrever , real 
time does not v1ait or stru1d still . Duration is a continuous, 
irreversible , organic, developing process . 2 Thus, these h ·ro 
kinds of n.ultiplicity may be vie-vred fror.:1 tHo different 
perspectives: 
That of ma terial objects , to \·rhich the conception 
of nrunber is immedi a tely applicable; Dnd the mul-
tiplicity of states of consciousness , 1.-ih ich cam10t 
be r egarded as numerical vlithout the help of some 
symbolical representation , in 1-vhich a necessary 
element is space . 3 
If vJe are to vim·l tho:'c existence of ttuhich \le are most 
a.ssul,edt! and "'I:Jhich '.•re l;J.'lOvi best las being7 . . . unquestion-
f l.. ably our o-vm , 1 • v.r.e n_us t let our ego live and refrain from 
fragnenting it into a discrete multiplicity . 5 Yet , this is 
not to say tha t ·v1e •Jill no longer find ::.ml tiplici ty or a 
succession of qu a litative d w.nge s . The difficulty 3er gson 
encounters in a ttempting to express the heterogeneous mul -; 
til)lici t y of duration is r eadily f ound in his early 110rl:s . 
l'n'lile duration is a heterogeneous multiplicity , it is a lso 
a unity , f or if it is regarded me:cely as multiplicity, then , 
o.gain , it is fragrnen:ted •. Thus , Bergson speak s of '1several 11 
1 . Ber gson , TF\'1 ' }J . 77 . 
2 . Bergson , CE, pp . 17-8. 
') Bergson, T:i.I'\··J ' p • 87. .) • 
l+ . Bere son , CE , p •. 3· 
5. Bergson , Tl~"~·J , p . 100 . 
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st __ tes 'l:ihich permeate one 2nother , but by using the torm 
ll several ," he himself r ealizes that 11 by the very language 
Hhich I ~>las co:JlJe_led to use , I betrayed the deeply in:;r ained 
habit of setting out time in space . 11 1 
If , then , one seeks an analysis of duration , Bergson 
lJ.ust spoeJr of a multiplicity of successive states of con-
s c iousness and , at the s2.1 e time , a unity vrhich is cayw.ble 
of binding then together . If (uration is cons idel~ed to be 
:r:1erely . syilt esis o: unity a..n.cl nul tiplici ty , it ·v:oul d appear 
as na mysterious operation uhich t al:e s place in darkness . 11 2 
Bergson reso::cts to various meta:;hors in ol~der to express 
the neaning of duration . But the best 1...-ay , according to 
Bergson , of gr2sping the significance of duration is to feel 
it and 11fror:1 q_uantity it returns to the state of quality . 11 3 
iii . .:.. ·10 Aspects o"' the Self . 
According to Bergson , our nental functions are of a 
utilitarian nature and "are essentially turned tovmrds 
action . u4 This is one o:' the basic principles of his vrorl;: , 
1:c::.tter and llenory . In turning tm·rards action , man see1::s to 
utilize and organize inert natter or solids . In Cr eative 
Evolution , \There Bergson trace s the evolution of man 211d 
the c:.ninal vmrld , he points out that tovmrds the organization 
1 . Bergson , TFU , p •. 122 . 
2 . Bergson , n f '1 ' p . 46 ~ 
..., 
.) • · ergson , TFVJ , p . 126 . 
h Bergson , 1"'. p • xviii . I • · .l. ' 
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and utilization of nature , i . e . , by our ability of nanufacturing 
instrunents in order to facilitate the conc:uest of na tur e , "the 
intelligence of animals tends as tm·mrd an i deal . ul Indeed , 
Ber gson goes so far D.S to sta te that r:wchanical invention is 
the essentia l , distinguishing feature of human. inteligence . 2 
Because of t his fact , "'de shoul d say not Homo sapiens , but 
J:Iono fabe1 • 113 
A necess<:..ry prerequisite for mechanica l invention is a 
hor2ogeneous r.1edium 1·1here juxtaposition is possible m""!.d 1:here 
q_ualito.tive felt heterogeneity z; ives 1·;ay to ho:o.ogeneity. :?or 
), 
3er gson , " space 2.:one is hoi'..:ogeneous , ll-r anC. it is obj ects in 
sp.::.ce thc:.t forD a discrete nul ti:>lici ty . This fo r n of 
:-Julti::_J lici ty is to be distinguished from the multiplicity 
contained \Ti t hin duration . Durati on has no t h ing in co;-.. :non 
1.:i th space . l'lhc.t ~:as terr::ed Bergson 1 s "inverted ::c.ntia:nisn11 
is the illicit substitution of discrete ~ultiplicity for the 
r·~ultiplici ty · •. -i t hin duration . Bergson states that 
1 . 
2 . 
') 
..) • 
l.·. .. 
...... 
? · 
our ego cones in contact \·lith the external Horld 
at its surface; our successive sens.:1tions , alt-~ough 
dissolving into one anothc~ , r e tain so:o.ething of 
the r.mtual externality 11hich belongs to t heir 
obj ective causes ; and t hus our superficial psyc~ic 
life cones to be pictured uithout <l1JY great ef~ort 
as sot out in a hm ... oge!1eous n eC. i un . :> 
:Jergso:1, Cl' ....... , p • 1 52 . 
Ibid . 
3orgson , c:c 
' 
~') . 153 . 
3er gson , r , --,- • L-' ·' ' p . 120 . 
Ibid ., p . 125 • 
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The result, then , is t hat our psychic life n ay be viei·red 
as containi!lg ei thor the discrete multiplicity fm::nd 1:li thin a 
homogeneous r.1ediurn , or it nay be vieued as cont a i ning an 
irreversible, organic developing process i ndic2.tive of q_uali -
tative !.mltiplicity. The former viei·T of the self , Bergson 
termed t he "social self, 11 \·lhile the latter is terned t he "funda-
nental self . 111 The social self is ordered and has a particular 
construct, it i s easily e:xpressed in i·mrds, and because t h is is 
so, it better anS'~Jers our daily n eeds . Hm·mver, by spreading out 
qualitnt ive multiplicity in s pace, feelinbs tend to l oose t h eir 
col or and consciou s sta tes becone juxtaposed and lifeless . 2 
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The socia l s elf n ay be viei·Ted as the outHar d , artificial 
n anifest.s.tion of t h e func" a.r.1er~tal self; 3 and , lil:e our perceptions 
of t he ext er nal i·TOrld '~:rhich "are clear , distinct, juxtaposed or 
4 juxtaposable one vii th another, 11 our psychic states c-.. ssume the 
same forn , i . e . , the for r.:::. of nunerical multi pl i city. Intu ition 
and not intellectual analysis is the i·ray i·J. uhich one Day come 
to knOi·i the real self . The follm·Ti ng d iscu ssion uill center 
on i n t uition as it relates to t e durational self . 
2 . I ntuition a~d t he Self 
Of using su ch a uord as 11 i ntuition , 11 Bergson had some qualms . 
He states t hat i ntuition "is a vord '\"Those use caused n e some 
degree of hesitation. 115 Undoubtedly , a sked over and over again 
1. Ibid . , p . 129 . 2. Ibid . , p . 133· 
3· Ibid . , p . 138 . 4. Bergson , n, p . 25. 
5. Bergson, CH, p . 33 . 
by both his detractors and his admirers for a more adequate 
definition, he still could not conply vli th their demands. "Let 
no one ask me,u he states, "for a simple and geometrical defi-
nition of intuition. 111 Indeed , it will be seen that any attempt 
to define intuition in this '\vay is impossible because of the 
very nature of intuition. 
A preliminary definition of intuition may be attempted by 
first seeking its application . Primarily, intuition is a search 
for "finding true duration . 112 That duration of which we are in 
a position to grasp most readily is the duration of the self . 
The durational aspect of the self is the very stuff out of which 
the self is made, and the intuition of the self is referred to 
by Bergson as a "direct contact of t he self with the self . "3 It 
vmuld not be v!rong to speak of intuition as the attempt to 
come into contact vli th the undistorted i mmediacy of experience 
4 
via introspective data . According to Bergson, it is 
impossible to "think real time, 11 but \ve are in a position to 
2( 
11live it ••• [JoiJ life transcends intellect. 115 Intuition, 
therefore, relates to the felt immediacy of experience which 
cannot be discursively characterized without losing its essence . 
11The constant element in the meaning of the term is that of direct 
or i mmediate apprehension . "6 Before proceeding further, let us 
first re-examine exactly how intellectual analysis fails to 
1 . Ibid . , p . 37. 2. Ibid . , p . 3lt- . 
3 · Bergson, D1, p . 61 . 4 . Capek, QI?. • cit . , p . 25. 
5. Bergson, CE, p . 53 . 6 . A W 1f "I ..... . t. " En • o , n~u~ ~on, ~· 
Brit . (1942), Vol. XII, p. 
~ 
capture the durational self . 
In the very beginning or thG D1troduction, Bergson makes it 
clear that there are ti.vo ways of lmovTing a thing: "the first 
i mplies that. i:Ie move round the object; the second , that ·vre enter 
into it . ul The first way of kno;:ring applies to the concepts of 
the u_r1derstanding and the second to i ntuition . The object lmo·wn 
by t h e intellect is al\·rays 1 1relative~1 ·vrhile the object knovm by 
intuition is. "absolute • 11 2 Bergson explains vrhat he means by this 
in the follo11ing iilay . A character , Hi th all his traits, may be 
presented in a novel . If,for only an instant, I can identify 
myself "~:rith him in a "simple and indivisible feeling,n no amount 
of descriptive analyses could ever characterize that siL"lple, 
felt i dentity. 3 Bergson eoes on to state that I can compare all 
the character 1·s traits vri t h whomever I wish, and, indeed, he can 
be related to the vThole universe, but, in this cas.e , they are so 
:wany points of vie'l.·r outside of t he character . "Description, 
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history , and analysis, 11 he states., "leave ne here in the 
relative . 114- Su c_l descriptions , then, are external and may be 
regarded as so many aymbo1s, or points of view. In this sense , 
reason leads us on the road to the infinite, never letting us rest, 
i·Thile intuition, in that simple, indivisible, felt i dentity , gives) 
us t he absolute , i . e ., absolute in the sense that it is a simple, 
indivisible, complete vievr . By intuition or "intellectual 
sypmath:z, 11 Bergson means ths.t sonething "by 1·rhich one places one-
self 'Hi thin an object in order to coincide v.ri th vrhat is unique 
1 . Bergson, Il-I, p . 21 . 
3. Ibid., p . 22 . 
2 . Ibid . 
4. Ibid . 
22 
in it and consequently inexpressible . 111 
Aside fron the character in a novel , the saiJ.e method may be 
applied to our m·m selves . Bergson states that 11 our duration 
can be presented to us directly in an intuition ••• but it can 
never ••• be enclosed in a conceptual representation ."2 Further, 
Bergson refers to intuition as an "intellectual auscultation ,tt 
i . e., it is an act whereby vre "feel the throbbing 11 of our. soul . 3 
Finally, Bert;son states that "from intuition one can pass to 
analysis, but not fr.om analysis to intuition.}t 
From all that has preceded, it uoulcl appear safe to say that 
Lntuition is quite distinct from intellectual analysis and the 
use of concepts , that intuition refers to a felt immediacy of 
experience, an that, as Bergson notes in Creative Evolution, 
real time ca~not be thought, but, on the contrary, it nust be 
lived. In eed, nlife transcends the intellect .u 5 However, near'" 
the conclusion of the Introduction, Bergson states that intu-
ition cannot arise. until vre have had "a long .fellovrship 11 vlith 
the ''superficial manifestations" of reality . 6 .i\nd 
1 . 
3 · 
5. 
7. 
even in the sinple o.nd privileged case ,,rhich He have used 
as an example, even for t he direct contact of the self 
with the self, the final effort of distinct i nt uition 
\·rould be impossible to anyone vrho had not combined and 
compared uith each other a very large number of psycho'-
logical analyses . ? 
Ibid., pp . 23- 24 . 2 . Ibid . , p . 30 . 
Ibid ., pp . 36- 37 . 4 • . Ibid., p . 42 . 
Bergs.on, CE, p . 53 . 6 . Bergson , TI' 
' 
p . 61 . 
Ibid . 
Until the above passage, it appeared s afe to s ay that, for 
Bergson , intuition preceded analysis, and that the intuition of 
the self \vas an act that circUI!lvented analysis, not one that 
proceeded through analysis . This appears to be a contr adiction 
on Bergson's part . On t he one hand, i nt uition and anal ysis are 
both necessary; on the other hand, analysis, as a method of 
procedure, is rejected in favor of i ntuition . Professor Luce 
offers a possible interpretation out of t his dilemma . He states 
t hat 
the t-vm descriptions are corr.plenent ary . The forner 
Lintui tion t hrough anal ys is? refers. t o t,1e preliminary 
work, the latter La felt i mmedia.c;z7 to the clinax ••• 
The act of pure i ntuition is ••• that storni ng of t~e 
peak. The intellectual conversion is nothing sudden . 
A l oo: at the above pass age cited by Bergson seens to verify 
this vie"\·l . Bergson spoal:s about a "fi:::ml eff ort of dist i nct 
intuition. n Distinct intuition i.·roul d ap~1ear t o be that ineffable, 
i r:'..rnediate experience r eferred to by Bergson , or as Luce says, 
11 t hat storning of the peak . 11 Very evidently - this last act, the 
final effort , is not itself enalytical . In truth , the realm of 
m1a.lysis is left behind . The ream of i ntellection also appears 
to be left behind for Bergson intimates that concepts nove in 
the reaL~ of universals-- a particular property delegated to an 
object is the result of abstractly relating what the object has 
in conmon to an infinity of things . 2 It is in this vray that a 
property is vim·red as being a part of the ob ject vlhen, i n 
actuality, it is no nore than a translation or a synbol of the 
1 . Luce, QQ• cit . , p . 31 . 2 . Bergson, n1 , p . 29 . 
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concrete object ~ 1 Quite to the contrary , according to Bergson , 
intuition gives us vrhat is unique and particular in the object, 
i . e . , it gives us t he nabsolute '' in so far as it gives us simply 
and co!:lpletely an actual existence out of which any arnount of 
predic~tion is possible . Intuition, it would appear , does not. 
t1ove in the realr.1 of the universal . Further , intuition is.: 
direct and reaches into the concrete; analysis is indirect and 
circ1.unvents the concrete . 
I n the Introduction, some ambiguity- remains as· to the exact 
relationship betvleen analysis and intuition. Hore light may be 
shed on this problem in the follm·ring section in i:Thich Bergson 1 s 
intuitive nethod \•rill be dis cussed . However , until intuition is 
related to J:atter anc: to life , any atteupt to reconcile this 
difficulty "1.-muld be premature . For the present tine, it is 
enough to point out. one of the key problems involved in Bergson 1·s 
doctrine of i ntuition--the problen of relating i ntuition to 
analysis .. 
I n concluding the discussion of the int1.1ition of the 
durational self , one point nore needs to be Dade . By entering 
into the concrete flm·r of duration , t h e individual is brought 
"into contact vri th a whole continuity of durations . 112 This 
"continuity of durations" may be related to "all the degrees of 
being . rr3 \ffien duration beCOmeS "attenuated , II i . e .' itS pUl-
satiOnS are more rapid than the pulsations indicative of our ovm 
1. 1£1_., pp . 28- 29 . 
3. Ibid ., p . 46. 
2 . Ibid . , pp . 48- 49 . 
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duration , the tendency is tovrards matter; the r.:oven ent is. from 
the qualitative to the quantitative . 1 In the opposite direc tion 
of the scale of being , c~uration contracts, i . e ., j_ts pulsations 
are slm:rer than our ovm, until a lir.1it is reached \·Jhich Bergson 
calls "eternity. 112 The L :portance of achieving an intuition of 
the durational self is apparent : a vrhole durational scale of 
being is opened to the individual . According to Bergson , it is 
,,.rithin these t\·ro linits t hat intuition moves . 11By an increasingly 
violent effort 11 in either direction, "vre can extend ourselves • • • 
/.fu"lg] transcend ourselves . n3 
3. The Intuitive . iethod 
According to Professor Ste·uart, Berg s o. 1 s philosophy is 
essentinlly a r,ethod . 4 Houever, Bergson "id not build his 
philosophy 'Hi th a preco:1cei vc::. ::1ethod in !lincl; rather, from his 
conclusions, :~is ::1ethod arose . 5 Tb.ree key factors 1::1a:l be 
considered of upmost importance for an adequate ru1dersta:nding of 
Bergson ' s r.:eth od . First, Bergson found t hat r eal tke or 
duration u2.s har dly considered in his day, especially '\·rhen dealing 
Hi th an. evolutionary process . 6 Second , Bergson firmly believed 
that the intellect 1·ms incapable of arriving at a l::nm·:ledge of 
duration . Third, fro:.l h is cri tiq_ue of t h e i ntellect, an d from 
3. Ibid . 
4 . J . lPKellar Ste1-rart , Critical Exoosition of Bergson ' s 
Philosophy (London : The Hacmillan Co ., 1913), p . 3. 
5. Luce , 2£• cit ., p . 3. 6 . Bergson , CH , p . 10 . 
tracing the genesis of it in Creative Evolution, Bergson found 
something that, vrhile opposed to the intellect as a i.•ray of 
Y~owing, was yet complementary to it becQuse of the dual nature 
of reality. That somethi ng vas intuition . 
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The intuitive method transcends the hmnan condition; it goes 
beyond the realm of concept-ual analysis . Concepts, Bergson notes 
in the Intro ·uction, are so many relative perspectives of the 
real; they may be considered a s syr:1bols or translations of the 
real, and, being nerely synbols or translations, they nay be 
compound ed indefinitely i.:Jithout ever coinciding 'Hith the real . 
The difficulty en co"Lmtered here results from uhat, for Bergson, 
is the essence of reason, i . e . , "to shut us up in the circle of 
tne gi ven. 111 But, Bergson maintains one c r·n break out of this 
circle by thrusting 11intelligence outside itself by a.n act of 
will . 11 2 
For Bergson, much of the philosophic speculation of the 
past suffered from one big illusion: 11 the faculty of lmovring 
[.f.iJ • • • supposed coextensive 'Hi th the vrhole of experience . 113 
Underlying this ass~ption is t h e belief that· nature is one, or 
t hat · all is complete, a!ld the intellect nerely need "enbrace it 
in its entirety . 11lt Hm·Tever , Bergson believed t hat the universe 
yet endures and is continually in a process of creation. • A 
single vision of the i.·rhole is , t herefore, in:~ossible . Further , 
the nature of dur ation is such that the law of cause and effect 
can..not perfectly be applie to it--each I:1or.1ent is unique in so 
1 . Bergson, CE, p . 211 . 2 . Ibid . , p . 212 . 
3 . lli.sl·, p . 209 . 4 . Ibid . 
far as there is a \vhole ne1v orga.'Ylic developing relationship . 
This being the case, prediction is i mpossible from a durational 
perspective . One cannot deduce one solution froB another, and 
nno i mportant truth \·rill be achieved by t he prolongation of an 
already acquired truth. 111 
27 
For the present ti~ e, it is enough to note the i mplications 
of such a view. There cannot be a single, completed philosophical 
system which can account for everything . \ihile Bergson believed 
that in the pas~t such systems had been the -vmrk of one man, the 
intuitive method, on the contrary, would be for the us.e of many . 2 
Ineed, there can never be a completed philosophy because of the 
very nature~ of reality, i . e . , reality undergoes continual 
creation. Because of this, the function of future philosophers· 
would be that of continually re- examining the philosophical 
problems of t he day , the solutions offered to such problems, and 
ascertaining t he validity of such solutions- i n light of their own 
rene1-1ed effort of intuition. 
The discussion that follovJS will center on the relationship 
bet\veen concepts and intuition, this time view·ed from the 
perspective of an intuitive method . This will be followed by a 
prospectus for futu~e philosophy. 
i . Intuition and Concepts in the Intuitive Method 
The intuition of the durational self reveals a qualitative 
1 . Bergsnn, CH, p . 35. 
2. Bergson, CE, p . xxiv . 
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multiplicity vlhich cannot be discursively characterized . Concepts-, 
as Bergson understands them, canr1ot capture the essence of such 
a durational reality. For example, the unity and multiplicity 
in~icative of duration can never be adequately described by 
concepts, i . e . , concepts of a mechanical nature reflective of the 
traditional logic. The only way in which kno·v;ledge of the unity 
and multiplicity of duration can be obtained is through the use 
of intuition. Further, the consciousness of our ovm durational 
selves "introduces us," according to Bergson, "to the -interior of 
a reality, on the r:1odel of vrhich vre must represent other 
realities . 111 All reality, it 1vas noted earlier, can be placed 
within a durational scale of being . Therefore, if metaphysics 
is that study 1·rhich concerns itself ·with the real, it must fir.st 
partake of intuition. 
Given t he content of intuition, Bergson must next decide 
in just 1-rhat vray it can be utilized . Certainly, i f intellectual 
analysis cannot arrive at a lmovlledge of duration, it cannot 
adequately undertake the study of duration .. In Creative 
Evolution, Bergson states that the findings of intuition must be 
communicated by intelligence . 2 Very evidently, Bergson here has 
i n nind a method of comnunication quite different f rom one that 
,,muld utilize mechanical concepts . It 1<Tas noted that ready-made 
concepts perform a pragmatic function: they have as t heir end the 
representation of particular states and things, and for the 
continuous t hey substitute t he discontinuous .. l' etaphysical 
1 . Bergson, Ill , p . 50 . 2 . Bergson, CE, p . 260 . 
development is to proceed from reality to concepts and not from 
concepts to reality •. 1 
In order to do this, Bergson states that t he n;ind 11has to 
reverse the direction of the operation by which it habitually 
t hinks; has perpetually to revise, or rather to recast, all its 
categories . 112 \ihile Bergson maintains t hat t he f irst goal of 
metaphysics is to dispense .with symbols, 3 it cannot dispense 
irli th concepts for other s ciences .. ust make use of concepts, and 
metaphys ics cannot dispense -vri t}). other sciences . 4 And, again, 
as it \·ms note above, the philosopher must endeavor to communi-
cate his intuition. As a result of t his, his original intuition, 
according to Bergson, is broken up into concepts . 5 
On t he one hand, symbols and concepts are terms t hat are 
used synonymously by Bergson . On the other hand, they are not . 
One conclusion must foll m·r fron t he above analysis : it is that 
Bergson has in mind a dynamic conception of t he understanding, 
and it is to t his that he refers when he states that i ntuition 
can be comwunicated . There are several ways in which t his is 
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possible . First, he notes that the "single aim of' the philosopher 
should be to promote a certain effort . "6 The certain effort here 
referred to is an effort of i ntuition. This effort may be 
promoted by the use of metaphores and concrete images . Second , 
Bergson notes t hat a true enpiricism is one that makes a fresh 
1 . Bergson, n1, p . 45. 
3. Ibid. , p . 2l1- . 
5. Bergson, CE, p . 260. 
2 . lli.£. ' p. 51 . 
4 . Ibid . , p . 30. Exactly \·Thy 
this is so is explained in 
the follm·ring section. 
6 . Bergson, IH, p. 27. 
start for each ne'\v object it studies in order to achieve concepts: 
that vdll apply exclusively to it alone . 1· And because it applies~ 
to one object alone, he states. t hat it is "a concept vrhich can 
2 
as yet hardly be called a concept . " Such concepts are called 
"fluid concepts 11 because they are able to follovr all the 
"sinuosities. of reality . 113 Third, in Creative Evolution, 
Bergson calls the developnent of such a conceptual process a 
11dialectic . 114 But even a dialectical development is no guarantee 
that t he findings of intuition cru1 be adequately communicated 
and developed . In such a "dialectic--'\•Thich is only a relaxation 
of intuition--many different agreenents are possible, uhile there 
5 is only one truth . n In short, a continual i ntuitional r-e-exami-
nation of reality is necessitated because even a develounent of 
flui concepts \·rill eventually breal~ down. 
From the above, it may be seen t~at Bergson takes a dynamic 
vie\·! of reason; reason functions in order to serve the findings 
of intuition.. Bergson is vague \·Then it cones to describing such 
a process, and it remains some\·rhat of a mystery. For example, 
at i:That point r:1ust the dialectical novement cease a.1'1d re-exami-
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nation through intuition begin? Or, for that matter, \vhat is the 
exact relationship bet'\veen fluid concepts and t,1e i ntuitional act? 
In conclusion, the intuitional nethod moves fron reality to 
concepts, from intuition to the controlled "relaxation of 
1. Ibiq. , p . 37· 2 . Ibid . 
3. Ibid . , p . 51 4. Bergson, CE, p. 260. 
5. Ibid. 
intuition," from O-J."l innediate, qualitative apprehension to its 
dialectical development . 
ii . Prospectus for a Future Philosophical Nethod 
Bergson believed t hat one of the prime mistakes. philosophy 
had committed i n the past \·las the handing over to positive 
science the complete consideration as to what constituted the 
f acts. This, for Bergson , amounted to surrender. Thus 
t he metaphysic or the critique that the philosopher 
~as reserved foT himself he has to receive, ready-
nade, fron positive science, it being already contained 
in the description and ani;llyses, t he whole care of \vhich 
is left· to the scientist•~ 
Scientific formulation is largely the work of the intellect, 
and the intellect has for its end a practical function; it cuts_ 
out of the real \·That is useful . Since t he intellect functions 
within a homogeneous medium , positive science caru1ot unders tand 
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real process. While positive science can come close to describing 
the properties of matter accurately enough because of the fact 
that matter tends towards homogeneity, 11 the duty of philosophy 
should be to intervene here actively112 and perform a critique. 
Since science formulates its laws from a practical perspective, 
it has "not follo\•red t he internal lines of the structure of 
things ."3 
In the Introduction, Bergson states that all the great . 
discoveries in science \·Tere the result of an original intuition 
1 . Ibid., P• 213 . 2. Ibid . , p • 215 . 
3. Bergson, HN , p . 178. 
similar to the one he describes . Hm:rever, the original 
intuition soon becomes lost when its findings are given over to 
a generai method which seeks extension and logical improvement.1 
It is at this level t hat the philosopher is to intervene so that 
the original intuition will not be lost, and so that science 
can recognize exactly how it over accentuates its position. If 
philosophers are to intervene, they must be far1iliar with the 
various sciences . It is for this reason that Bergson states 
that the intuitive r:1ethod 11\·rould put !!lore science into meta-
phys.ics . 112 Indeed, it is for this reason that analysis must 
precede intuition in the intuitive method. But, at t he s~1e 
time, philosophy must go beyond concepts, freeing itself of their. 
rigidity . 
It is ·Horth while to note that both Kant and Bergson sought 
to give metaphysics a secure foundation. According to Bergson, 
Kant took both t he metaphysician and the scientist too literally. 
Because of the independence he gave to the lh!derstanding, 
"science ivith its relations presents to him no more than a fiL.il 
of form, and metaphysics, with its t hings, no more thru1 a film of 
matter . 11 3 Hetaphysical knm·Tledge became relativistic as soon as 
original intuition \<!as replaced by an externalized , abstract 
perspective, i . e . , by the concepts of the Ul!derstanding . SUch 
being the case, metaphysics i·ras left t'l.vo equally possible 
opposite choices ivhich negated each other--the antinomies_. 4 
1 . Bergson, n-.r , p . 53. 
3 • Ibid . , p • 57 . 
2. Ibid . , p. 54. 
4. Ibid . , p . 59. 
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Kant modeled his method on the method enployed by the 
sciences . Thus , the methods that had been successful in logic, 
mathematics , and physics were brought over to philosophy. As 
a result , Kant asked hm·I a mathematics vras possible, hOi>J a pure 
science was possible, and hovl. metaphysics as a science vJas. 
possible? He sought to find what the nature of our mind must 
be if the science of his day ,,-as justified. Of the accuracy 
or pretensions of the science of his day , he did not, or cou1d 
not question . On the contrary, Bergson does question the very 
findings of science .. Intuition bridges the gap between the 
thesis and antit_esis of the antinomies by plunging t hrough the 
surface layer of formalized conceptual systems . 
For Bergson, philosophy is that science '\·Ihich comes into 
contact '\•Ji th a 1>1hole continuity of durations . Because the nature 
of duration is qualitative, and because concepts revolve in the 
realm of the quantitative , intuition is the only faculty that 
can achieve knm'lledge of its unique characteristics . Concepts 
are so many external views, or symbols, substituted for concrete 
reality . This being the cas e, "metaphysics ••• is the science 
which claims to disp-ense '"i th symbols . ul Further, the more. one 
moves into the qualitative realm of duration, the Iess possible 
is it to represent, symbolically, the true characteristics of 
such a realm. 2 According to Bergson, netaphysics '\·rill loose the 
''utility and exactituden f ound in science, but it will thereby 
1 . Ibid . , p . 24. 
2 . Ibid . , p . 52 . 
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gain "range and extension" of its· subject matter .1 It would 
appear that by loss of exactitude, Bergson here intimates that 
the la1owledge metaphysics gains through i ntuition is arrived at 
t hrough an ineffable conscious i tunediacy . Finally, the ultimate 
objective of metaphysics is the performing of "qualitative 
differentiations and integrations . "2 
In conclusion, Bergson states t hat the mind "has to reverse 
the direction of the operation by v.rhich it habitually thinks . 11 3 
That is, instead of moving from concepts to reality, the move-
ment must be from reality to concepts. An intuitive method 
'\·JOuld be one in i'Jhich this procedure is practiced in a methodical 
manner . Indeed, it must be continually practiced because no one 
truth, a~cording to Bergson, can be deduced from another . 
Further, since the movement from reality to concepts is a pre-
carious one, a continual intuitional sounding i nto concrete 
reality is necessary . It is in this vray that a progressive and 
perfectible philosophy can be built up . 
4 . Summary 
'bro main areas of Bergson ' s philosophy were examined in 
this chapter- -first, t he durational self and t he intuition of 
duration, and second , its application Xn an intuitive method . 
The exposition began with an examination of how qualitative 
psychic states tend to be vie'\·Ted quantitatively.. Such a view, 
according to Bergson, is the result of an unsophisticated 
1 . Ibid . 2. Ibid . , P• 53 . 
3· Ibid., P• 51. 
35 
empiricism and plain confusion. Deep-seated psychic states, for 
example , may have physiologica.l effects. It is these measurable 
effects which are often substituted for the psychic states them-
selves . In his examination of representative sensations, Bergson 
held that- the belief in the existence oi' intensive psychic 
magnitudes was. the result of borl'O\•Ting erroneously, from our 
perceptions of t he external world, distinctions which are in-
applicable to an introspective view of the self . 
Next, the psychic states of the self were re-examined in 
themselves . It vras found that these states display a peculiar 
type of change, i . e . , they endure. The unity and multiplicity 
contained vri t hin duration vras also seen to be of a peculiar 
kind . vlhile qualitative conscious states are multiple., their. 
rmltiplicity is not distinct. While they displ ay unity, the 
unity is one of progression. Further, it was pointed out tha~ 
Bergson maintained t hat if the intellect sought after clear-cut 
distinctions., such dis tinctions could only take place i n a homo-
geneous mediun . This being the case, real proces:s or duration 
were lost to it . Therefore, the self of intellectual analysis 
\·ras erroneously believed to be composed of juxtapositional. 
states:, more indicative of the needs of clear expression and 
discursive language .. The fundamental or durational self vtas 
substituted for the social or discursive self . 
The intuition of the self vms examined next . This appli-
cation of intuition ·Has seen to be vThat Bergson refers to as a 
ttprivileged case . n It \vas noted that the use of i ntuition vTas 
an attempt to find true dur ation , and, since the self endures, 
it readily avails itself for being one of the primary objects of 
intuition. From all that Bergson states in most of the Intro-
duction, it appeared that the intuition of the self was an 
irmnediate return to the felt i mmediacy of experience . It pre-
ceded analysis . But , near the end of the Introduction, Bergson 
states that analysis precedes intuition, and that intuition 
moves through analysis . A way out of this apparent contradiction 
was offered by Professor.· Luce--the preliminary work of analysis 
culminates in pure intuition. Nevertheless , ambiguity remained, 
and ~til the intuition of life and matter are examined, no 
final statement at this time could be made .. Finally, it vias 
noted that the i ntuition of the durational self opened to the 
individual a whole. durational scale of being . 
This chapter concluded with a discussion of Bergson ' s 
i ntuitive method . It vms noted that since reality is durational, 
metaphysics cannot be considered a closed book; there can never 
be a completed philosophical system like those of the past . 
Instead , a future philosophy 'tmuld be one in which there is a 
progression of knowledge entailing the renewed re- evaluation 
and vmrk of many . A continual effort of intuition is necessary . 
Out of the content of i ntuition a dialectic may develop. Intu-
ition must be comrmmicated . Ho\·Tever , conceptual development 
calLnot be trusted; the dialectic eventually breaks dovm . Again, 
recall to intuition is necessitated . While fluid concepts are 
to be used, it must be remembered that nothing can replace the 
actual intuition of duration. Bergson is vague about the exact 
vray in vlhich intuition and this dynamic conception of reason 
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opperate . 
Since soue type of analysis is needed prior to intuition, 
philosophy must be familiar ·Hith science . For exa111ple, the 
intuition of the self proceeds through a large number of psycho-
logical analyses . Vore science is brought into the realm of 
philosophy. Finally, since the object of metaphysics is to 
deal \vi th duration , it must dispense 1-vi th symbols. Its concern 
lies ·Hith qualitative differentiations and integrations . In 
order to accomplish this, the usual operation of the mind must 
be reversed . This must be practiced in a methodical manner . 
3? 
CHAPTER III 
INTUITION OF LIFE 
1 . Bergson•·s Method in Creative Evolution 
In the introductory chapter of this thesis, it \vas stated 
that this chapter would deal 't'li th the relat ionship bet\veen 
instinct and intelligence . Further, instinct will be related 
to intuition, and intuition, as it is presented in this chapter, 
will bear on life . Hmvever, before starting such an exposition, 
it is necessary to point out Bergson's complicated procedural 
method inherent in Creative Evolution ~ The difficulty results 
from the fact t hat Bergson developed his position through two 
different approaches: first, through a psychological per-
spective , 1 and second , through a ttmethod /_by which7 philosophy 
can attempt a real genesis of the i ntellect at the same time as 
2 
of matter . n If, in t his chapter, an attempt is to be made so 
that the goals stated above can be achieved, it is important to 
understand Bergson ' s procedure . 
In the first procedural method, Bergson attenpted--through 
an empirical study of evolution--to arrive at the final develop-
ment of consciousness in both man and animal . According to 
Bergson, t here are other "forms of consciousness" besides the 
consciousness of man . If the consciousnes s indi cative of the 
1 . Bergson, CE, p . 169 . 
2 . Ibid . 
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intellect could be brought together vJi th other forns of 
consciousness, n:an Houid be . able to ''have a vision of life 
complete . 111 It is fr01:1 a '~:Tider conception of consciousness , or 
the "vague nebulosityn surrounaing the intellect, that Bergson 
s01j.ght a secure foundation for t he i ntuitive faculty . 
Through his empirical study of evolution , Ber gson hoped to 
, obtain the original state from 'Hhich the intellect and intuition 
had issued . It is from "consciousness in general," or a 
consciousness 'Hhich is ttcoextensive vlith universal life, 112 that 
intuition a..-r1d the intellect have evolved . This finding 1:ms in-
corporated into his philsophical method : by returning to the 
"'.rider and higher forn of existence" from which t he intellect 
had been cut, Bergson hoped to shm·l vrhy the intellect had 
necessaril;y: developed the \:Jay it had , and , t herefore, vihy it is 
necessarilj[ ill- equipped to comprehend d~ation . Through this 
second procedural method , we are to see , according to Bergson , 
exactly hmv the forn of t he intellect developed. 
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Through the first procedural net hod, i . e . , through an 
empirical study of evolution psychologic~lly orientated, Bergson 
also attempted to shovJ us _ how t he for 1 of t he intellect developed . 
But here, it must be noted, he proceeds through an empirical 
examination, more theoretical t han positive , more external than 
internal' . For example, for Bergson t he intellect is a faculty 
used in order to accomplish the s atisfaction of our needs . The 
intellect does not have a specu lative end but a practical one . 
1 . Ibid ., p . xxiii . 2 . Ibid ., p . 204. 
Therefore, if one i•rere to "postulate action , • • • t he very form 
of the intellect could be deduced from it . ttl In shor.t, the form 
of' the intellect can be dedu ced from its function, and its; 
ftU1ction can be determined through an empirical investigation. 
On the other hand, if intelligence is re- absorbed into the 
principle underlying it, it can 11live back again its ovm 
genesis . 112 But the genesis of the i ntellect involves, at the 
same tine , the genesis of matter . According to Bergson, 
!! intellectuality and materiality have been constituted, in 
detail , by reciprocal adaptation. 113 Since "the detail of matter 
is ruled by the requirements of our action, "4 our vim.; of matter 
is determined through the general form of t he intellect acting 
upon matter . Thus, the intellect and matter stand in a develop-
ing relationship . This being the case, 
as matter is determined by intelligence, as there is 
between them an evident agreement, v.re cannot malce the 
genesis of the one 'i·Ji thout making t he genesis of the 
other . An i dentical process nust have cut out· matter 
and intellect, at the same time, from a stuff that 
constituted both. Into this reality v!e shall get back 
more and more ·completely, in proportion a~ ,,,e compel 
ourselves to transcend pure intelligence . / 
Certainly, in tr~~scending pure intelligence, Bergson is no 
longer proceeding through the empirical method vli th vrhich he 
started his study. In tracing the genesis of the intellect and 
and matter, he contends t~at the very movenent~ to t he intellect's 
1 . Ibid., p . 168 . 2. Ibid. , p . 210 . 
3· Ibid., p . 205 . Ll- . Ibid . 
5. Ibid . , p . 218 . 
final development can nmv be grasped . 1 Further, in the above 
quotation vlhere Bergson speaks about compelling ourselves to 
transcend the intellect, he is speaking about utilizing intu-
ition . Intuition, it ,,;as previously noted, brings one into 
contact vrith the very invmrdness of life, or process, of a 
t hing, i . e . , it attains its absolute essence . The unity and 
multiplicity indicative of duration is understood . In other 
words, internal existence, whether it be of life, t he self, or 
of matter is understood . Through the use of i nt uition, Bergson 
maintains that '\ve can return to the higher and vrider existence 
from which the intellect and matter have been cut . By slowly 
slackening the effort of intuition , i . e . , by the lfdetension" of 
intuition, vie can be brought into the position of seeing hm.; and 
why t he intellect assumes the form it does . Our view of this 
process is no longer external but i nternal, no longer theoretical 
but positive . 
In t he exposition t hat is to follow, it ~~11 be noted that 
there are t-vro forms of consciousness which are exemplified in 
the faculties of intellect and intuition . "Intelligence, Bergson 
states, 11is charged vrith matter and i nst i nct with life . 112 Both 
must be utilized in order to obtain a co~plete view of the range 
of being . If such is the case, then met aphysics, Bergson notes, 
is dependent upon a theory of knouledge . 3 But, through his 
1 . Ibid ., p . xxv . 
2. Ibid ., P• 196 . 
3 · Ibid . 
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second method of procedure, Bergson found that the double form 
of consciousness, ·Hhich had split in two because consciousness 
"had to apply itself to matter at t he same time as it had to 
follovr the stre.am of life, 111 is due to the double fror:J of the 
real . 2 T~us, a theory of knm·Iledg e is dependent upon meta-
physics. Bergson goes on to state that the \·Jay out of this 
circle is through an uempirical study of evolution." 
Sunu:J.arizing, it vras first noted t : at Bergson uses two 
different approaches . in expounding his theories as they are 
contained in Creative Evolution : (1) an empirical method, 
psychologically orientated, and (2) a philosophical nethod in 
\·Jhich metaphysics and a theory of kno1:1ledge are inte:P.dependent . 
In order to find the key to this inte11dependency, Bergson 
inplies t hat an empirical study of evolution is the starting 
point , i . e ., in finding that consciousness divi des itself in its 
"run through matter . 11 The first half of Cr eative Evolution 
follm·rs along the lines of the irst method of inquiry; the 
second half follous the second method . 
In the exposition that is to follovi, Bergson ' s empirical 
method, in which he traces the development of instinct and 
intelligence, itlill be examined. Hovmver, the emphasis \vill be 
placed upon the development of instinct . Next, the intellect 
v7ill be exar.1ined : first, through Bergson ' s findings arrived at 
through an e 1pirical investigation of evol ution, and second, 
1. Ibid . 2. Ibid . 
through his philosophical method , i . e ., th~ough the tracing of 
the genesis of the intellect . It, is to be noted that it is 
difficult to treat Bergson 's development of instinct without , 
in part, treating the collateral development of the intellect. 
Therefore some repetition \iili occur vrhen the intellect is 
examined . Finally, this chapter will conclude \'lith an expo-
sition of the intuition of life . 
2. Instinct 
According to Bergson , no clean- cut distinctions can be 
made betvteen the plant and animal kingdoms •1 Certain character-
istics · vrhich are indicative of one can, in certain cases, be 
found in the other . Nevertheless, he found that . a..···linal life 
was characterized by mobility in space, and the plant world had 
the general tendency of a fixity in location. 2 An examination 
of these t\v-o general tendencies lead Bergson to conclude that 
"bet-vteen mobility an consciousness there is an obvious relation-
sb,ip . n3 The more he found the development of a nervous system 
present , the clearer . vms the consciousnes s that acconpanied 
such a system. This-, he believed, resulted from the fact ti1at. 
reflex and involuntary nervous systems gave ground to inde-
terminism whenever the possibility of choice arose; along with 
the increasing possibility of choice, increasing consciousness 
arose . Thus, Bergson formulated the principle that 11t he 
humblest organism is conscious in proportion to its pov1er to 
1 . Ibid ., p . 117 . 
3. Ibid., p . 122. 
2. Ibid., pp . 120-121. 
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move freely . "- Since plants are generally fixed in their 
location, consciousness is inhibited . On the other hand , 
aninal life , "~:lith the increasing complexity of a nervous 
system , pointed the vray tm·rards the possibility of an increasing 
consciousness . From this, it nay be seen th~t Bergson believed 
in a consciousness as vlide as life, or one that Has coextensive 
vrith universal life . 
Bergson found t hat the evolution of the animal kingdom 
also leads in tvro different directions, to·wards instinct and 
intelligence . 2 Just. as the plant and animal realms contained 
characteristics that viere interpenetrating, so also did he 
believe that instinct and · intelligence ·Here interpenetrating . 
According to Bergson, the "original feature" of the 
intellect is that it is a faculty for "manufacturing artificial 
objects , especially tools to make tools , and of indefinitely 
varying the manufacture . u3 The real end of such construction is 
the satisfaction of our needs . Instinct may be regarded as a 
faculty 'Hith a similar end, but its means for the attainment of 
that end are different . Instead of using artificially constructed 
objects, it makes use of inborn mechanisms . Bergson refers to 
such organs as 11organized instrur1ents . u4 Nan , as an intelligent 
animal, has the ability to manufacture tools so t hat he can cope 
\vi th the various problems '\'lith vrhich he is confronted . Such 
organization requires the use of abstraction, differentiation 
1 . Ibid . , p . 123 . 
3 . Ibid., pp . 153- 154. 
2. Ibid . , p . 149 . 
4 . Ibid . , p . 155. 
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and the ability to use one object for one particular purpose 
or for many . Inborn mechanisms , on t he other hand , appear to 
fit precisely to that ·uhich they are to be applied . 1m extreme 
complexity of organization is found vri thin inborn mechanisms; 
but 1tThile this is true, they appear to function ,.,i th an admirable 
simplicity.l However, t hese structures prove to be invariable , 
and tis may be regarded as a limiting factor . 2 
Instinct , according to Bergson, "carries out .1.urt her the 
'"ork by vrhich life organizes matter . 113 For example, vrhen a 
chick breaks ou t of its shell';: it is carrying out a movement that 
,,.ras present Hithin its embryonic life; at the same time, it uses 
the faculty of instinct . Therefore , Bergson concludes that "the 
most essential of t he primary instincts are really ••• vital 
4 processes . 11 Instinct, if it could become conscious, vmuld give 
us the key to vi tal operations . 5 Hm.·rever, because instinct is 
caught up in t he action of vital processes, consciousness is 
negated . 
It is here that Ber gson develops an extr aordinary t heme : 
there are 11 tvro l{inds of unconsciousness_.u6 It vras previously 
noted that Bergson formulated a principle i n regar d to con~cious -
ness--t he consciousness of the humblest organism increases in the 
same prO'portion as its power to move increases. This reference 
1 . Ibid . 2 . J..1?1£ . 
3. Ibid ., p . 182 . 4. Ibid . 
5. Ibid ., p . 194. 6 . Ibid . , p . 158 . 
to consciousness noi-r needs further qualification . \mile an 
instinctive ~1imal is conscious in certain cases, it is un-
conscious in others . fuen it is unconscious, this does not 
mean, according to Bergson, that consciousness is "absent;" 
instead , consciousness is 11nullified . 111 An inanimate object 
would be representative of an unconsciousness that is absent, 
i . e . , equal to zero, vrhile instinct is representative of a 
nullified consciousness , or unconsciousness . An instinctive 
animal is caught up in the perfornance of actions . If the act 
should be interrupted before its completion, consciousness would 
occur . The representation of the act, or the idea of the act 
"is stopped up by action . 112 When real activity is replaced by 
virtual activity, consciousness arises . 3 
\!That is t he significance of such a vievr? Better still , one 
nay ask the value of this doctrine of unconsciousness? T:'lirst, 
it i·ras noted above tha.t within the instinctive process lies the 
key to the vital operations of life . It vras further noted that 
if instinct could be made conscious, it i·muld give us knm.v-ledge 
of the very heart of life . Instinct, for Bergson, inplies 
lmm·T1edge, but Bergson uses the term uknovrledge,'' in its relation 
to instinct, in a very special i·ray . For example, an instinctive 
animal appears to :Y..noi·T exactly hm·T to deal Hi th its prey. The 
Ammophila seems to know exactly what nerve center of the cater-
pillar must be paxaly~ed .4 Here, knowledge is not explicit but 
1 . Ibiq. 
3 . Ibid . , p . 160 . 
2. Ibid . , p . 159 . 
4 . Ibid . , p . 191. 
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implicit; it is a felt vulnerability that arises vrhen the tvm 
are confronted Hi th each other . If this can be called knovrledge, 
t h en it is 11 l ived rather 1 than represented . " Indeed , Bergson 
states that "instinct is sympathy . 112 Knovrledge , in the case of 
instinct, is acted and unconscious; in the case of intelligence, 
lmmvledge is thought and con scious .. 3 But a very i mportant point 
is to be noted here : so long as. the discussion turns upon 
consciousness, the d ifference bet\·leen instinct and intellect nis 
a difference of degree t han of kind . 11lt Consciousness, therefore, 
is a connecting link bet\•reen instinct and intelligence . l•Ian is, 
in part, an instinctive a."li mal . If consciousness could be intro-
duced into that realm, then man would be able to achieve a 
knov1ledge of vi tal processes never before attainable . He would 
be able to obtain an intuition of life . This is entirely 
possible for the reason t hat "though instinct is not \vi thin the 
domain of intelligence , it is not situated beyond the limits of 
mind . "5 
Let us briefly surrrr. arize vlhat has preceded . First , 
Bergson ' s empirical study of evolution led him to conclude that 
mobility vras one of the prime characteristics of the ani mal 
kingdo~ , and that cons ciousness increas ed in por portion to the 
development of a nervous system. This led _ to t he further 
conclusion that consciousness vras as \vide as life itself . 
1 . Ibid ., p . 193 . 2. Ibid ., p . 19lt . 
3· Ibid ., p . 160 . lt . Ibid ., p . 161. 
5 . Ibid ., p . 192. 
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Second, in his exanination of instinct ru~d intelligence, he 
found that although they utilized different i nstruments in 
achieveing t he ultimate attainnent of wants, they are, never-
theless, situated within the realm of nind . Further, he found 
that consci ousness vias the connecting link between t he t't.vo . 
Third, instinct attains a. lmm:Jledge of life, but such 1mm·rledge, 
because of the lack of consciousness, i . e . , because conscious-
ness is inhibited, is lived rather than thought, implicit r ather 
than explicit . However, such YJlm'lledge is one vTith the vital 
processes of life . Fourth, and last , it was intimated t hat if 
such lmm..rledge could be made explicit, it vmuld reveal the inner-
most secrets of life . This last point 'Hill be further developed 
when, later in this chapter, the discus sion turns to the intu-
ition of life. 
3. Intelligence 
In the follo1·Ting discussion, Bergson ' s account of t he 
development of the intellectual f aculty vrill be exanined through 
t'\'ro different perspectives . First, t hrough an empirical study of 
evolution . Second, t hrough the use of Bergson ' s philosophical 
ethod . Hm1ever, it should be kept in mind that both method-
ological approaches accurately describe man's intellectual 
faculty . 
i . Pragmatic Development of the Intellect 
ccording to Bergson, the appearance of man on earth may be 
ascribed to the time ,.,hen the first i:reapons and tools -v;ere 
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cons_tructed .1 The original and essential feature of human 
intelligence , for Bergson, is the abi l ity to construct artificial 
instruments . In Creative Evolution , as in 1 atter and Hemory, 
the principle set forth i s that the intellect aims at a practical 
end and not a speculative end . .pparently, a study of the 
history of evolution led Ber gson to conclude that "the faculty 
of understanding f:isJ an appendage of the faculty of acting . 112 
Above all else , the intellect seeks "to secure the perf.ect 
,fitting of our body to its environment . 113 To find that the 
intellect is especially adapted t o t he material \·rorld , one need 
not choosE a particular philosophical perspective in order to 
arrive at such a conclusi on. "It is enough," states Bergson, 
11 to take up the point of vie\v of corrunon sense . u4 
In t he previous section , it was noted thc.t instinct appears: 
to be one with the vital processes of life . An instinctive 
animal appears to knm:l the life habits of certain animals; it 
appears to 1movl precisely hov; to attack its prey-. Thus, instinct 
appeared to Bergson to be a faculty t hat achieved an intimate 
knmdedge of life . It involved knmvledge t hat '\ifas: acted and 
unconscious . On the other hand, t he development of a nervous 
system and the i ntroduction of indeterminism i n so far as a 
particular stimulus did not require one course of action, opened 
the . door to ne\v vistas for man. Consciousness vras freed . But 
1 . Ibid., p . 151 . 
3. Ibid . 
2. Ibid . , p . xix. 
l1- . Ibid . , p . 169 . 
if instinct achieved a sympathetic knovrledge of l:Lfe, intelli-
gence only achieves a superficial, external knowledge of it . 
"Instinct," states Bergson , "implies the knowledge of a matter . 111 
By "matt er, tt Bergson means that instinct, sympathetical ly, is 
able to achieve the material essence of the object itself . The 
intellect, on the other hand , revolves around the particular 
object to vmich it relates itself, i . e . , the t hing i n itself . 
It relates the properties of one object to another . Such 
properties are abstracted out· of the concrete content of the 
object . Therefore, for Bergson, intelligence implies a 
2 
"knm·rledge of a form . 11 If the essential feature of intelli-
gence is the construction of artificial objects, i . e ., the 
ability to manipulate unorg~~ized material, it must be able to 
make use of relations . For exe~ple, it mus t have the ability to 
mru{e use of abstracted characteristics; it must be able to relate 
like to like . Therefore, the function of the intellect is to 
establish relations among objects '~fTithout necessarily dealing 
'\vi th the object , qua object . The intellect obtains only a 
knovrledge of appearance, or form . 
In seeking to establish relations among objects, t he 
intellect looses sight of the object itself . Bergson is quite in 
ac cord with the Kantian position that the intellect cannot know 
the thing in itself . However , the form of the intellect, he 
contends , is no mere accident . 3 The intellect is a faculty that 
1 . Ibid ., P• 164. 2 . Ibid . 
3 · Ibid., p . 167. 
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aims at the accomplishment of an action in order to satisfy a 
need . Therefore , if one were to "postulate action ••• the 
very from of the intellect can be deduced from it . 111 
Bergson states that 11 t he '\·Thole of matter is :o.ade to appear 
to our thought as an irmense piece of cloth in which '\·re can cut 
2 
out what 1:1e will and se1:1 it tog.ether. as we please ." The mediur:1 
in i:Thich this is possible must be , according to Bergson , a 
homogeneous and empty one . Further , such a medium is never 
perceived ; it is conceived . 3 Such a medium is space . In order 
for the deconposing and recomposing of matter to take plac·e, 
space is projected behind real extension. 4 For novr, w.e need 
only state that space is not a necessary. prerequisite for the 
perception of an extended · object; this will be treated at 
length in the follovTing chapter of this thesis . It is enough 
to point out that space is nothing more than 11 t he plan of our 
possible action on things ."5 
Bergson accepted the Kantian forms of the sensibility . 
However , Bergson believed that the development of the forms of 
space and time vmre the result of the practical bent of the 
intellect . In other words, they are not ~ priori . Just as 
objects are fixed in space by the intellect, so also did it fix 
real becoming i~ time . 6 Since Bergson believed that an organism 
endures just like our m·m consciousness endures, "the i ntellect 
1 . Ibid., p . 168 . 2 . Ibid., p . 172. 
3· Ibid. l;.. Ibid . 
5. Ibid ., p . 173 · 6 . Ibid., p . 179 . 
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is characterized by a natural inability to comprehend life . ul 
Exactly why the intellectual faculty has necessarily developed 
the vmy it has is the object of discussion in the follovring 
section. 
In conclusion, Bergson ' s whole argumen~ in t he .first half 
of Creative Eyolution, revolves around the view that the 
intellect is a f aculty whose function it is to see us out of any 
difficulty and to s ecure the best fitting of our body into its 
environment . Therefore, the intellect does not have a apecu-
l ative end but a pragmatic one . One of its original features is 
its ability to construct artificial i nstruments. By knovTing the 
function of the intellect and by knowing its essential con-
structions, Bergson seeks to deduce its form . In other '\·lords, 
Bergson asks what must be the form of the intellect if the 
intellect is a faculty for decomposing and recomposing matter . 
His answer to t hat question is t hat the i ntellect itself is an 
artificial construction of t he Kantian type . And it is of the 
Kantian type not because its forms are ~ priori, but because 
its forms are the direct result·. of its function . 
ii . The Genesis of the Intellect 
The second procedural method t hat Bergson uses in Creative 
Evolution may nO'H be examined. Iatter, accordi ng to Bergson, 
lends itself to being regarded as composed of distinct entities . 
The intellect readily avails itself of su ch a vievr. The raore 
1. Ibid ., p . 182 . 
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intellect regards natter as composed of distinct ent ities, the 
more its ovm concepts tend to become distinct . Natter assumes 
the form of extension adjoining extension; 1 indeed, such is 
the vlork of positive science, i . e ., to cut up matter into all 
its possible articulations . These clear, juxtapositional 
articulations, given to the philosopher by t he scientist, are 
accepted a.s fact . 2 If the philosopher accepts these clear-cut 
distinctions as fact, and if he is at the sene time to attenpt 
to find the nature of the intellect, he has limited himself to 
a mechanical view of the understanding . And he has done so 
because in attenpt i ng to deduce the form of the i ntellect from 
its achievements, he has already prejudiced his conclusions . 
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Not only, then, is the nature of matter predeternined for the 
philosopher, but also t he nature of the intellect is predetermined 
for him. 
It is at this point that Ber gson asks us to return to the 
higher and vrider form of existence f r om uhich the intellect has 
been cut . 3 The method by which this is to be attained is through 
the use of intuition , and the object of this intuition is the 
durational self . Through an effort of intuition, according to 
Bergson, '\ve return to pure duration. 4 Once this is achieved, 
the effort of intuition may be relaxed . The self, i•rhose parts 
had been interpenetrating , is nov1 broken up and scattered . 
Recollections become external to one another in the same 
1 . Ibid . , p . 207 . 2 . Ibid . , p . 213 . 
3 · ~. , p . 218 . 4. Ibid . , p . 219. 
porportion that t hey become fixed; "our personality thus 
descends in the direction of space .nl 
According to Bergson, if the tension and strain of the 
effort of intuition \'l'ere relaxed completely , "absolute passivity" 
vmuld be achieved . bsolute passivity may be regarded as that 
'Hhich is completely devoid of duration . The self, hm..rever , 
never achieves such a state of instantaneity , i . e ., an existence 
which is born and dies Ul1Ceasingly . 2 Yet, matter is regarded 
in such a vray . But even such a vievl of matter is erroneous for 
''analysis resolves it ffiattey into elementary vibrations, the 
shortest of vft1ich are of very slight duration, almost vanishing, 
but not nothing . 113 
Bergson ' s next step is to regard both the self and matter 
vTithin a durational medium. Natter may be regarded as having a 
dissipated durational status, and the self may be viewed either 
from the perspective o..f pure duration , or as descending in the 
direction o..f a passivity ivhich contains juxtapositioned states . 
The direction that materiality takes vri thin a durational 
mediUl~ is thus s·een to be the sarae direction that the solidified 
ego , representative of intellectuality , takes when the tension 
of intuition is relaxed . According to Bergson, '~:Then the 
durational tension of the self is relaxed, the self moves in the 
direction of the extended. Matter is nothing but this movement 
pushed further, and "physics is simply psychics inverted . 114 
1 . Ibid., p . 221 . 
3· IQisl. 
2 . Ibid . , p. . 220 . 
11- . Ibid., p. 221 . 
Space is already an implicit ideal of the mind , that is, of the 
mind ' s mm "detension, " vrhich is another vray of saying the 
mind 's 11 extension . 111 
Summarizing thus far, Bergson found that "'fTi thin a durational 
medium matter and the self could be related. Matter differs 
from spirituality in the degree of durational tension present . 
m intensified duration is indicative of the self, vn1ile a 
dissipated duration is indicative of matter . The latter is the 
inverse Bovement of the former vri thin a durational scale of 
being. The idea of space results from the mind 's 11detension, 11 
or 11 extension. 11 
Proceeding further, Bergson states that "the mind finds 
space in things," but could have come upon it itself through the 
2 inversion of its own movement if it ,.rere pushed far enough. 
The idea of space and the spatiality of things result from the 
detension of duration . Exactly vrhat Bergson means must be 
postponed until the next chapter vJhere the exposition turns to 
matter . It is enough to point out that matter aids the mind to 
achieve the form of space vlhich is contained in mind as an 
implicit idea. Further, mind carries the idea of space to its 
ideal limit once it receives the i mpetus from matter . Hatter 
itself, it r.rust be remembered , tends tov;ards homogeneity, and 
it is characterized accurately enough within such a medium. 
Once in pos~ession of the idea of space, mind uses it whenever 
1. Ibid. 
2. !bid. 
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the denands of action require it . 1 Thus it is that the 
intellectuality of mind and the materiality of things are 
naturally adapted to each other ; they result from "the same 
inversion of the sane movement ,"2 i . e ., the 11detension, u or 
"extension ," or "interruptionu of the flov; of duration • 
.., 
~. Intuition and Life 
It '\'Tas noted earlier that intelligence is ucharged 11 '\·Ti th 
matter , and instinct is "charged" vii th life . In order to get 
the double essence of both, both nust be squeezed together . 
Therefore, metaphysics_ vras dependent upon a theory of knO'\vledge . 
On the other hand , Bergson found that consciousness had divided 
either into intuition or intelligence, and that the double form 
of consciousness "Vras due to the double form of t he real, i . e . , 
consciousness turned either in the direction of matter or life. 
Therefore, a theory of lmovrledge '\'Tas dependent upon metaphysics.. 
The way out of this circle is an empirical study of evolution. 
And it vras., for Bergson , an empirical study of evolution that 
revealed the Hay in '\·rhich consciousness had split up , either in 
the direction of instinct or intellect . 
The present exposition has brought us up to the point where 
instinct and intelligence have divided . Now the problem is to 
bring intelligence and intuition together vli thin the human 
mind . The key to this relationship is Bergson ' s theory of 
consciousness . Man nay be an intelligent animal , but he is also 
1. Ibid., pp. 221- 222 . 
2. ~., pp . 225- 226 . 
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an instinctive animal . It VIas noted earlier that instinct and 
intelligence are never found in pure states; "they are 
tendencies and not things ."1 If :wan \·rer.e able to utilize his 
own instinctive tendency, he \·TOuld be able to achieve an intimate 
knovrledge of vi tal processes . Ho\<Tever, 1-rhile t he i ntellect moves 
in the realm of consciousness , instinct, it vras seen , is caught 
up in action and is unconscious . Consciousness is inhibited in 
the case of instinct . If the sympathy of instinct "could extend 
its object and reflect upon itself, it vrould give us the key to 
vital operations . 112 It can with the introduction of conscious-
ness . Bergson redefines intuition as "instinct t hat has become 
disinterested, self- conscious, capable of. reflecting upon its 
object and of enla!'ging it indefinitely . 113 Consciousness in man 
arises_ '\vhen real action gives Hay to virtual action. vlhen 
consciousness turns tovmrds :oatter and shapes itself into 
intellect , "it externalizes itself in relationship to itself . 114 
In other vrords, this "externalized" consciousness grasps only 
the external relations of its own self , i . e . , it views its own 
ego as an ego composed of juxtaposed states . The same may be 
said of vi tal processes . Hm·rever, once consciousness is freed 
from the vice that action holds it in, "it can turn im·rards on 
itsel~ and awaken the potentialities of intuition which still 
slumber '\ri thin it . u 5 In this \·ray, the individual is brought 
1. Ibid., p . 151. 2 . Ibid. , p . 194. 
3· Ibid . 4. Ibid . , p . 200 . 
5. Ibid . 
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into contact ., .. lith the very im·;ardness of life. 
The significance of this developnent of intuition is that 
Bergson novT presents solid ground upon \vhich intuition can 
stand . \ihile Bergson refers to intuition as "an indefinite 
series of actsn1 in the Introduction, he no·H Defers to it as a 
11faculty . 11 2 The question arises as. to Hhether or not intuition 
and instinct are synonymous terms . Indeed, Professor Flev1elling 
maintains that instinct and intuition are synonymous. 3 No 
doubt a strong argument can be made that instinct and intuition 
are synonynous terms in Bergson ' s philosophy. But, on the other 
hand , there can be no doubt that Bergson does not intend this 
to be the case just as he certainly 'l:lould ·deny that instinct 
and intelligence are synonymous terms . Bergson ' s examination of 
instinct and i ntelligence in relation to consciousness, it may 
be recalled, \:Jas fror.1 a psychological perspedtive . As long as 
this vras true, Bergson contended that they differed merely in 
degree . The same r.1ay be said of instinct and intuition: as 
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long as Bergson examines them from a psychological perspective, 
they differ merely in degree , i . e ., in the degree that conscious-
nes~ is present . It is in t~is sense that instinct can be 
11 enlarged and purified into intui tion. 114 Hovmver., \vi th the 
1 . Bergson, IM , p . 46-. 
2 . Bergson , CE, p . 195. 
3· Ralph Fle\·Telling, Bergson and Pel~sonal Realism The bingdon Press, 1920), p . 8~ (Hei.·T York : 
4. Bergson, CE, ~ . 195. 
introduction of consciousness into instinct, instinct is no. 
longer instinct-- it is intuition, the ''vague nebulosity" 
surrounding the "luminous nucleu~ 11 of intelligence .1 
In conclusion, the intuition of the self, which vras 
discussed in the second chapter of this thesis, is already- the 
intuition of life . Where the two dif~er is in the fact that 
here intuition takes "life in general for its object . 112 Just as 
the mechanical forms of the understanding failed to obtain the 
true nat~re of the self, so too does it fail in attempting to 
achieve a kno"l'rledge of the nature of vi tal processes. Life, 
Bergson tells us , is continual grovrth , "reciprocal interpene-
tration" and "endlessly continue creation. 113 In short, 11the 
organism vrhich lives is a t ?-ing that endures, 114 and it is_ 
intuition vrhich introduces us into that realm. 
5. Sunmary 
Thre:e important areas of Bergson' s philosophy were examined 
in this chapter: (1) Bergson 1 ~ s nethodological approach in 
Creative Evolution; (2) the application of this nethod in the 
enpirical examination of the evolution of consciousnes_s as- it is 
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displayed in instinct and intelligence, and the ideal genesis of 
the intellect which necessarily established the development of the 
intellect; (3) and, finally, Bergson ' s development of instinct 
into intuition. 
1 . Ibid . 
3. Ibid. , p . 195. 
2 . I.biq . ' p . 191!-. 
4. Ibid . , p. 19 . 
First, it w s-: noted that Bergson maintains that metaphysics 
is dependent on a theory of lmovrledge , and a theory of lLnowledge 
is dependent upon metaphysic~. This resulted fron the fact that 
there is a double form of consciousness, exemplified in intellect 
and i ntuition , jus·t as·. there is a doubJ.:.e form of reality, 
exemplified in matter and spirituality. For Bergson, the way 
out of the circle waS' an enpirical investigation o.f life and, 
ultimately , a theory of life . While an emp±rical inves~tigation 
of life shovls us the development of the forLl of the intellect, 
the ideal genesis of t h e intellect sho\'TS us the necessity of 
its development in its present form . 
Second, an empirical investigation of t h e development of · 
consciousness shovred that - instinct vras · moulded on the very 
content of life, vlhile the i ntellect revolved around it. .An 
instinctive animal appeared to have an i mplicit, innate 
lmovrledge of vi tal processes . The intellect is geared tmvnrds. 
action; it ains at decomposing and recomposing matter in order 
to satisfy our wants, i.e ., the secure fitting of our body into 
its environnent . According to Bergson, no complicated philo-
sophical position need be adopted in order to see that the form 
of the intellect can be deduced from its function. In the ideal 
genesis of t h e intellect, Bergson attempted to show us exactly 
hmi the intellect nec.essarily adopted its present form . From 
the intuition of our ovm durational selves, i . e . , after returning 
to the higher and vrider existence from '\'lhich t h e intellect '\vas. 
cut , Bergson attet1pted to shm·r the internal eg9lution of the 
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intellect . Both intellect and matter are, at once, the 
interruption , or (what is the same for Bergson) , the reverse 
movement of the impulsion of consciousness . Hatter lends it-
self to being vie'\·ied as a discrete multiplicity , as extension 
adjoining extension , and intellect carries t his i npetus to its 
ideal end, i . e ., the development of the form of space . 
Third ' · instinct and intellect were seen to be cut out of 
a higher and vTider form of existence--a consciousness in 
general rlhich is coextensive ivith universal life . Thus it viaS 
that instinct and intelligence could be related; in so far as 
consciousness i·ras concerned , they differed merely in degree . 
Man , by projecting consciousness into his instinctive faculty, 
caused that faculty to become transformed into an intuitional 
one . The implicit, u..n.conscious .. kn.m·;ledge of instinct became 
the explicit, conscious knmviedge of intuition. 
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CHAPTER IV 
DTTUITIO.- OF l ATTER 
1 . Intuition, Dt1ration, and Perception 
In Chapter II of this thesis, it ·Has pointed out that for. 
Bergson intuition is the quest for finding 11true duration u 
In thB.t chapter, Bergson 1·s conception of duration \vas prinarily 
talcen fron Tine and Free Hill and the Introduction. In both 
of these worlcs, duration and its relation to the psychical. life 
o·f the self vras one of Bergson ' s primary concerns . In Chap tel!· 
III of this thesis, duration uas related to the evolutionary 
:mover2ent underlying life, particularly as it is contained in 
Creative Evolution. It no·w renains for us to exanine, in l~att.er 
.§!ld r.;enory, duration as it relates to matter and hovr matter 
relates to intuition. 
Before entering into such a discussion, one is confronted 
vrith the problen of relating ttpure perceptionn1 to intuition . 
\mat must be deternined is vrhether or not these tuo terms are 
to be considere s~1onyriloua. Bergson tell s us. that i n pure 
perception the subject is one uith the object of lmm·rledge, 
and that pure perception ttplunges roots deep into t h e real . 11 2 
He goes so far as to call pure perception a "series of instan-
taneous visions n3 and an "instantaneous i ntuition . 114 Cor1pli-
eating matters nore, the doctrine of pure perception is a 
1. Bergson, MH, p . 51 . 
3. Ibid., p . 52. 
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2 . Ibid . , p . 56 . 
4. Ibid . , P • 53. 
theoretical construct and is not to be co11..:fused "~:Ti th concrete 
perception. 1 Is intuition , then , only a theor etical construct? 
If 11 pure perception11 is synonynous Hith intuition , then t his 
'\·muld appear to be the case . In the follovring discussion, it 
\Till be our contention that intv_ition is not synonyr:1ous Hi th 
pure perception , and that in 1' atter and l·.!:emory, Bergson con-
ceives of intuition in t·vro ways : ( 1 ) intuition as a functioning 
faculty , and (2 ) intuition as a theoretical construct . 
Bergson developed a theory of pure perception for an 
important reason: to bring about a reconciliation betv-een 
materialistic realisw and subjective idealis= . Ac cordine to 
Bergson , subjective idealism regaxds our perceptions as being 
composed of quali t CJ.ti ve , inextensi ve psychic states ':rhile 
materialistic realis~ regards the perceived LU!iverse as capable 
of being resolved into the Quantitative and the honogeneous . 2 
The for Jer school derives the seconc:' vievr fro:::1 the first vrhile 
the latter school derives the first vie"~:T fron the second . 
Bergson finds that both s chools proceed inade~uately . 3 Instead , 
he believed that his theory of pure perception could a c t as a 
mediating ground between the tvro . vlithin a durational scale 
of being , there is a uniform transition betvreen the homogeneous 
and the heterogeneous , bet·Heen quality and quantity and 
betvreen matter and meL'lory . Pure perception 
1. Ibid ., pp . 51- 52. 
2. I bid ., p . 175. 
3· I bi • 
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may be viewed as the vehicle that brings the percipient towards 
the homogeneous end of the durational scale of being . 
Bergson believed that if one could return to an un-
distorted immediacy, i . e ., an in1r:1ediate contact Hith materiality 
itself, and before enory "contracts external :::aments into a 
s ingle internal mooent 111 and , at the same tit1e, adds to per-
ception by borro·wing froLl previous perceptions ·vrhich then go to 
overlay i nrJediate perceptions, one could have pure perception. 
The subjective side of perception vroulcl be neg ated, but the 
objective side of perception i:rou ld remain . Hm·rever, it i:Tas 
noted above that vrhen Bergson speaks about an "instantaneous 
intui tion112 and an 11 i rJJ!1ediate intuition, n3 he is speaking about 
a theoretical type of intuition. He tells us, for exanple, 
" that in pure perception 1ve are actually placed outside our-
selves, 1·re touch the reality of the object in an i ·~ediate 
intui tion. 114 ... t the same tine, he tells us that pure perception 
is an 11 exaggeration. 11 5 
Bergson also speaks about "concrete perception. 11 6 Here, 
menory , or the subjective side of perception, is restored to 
the percipient . Bergson no l onger refers to an i mnediate or 
an instantaneous intuition; instead, he refers to a " single 
intuition117 cmd one 11relatively simple intuition. 11 8 From the 
preceding , \ ·Ie may , not I·Ii thout reason, state that for Bergson 
1. Ibid ., p . 19~ 2. Ibid . , p . 53. 3· Ibi . , pp . 53, 
4. Ibid ., p . 63 . 5. Ibid . , p . 52. 6. Ibid ., p . 216. 
-
7- Ibid., pp . 60 , 216 . 8. Ibid ., p . 56 . 
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63 . 
pure perception is to instantaneous intuition 'Hhat concrete 
perception is to simple intuition. Our intuition , then, al"~.-iays 
contains the subjective element of nernory . 
A new problem arises : if intuition contains a subjective 
element, i . e ., memory , hovr is such an intuition capable of 
bringing us into contact with objective reality? Bergson ' s 
ansvrer to this problem must be held aside for the present moment 
until duration is related to matter ~~d to perception. It is in 
the nedium of duration t hat Bergson seeks to reconcile this 
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problem. On the side of matter, the discussion t hat follows '\·rill 
center on Bergson ' s concept of rhythm. On the side of perception, 
the discussion '\vill center on Bergson ' s concept of tension.. And , 
finally , Bergson ' s answer to the above problem will be found in 
the discussion that follows, intuition and matter . 
i . The Concept of Rhythm 
In Time and Free Hill , it vias previously noted, Bergson 1 s 
vieH of externality ·Has held to be quite apart from the 
durational flovr of the self . Outside of the self 
' 
there was 
only pure honogenei ty and duration or real process ·Has. non-
existent . Hovrever , this vievr vras modified not only in Creativ~ 
Evolution but also in Hatter and Memory . lmile matter may lend 
itself to being , carved into independent bodies, such divisions, 
1 
conceived within determined outlines, are artificial ones . 
vfuen conceived as atoms or particles , our view of matter is a 
result of over conceptualizing which arises out of our ovm needs. 
1 . Ibid., p. 192. 
Instead, if one ·y,ere to regard matter as reducible to i·raves of.· 
energy or in terns of force, science i·muld move closer. to the 
continuity underlying nature . Further, s-LlCh a continuity, if 
it could be related to the continuity foUJ."ld underlying our ovm 
psychical states, i·muld be an invaluable asset for Bergson : 
i·ri thin a durational :oediU:r.l , natter and the self could meet . 
In Chapter II of this thesis, the quQlitative heterogeneity 
of psychic states was exais i n ed . \I L1ile t hes e states 1.·1ere 
con~i ered by BeTgson to be an organic developing process , nove-
ment, as regarded by science, t urned out td be mere illusion. 
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I ndeed , at one time Bergson hinself could not B.ccount f or external 
process. Hm·rever, Bergson novr tells us that real movements are 
qualitative . 1 Stated another vmy, it is the qualitative that 
contains movenent . 2 Pure perception "~:rould give us the irhole of 
matter in Hhatever qualitative characteristics yet a part of it 
uhile concrete perception , utilizing intuition and consciousness , 
'\•rould give us sonething close to this qualitative 1·1hole '\·rhich 
vmuld be adequate enough to characterize it . 3 
The duration of the successive n onents o:L tin e of this 
external continuity displays a quality not "'Hi t hout some likeness 
4 to the continuity of our oim consciousness • " One o_ t he 
differences bet·ween t h e tivo is the rhyth.D of these Tioven ents . 5 
1 . Ibid ., p . 193 · 2. Ibid ., p . 201 . 
3. Ibid ., p . 58 . L.. Ibid ., p . 198 . •• 
5. Another , discussed in the section t:.1at follows, is tension . 
As one moves to one of the ideal limits of duration--pure 
homogeneity--one would find , according to Bergson, that the 
rhythn, or internal vibrations of these movements , reverberate 
faster . The duration of the self is lived at a much slO\ver 
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rhythm . Our consciousness has a duration vrith its ovm relatively 
determined rhythm because menory condenses uan enormous multi-
plicity of vibrations . 111 That duration iifhich vibrates at a 
faster beat has the tendency merely to react ·with the result 
that there is no possibility of choice, and deterninism results . 
If, in concrete perception, one vrere to ideally divide the 
durational span of time to that exemplified in matter, the 
individual -r,·rould be one uith matter , memory i·rould be eliminated, 
and pure perception i·rould result . 2 The subjective side of 
perception would also have been eliminated . 
ii . The Concept of Tension 
It is only t he next step from Bergson 1 s concept of rhythrn 
to his conceJ t of tension. In pure perception , it vras noted, 
the percipient -r,muld be Hi thin materiality itself, subject and 
object rmiting . Perception , hovrever , is never instantaneous . 
Memory performs the function of contracting for consciousness 
an infinitely diluted reverberation , or rhythm, of qualitative 
movement , which borders on the repetitious, into a contracted 
duration , qualitatively enriched because of its contraction. 
Thus, meEory introduces the concept of tension or contraction . 
The tendency of dissipated, qualitative s~read-outness is , 
1 . Bergson , MM, p . 57 . 2. Ibid . 
reverting to metaphor , suallm·red up by the subjective eleTient--
r.1emory--lri thin concrete perception. 
The develop .wnt of conscious a'\·rareness points to a slm·rer 
duration.al rhythD t han that '\·Thich is containeC: in nere :r:mterial 
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being . In turn, depending upon the 11aifferent kinds of conscious-
ness 111 to '\·Thich one uay refer, a slov;er or faster rhythn is 
found and, therefore , a difference in the degree of tension or 
elasticity . 2 It vmuld appear that the ideal linits of duration 
vmuld depend upon the degree of tension contained '\·Ti thin 
duration . J.:oving towards _onogeneity or pure repetition, an 
attenu~ted duration is fou_~d . In the opposite direction, the 
ideal limit reached is i·lhat Bergson calls 11 eterni ty, n3 or a 
d ration '\·Thich he also terns 11 supr aconscious. n4 It vras noted 
earlier t hat Bergson uses the terns perception and intuition 
interchangeably, and that there are tuo levels of each--theoretical 
cu.'1d functioning . The following chart relates perception and 
its equivalent intuitional term to duration. The first line 
is to be regarded as t~eoretical perception; the second line is 
is to be regarded as functioning perception. 
PE.. CEPTION DURATIOH r ·JTUITIOIT 
Pure Perception Attenuated Duration Instantaneous Intuition 
Concrete Perception Intensified Duration Simple Intuition 
In the above chart , instantaneous intuition or pure 
1 . Ibid., p . 203 . 2 . Ibid . 
3. Bergson, IM, p . 49 . 4 . Bergson, CE, p . 284. 
crception ioJOUld be one 1:ii th natter . Hatter, hmvever, is never 
pure repetition; it contains ~n attenuated duration , i . e ., it& 
rhytt raic beat ten-s to be repetitious and its tension tends 
tm·rards "detension. ul There is, t hen, some degree of tension 
on t h e side of matter hm·rever attenuated is i ·ts duration. On 
t h e side of intuition, an instantaneous intu ition 1'JOu ld be the 
intuition of a being 11i th an attenuated duration , uhich is 
another 1.ray of sayi ng a being \•Ji t hout cons cious m.-areness . 
Sin1ple intuition or concrete perc eption introduces the 
addition of Dor-10ry .- lienory, it vras noted , is t hat '\·Thich contract s 
na m.unber of external monents into a single internc::..l no1.1ent . 1 2 
The result is an i n tensification of duration, and it is only 
v!here t here is such an intensification of duration that t he 
possibility of sinple or concrete intuition can arise . 
Perception is no longer i n things, i . e ., subject and object are_. 
no longer to be considered as one; perception is vrithin the 
self . Thus , n emory Drovides the ground for a uidening 
consciousness ancl. , a t t h e san e tine , for the developuent of 
instantw~eous intuition into simple i n t u ition. 
2 . Intuition ancl 1·1atter 
A. recurrent t~1ene i n Bergson t s \vork s is t 1at natter tends, 
to-vrards pure ho:r:1ogenei ty as an ideal limit . A f.evr more i·rords. 
needs to be said about t~lis particular kind of hor..1ogenei ty . 
Homogeneity ·Has previously r elc::.ted to the intellect ancl form 
of t h e i ntellect in the disc1~ ssion con t a ined in the preceding 
1 . Ibid., p . 221 . 2 . Bergson 1-J I , p . 19 . 
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chapter of t is thesis . It "~.-.r o. s noted that spa.ce , as an 
intellectual for. , arose both naturally ancl. artificially, i . e . , 
matter i tsclf tGndeJ tm·m.rds honogenei ty readily avc.iling itself 
to t h e i ntellect vrhich t .. en carried suc.1 a vieu to its i deal 
end, and t he intellect itself i s played a tendency tm·;ar ~ s 
spatial for 1 as a result "of its m·m natural movement . 111 Let 
us nov1 regard honogene.ity solely from the pers:~ective of natt.er . 
vlhen \ ·Te o, Bergson tells us that here hor.:ogenei ty neans c::. 
slackened duration, i . e ., a 1u ration \:lhich lac ·~s tension and 
vuich has an internal rhythm tending tou.rds necessity. 2 
Bergson believed that tension reconciled the difference between 
qualita tive conscious states and matter regarded as quantitative 
J:J.ovement . 3 Further, unless q_ualities are placed \·Tit ... in n ove-
nents , sone type of pre-establishe ~ harr. ony uust be appealed 
to i__ ore cr to bril''lg qualitative conscious st 2.tes into a true 
knowledge relat ionship 1'Ti th the quantitative lJ erspecti ve of 
science . 4 Bergson ' s solution to this problen, then, was. to 
vie\·r real n oven ent or durational f lm·i as containing quality 
accor ing to t __ e egree of tens ion pr esen t t el"ein. 
If i:.."latter is to be regarded fro r:.: a durc.ticnal pers)ective, 
thm \·,·hat is its relationship to extensity? Further, what is 
t h e relationship betvreen material extensity and space? First, 
natter is not purely extended;5 second, extensity and space 
1 . Be.rgsqm , . cE , p . 221. 2. Bergs_on, J.J_ , p . 199. 
3 . Ibid., p . 177. 4-. Ibi ., p . 201 . 5. Ibid., p . 181. 
. 1 
are not synony.-.1ous terns for Bergson . Dealing vTit_l t h e latter 
first (th e second rela tions:1.ip), Bergson believed that 11 space 
is r:J.erely conceived112 and is not an essential elenent either 
i n regard to 1:1atter or our lc.YJ.O'\Iledge of matter . Thus , he states 
t hat 
honogen eous s pace and hor::ogeneous tin.e are t i1en neither 
prOl)erties of things nor essen tial conditions of our 
faculty of 1mm·ring t~e - ~ :they express, in abstract 
form , t :.e double \·iorl: of solidificati~n and of division 
·which 1·1e effect on t h e L..1oving conti nuity of the real . 3 
According to Bergson, "perfect s patiality," i . e ., pure 
space, 1-rould be sonething '\'lh ich 1;TOUld e:::ist if there uere, in 
t h e rmterial un iverse, "a perfect externality of parts i n their 
relation to one another ••• ~o!f cor:J.plete reciprocal inde-
l..t-pendcnce.11 But matter is not of such a genre . Hatter 
' 
' 
considered i n t er ms of force, is interpenetrating , and recipro-
cal i nfluen ces do exist . 
Tl..U'ninc: to t he first : ela tionship l isted above, Bergson 
notes that material extensity is not 11 t hat , conposite extensity 
uhich :Ls cons i dered i n geon etry. 11 5 It is the perceiving mind 
t hat outlines , i n distinct for:o , ·Hhat are t ermed the distinct, 
characteristic properties of natter . But such cha.racteristics 
are cut out of e. l a r ger \·Thole--the 1mrld of nul tiple pb j ects, 
m~YJ. , trees, stones and atoms t hus make t h eir appearance. All 
appear extended . Extension , for Bergson , is not mere spatial 
spread- out ness. Su ccinctly, Bergson ofi nes e::::tension "as a 
/ 
1 . I bi d ., • 182 . 
4. Ber gson, CE, p . 222 . 
2 . Ibid . 3. Ibid ., p • . 207 . 
5. Bergson, .J.·I , p . 176 . 
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tensj_on \rhich is interrupted . 111 Vie-vred, t l1en, "i·ii thin a durational 
medhun , 11 extensi ty is prior to spnce, 11 and space is that some-
t ing 1·rhich 11'\ve stretch bene nth nat erial continuity. 112 Homo-
geneous spa.ce is idee.l space and ideal s:;ace adnits of degree.3 
That is, as tension begins to 11detend 11 itself, extensity and 
spatial relationships develop. Such a development is not 
contained "i"Tithin an intuitional perspective but is the result of 
an intellectual one . 
Bergson speaks about ttan e~·tended conti nm .. ID; 114 this 
continuun, vrhich is t:_e real material nniverse, is not to be 
conceived of as individuated extension . On the other hand, the 
real that is given i n perception is not pur e ine::::tensity for 
such purity cnn belong only to supraconsciousness . Therefore, 
Bergson states that 
That vrhich is given, that v.:rhich is real, is sonething 
internediate beti·men divided e::tension and pure in-5 extension. It is vrhat vre had termed the extensive . 
The diversity of sensible qualities or "concrete; extensity" 
is not to be regarded as e:..:.:..sting 'l.·ri t :J.in a spatial J.l1,ecliUll1--
"rather is it space that vJe tl1rust into extensity . u6 This being 
the case' \•Then Bergson s:peal~s about nateriali ty as tending 
tovrarcls hor:ogenei ty, uhat does he mean by "ho:Lloeenei ty 11 ? Instead 
of regarding hOI:.logeneity fron a spatial or intellectual per-
spective, it ,.-011ld- be "i·rell to regard it from a durational 
perspective , i . e ., _1ot::ogeneity results fron, borrovring Bergson 's 
1. Bm .. "gson , CE, p . 267 . 2. Bergson , 1-n: , p . 227 . 
3· Bergson, CE 
' 
p . 225. 4. Bergson, l·J l ' p . 228 . 
5. Ibid ., p . 241 . 6. Ibid ., p . 214. 
term, detensi f'i cation . The difference , t h en, betvJeen extensity 
and ine:{tensity is the difference beh·reen 3.11 attenue.ted duration 
and an intensified duration . 
The question raised o.t the begiP..ning of this chapter Eay 
no'H be re-exa.ni!led . It ;as noted that pu.re perce)tion or 
i nstantn11eous int-t.:.i tion Hould give us :w.c:.teriali ty itself . r,he 
question is uhether sinple intuition or intuition conplico.ted 
by ncnory can give us this s ar1e objective material reality . 
On Bergson ' s account, if matter is regarded in terDs of the 
degree of tension containeC' 111i thin duration , si rple intuition 
can give us materi ality as it r eally exists . The difference 
bet1·reen pure ~Jerception and concrete perception is a difference 
in r e6ard to tension. On the sid e of r:atter, pure honogeneity 
na:l be rej ected--r.mterial entities do exert reciprocal influ-
ences upon each other . The difference bet1·reen the concrete 
exter.sity of siruple intuition, i . e . , qualitative discernibility 
resultinG fron the introduction of met!ory , and the indivisible 
exte;~s i ty of the qualitative 'Hhole is also to be vieiied as a 
difference in the degree of tension present . Therefore , tension 
is the nediating principle betvreen sinple intuition and the 
qualitative extensive \·-hole . Concrete extensity differs froJ.il 
the quLli tati ve extensive vrhole :r.1erely a s a 11r elation of the 
part to the vrhole . nl Fron this it follm·rs tho.t instantaneous 
intuition anc't its object, t he IJ.aterial universe or the indi-
visible e::tensive Hhole, differ merely in degree 1r01~ s i nple 
1 . Ibid . , p . 58 . 
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intuition and its object, concrete extensity. Lntuition, 
duration , and natter are related to e2..ch other in the follm-ring 
c _art . Seen from the perspective of i ntuition, the first line 
is to be regarded as being theoretical; t he second line refers 
to ftmctioning intuition. 
JU.l. TIOr l1ATTER I~;TUITIOH 
Attenuated Indivisible Extensive vJhole Instantaneous 
Intensified Concrete Extensity Simple 
Since the perspective of the above chart is that- of intu-
ition, it is to be noted that the indivisible extensive whole 
is truely characteristic of t he real . It is not a t heoretical 
construct . In conclusion, vThile concrete extensity may be 
regar ded as the content of perception , the indivisible extensive 
vTholE~ is not such a content--in instantaneous i n t uition, the 
subject and object unite; subject becomes t he object . 
3. Intuition, Consciousness, and :t-iatter 
The method of procedure in t he previous sections of this 
chapter has been an atte:r:1pt to relate; Hit hin a durational 
mediw':l , t :1e representation of r:1atter , .. ,i th matter o.s . it really 
exists . Bergson's conception of rhythrJ and tension was an 
' endeavor to reconcile vThat the idealists call a representation 
1·1ith vrhat the realists call a thing •1 Pure perception, accord-
ing to Bergson , places one vrithin matter its elf v.rhile pure 
memory penetrates the realn of spirit . Our concern has been in 
1 . Ibifh., p . xi. 
the forner realm., that is, vTi th the doctrine of pure per-
ception. 
According to Bergson, it is "in concrete perception 
Cth&.tJ :memory intervenes . 111 Instantaneous intuition or pure 
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perception , it was noted above , is merely a t heoretical construct, 
and the subjective element--nenory-- wa.s found lack ing . 11 0ur 
• 
11 B t t 11b · b b · 1 112 conscJ.ousness , ergson s a es, egJ.ns y eJ.ng on y menory. 
Since our consciousness can arise only vrt1ere memory lS present , 
it follov:s that in instantaneous intuition consciousness as i·Te 
lmovr it cannot be present . Indeed, if the subject unites 'vith 
the object of perception , t he self identity of the subject 
Simple intuition does contain the element of memory, and, 
therefore, consciousness is present . Such a consciousness, 
Bergson offers, is one that is not concerned 'Hi th the exigencies 
of life . 3 Instead , it is a conscio"t+sness ,.,hich gives its un-
divided attention to vibrating , qualitative movements . Conscious-
ness of the qualitative can arise only uhere an i nfinitely 
diluted e::--istence is condensed into the monents of an intenser 
life . 4 
In .•Iatter and Henor;z:, as in Creative Evolution, Bergson 
postulates a rising consciousness vri th the development of a 
nervous systeL1 in Hhich there is greater complication. 
1 . Ibid., p . 216 . 
3. Ibid., p . 205 . 
2 . Ibid . Italics mine . 
4 . Ibid • , p • 204. 
nconsciousness, 11 he states , 11neans virtual action . 111 It is only 
Hhere real action, or ir:u:1ediate reaction, is modified that. 
consciousness as "\:Je knm·I it can arise . Hovi, then, is such a 
consciousness related to simple intuition? 
The mediating l;rinciple, it i:ras noted earlier, bet\·reen 
qualitative conscious states and quantitative honoe;eneous oove-
ments is tension . But tension, according to Bergson, can arise 
only vJhere there i s some degree of consciousness present . 2 
Hhile consciousness in nan can arise only '\'Then _ eal action gives 
ground to virtual action , there nust be some kind of conscious-
ness present a t the lower levels of the scale of being if 
Bergson is still to speak about tension . Thus, Bergson must 
refer to "different kinds of consciousness .u3 In sum, there 
nust be c ifferent :inds of consciousness present \ •Ti thil"l a 
durational scale of being if rhythm and tension, differing in 
various degrees, are also present within such a scale . 
Vieued vTithin a durational perspective, it can be seen that 
7E 
our consciousness is cut out of a \•rider or nore diluted conscious-
ness . This is precisely Bergson ' s position in Creative 
Evolution : instinct and intelligence 11 stand out fron t he same 
background, 11 a consciousness in general Hhich is "coextensive 
vii th universal life.)+ In turn , consciousness in general is cut 
out of another bac cground--a universal 11 l atent consciousness . fl5 
1 . Ibid ., p . 36. 2 . Ibid ., p . 203 . 
3 · Ibid . 4. Bergson, CE 
' 
p . 204 . 
5. Bergson, l I , p . 245. 
In Hatter and Hemor;;: , Bergson states that 
e xtended natter, regarded as a vrhole , is like a 
consciousness \·There everything balru1.c es and compensates 
and neutralizes everything else . l 
Every reality has a kinship , ~n analogy; , in s hort a 
relation i.·ri th consciousness . 2 
In t he following chart, consciousness is relatee to intuition 
and duration. Again, . fron the perspective of intuition, the 
f irst line is to be regarded theoretically and the second l i n e 
as functional . On both l evels , hovmver , duration and conscious-
ness really exist in the uay in •:lhich they are specified . 
DURATION COITSCIOUSNESS · I:ijTUITIOH 
f~ttenuated Latent Consciousness Instantaneous· 
Intensified Expanded Consciousness Simple 
In the above chart , simple intuition signifies the 
isolation of a -)art (concrete content ~ from the lihole • . If ·He 
descend to :J.ateriali ty itself as ,,re are theoretice.lly supposed 
to do in i n stantaneous intu ition, then it is unlikely that i.·Je 
are consciou s . At t:1e level of instantaneous intu ition , there 
is an attenuated duration present and a r egistering of quali-
ta.tive movement however i.·mal;: the tension such over:1.ent contains . 
I n sinple intu ition, there is more tension , contraction and 
the prolongation of moments into e~ch other . Here, the tenm 
consciousness tc:-. --es on new meaning . It is no longer a dissipated 
consciousness but a consciousness at least felt an lived 
because of its expansion . 
l . I bid . , p . 216. 2. Ibid . , p . 225. Italics.· mine . 
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ttintuition, 11 Bergson states, "signifies first of all 
cons ciousnes s., but i cmediate consciousness.. 111 Yet , it is more 
than ir..rr..1ediate consciousness . It is also "cons.ciousne-ss extended, 
pressL1g upon the edge of an unconsciousness uhich gives 1my 
and Hhich resists .n2 For Bergson , intuition relates to spirit, 
duration and pure change . r:atter, in light of the preceding 
dis cussion , is related to uration. And, finally, consciousness 
is related to duration according to the ar1o1.mt of tension present 
in duration. Therefore, Bergson concludes that the material 
universe, because of its. \veakened duration , may be regarded 
as containing a "latent consciousness ." Thus, intuition seeks 
"to grasp in t hings, even material things, their participation 
in spirituality."3 By a "participation in spirituality,u it 
,.;ould appe~r that Bergson is tall::ing about the relo.tion of 
tension and consciousness to matter . The scale of being contains, 
on one end,latent consciousness and, on the other, supra-
consciousness. Intuition contains, according to t he amount of 
effort of intuition, a consciousness i:Thich varies beti:Jeen these 
t1:10 ideal ends . 
4. Intuition vs. Intelligence 
Hi th the conclusion of the e;:posi tion of Bergsonia..n. 
intuition , one thing more needs to be done before a critical 
evaluation is presented . As it vms noted i n the introductory 
chapter , this chapter , Chapter IV, . ·uill conclude \•Ji th Bergson 1 s 
1 . Bergson , CH, p . 35. 
3. Ibid. 
2 . Ibid ., p . 37 . 
defense of his doctrine of intuition in so far as he believed 
it did not deprecate man 's intellectual faculty. 
In Che>.pter III, it vras noted t hat our nent al functions 
have, according to Bergson , a utilitarian nature and ~e turned 
tm·Jards action. Our representations, even our consciousness, 
~ay be defined as t he arithmetical difference between real and 
virtual action. The intellect is that faculty ·uhich naltes a..'1.d 
uses unorganized instruments, i . e ., Ban does not depend upon 
internal, naturally orgru1ized orgQlls that are used i nstinctively 
in order to satisfy his vlants; instead , he has the ability to 
f ashion instrunents out of unorganized natter in order to 
satisfy his vrants . The i ntellect is a t home vri th the dis-
continuous, 'Hi th t he i mmobile; it ai n s a t decompos i ng and re-
col!l~;osing, but of qualitative neovment, i.e., of t he aurational, 
it can never form a clear conception 'lrJi thout the aid of 
intuition. Duration can never be presented to us through 
conceptual r epresentations . Instead, its presence can be f ound 
only through a direct or an ir~ediate kind of experience . that 
is felt and lived . In short, Bergson appeals to an i n t uition 
'Hhich is prior t o analysis and prior to intellection. 
The end result of Bergson ' s critique of the i ntellect is 
t 1e c arge t hat his philosophica l pos ition is anti-intellectual . 
Because of Bergson ' s r adical criticism of t he intellectual 
f c.cul ty, Profes s or 1~ari tain states t hat "Bergsonianisn 
oust ••• be ·considered as an anti-intellectual philosophy; it 
denies the i ntellect it s privilege of being the faculty of the 
7S 
true .n1 Further, the doctrine of i ntv_ition results in 11the 
most surpri s ing abdication of intellect and reason . 112 
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Let us note that __ Bergson hj_mself uses t he tern "intellectual rr 
'Hhen , in t h e Introduction, he states t hat i n t uition can be 
defined as being a k ind of 11 intel lectual sympathy; 11 hm·rever, 
intellection only comes after i ntuition i n his i nt uitive 
method . Further, Hhile the intuition of t1e durat ional self is 
an i1~ediate felt experience, another v ariety of intuition only 
arises after 11 a long fellovrship 11 l·rith its object and after a 
seemingly long analytical study. Intuition t hus appears to be 
an intellectual process ru1d , at the s ru~e time , a non-intellectual 
process . 
First, let us exa.r.1ine vrhat has just been terBed the non-
intellectual aspect of intuition , i . e ., intu ition as i.nlmediacy. 
There are t:vro vro..ys , accordi ng to Bergson, in '\·rhich t _ought 
processes may function--t hrout;h an "infra- intellectual" process 
or t hr ough a 11 supra - i ntellectual 11 process . ~Jhile these tvm 
directions o:- .. roce-ures of thought are at least i nplied in 
Bergson 1 s earlier 1:rorks, they do not receive a clear and concise 
exposition until Bergson 1 s last big l·rorl: , The THo Sources of 
1-forali ty and Religion . 3 A descripti on of these ti·:o directions 
of t hough t are cont a ined i n t he early pages of The Tvm Sources 
1vhere Bergson deals 1.·-Ti t h creative emotion . Ber gson states that 
1 . Naritain, £12 • cit ., p . 146 . 
2 . Ibid . , • 126~ 
3. The saJJe t h ene, soaevhat underdeveloped ,,,hen compared to 
The Tvm So u.rces, G.ppears in Be:::.-.gson 1 s essay entitled 
"Philosophical .Lntui tion, 11 containec in Creative Eind . 
tt there are er:10tions ':rhich beget thought . 111 l•Jhile creative 
emotion and intuitioE are not synonymous terms , they are 
related in that intuition as inm1ediacy is contained in the 
psychic state indicative of creative emotion. Therefore , a 
brief description of this state is in order . In this vray , some 
light nay be shed on this variety of intuition . 
rr The mind , 11 Bergson states , ''cold- harnners 11 its ideas 
together \·Jhen it proceeds infra- intellectually. 2 Here , there 
is no real creative thought . At most , there is only a re-
arrangement of the old--a dry synthesis of that which has 
already been stated.3 If there is any emotion related to this 
direction of the mind , it arises out of, and has nothing to do 
·1:1i th, the Hay in \vhich the thought process itself arises . 
Here, "er..1otion is the consequence of an idea . "4 
Bergson naintai ns that there is quite a different _dnd of 
emotion vJhich is the underlying and key factor -- 11 the source 11 --
of the greatest creations in art , science and civilization. 5 
Such an enotion acts as a generative force . 6 This emotion is a 
cause , not an -effect, of intellectual developaent . This state 
of the n ind Bergson calls 11 supra-intellectual .11 Such a state 
is inspiration, intuition, emotion, suceptible of 
analysis into i deas ivhich furnish intellectual notations 
1 . Bergson , The Ti,JO Sources of Hora_lity and Religion , trans . by 
R. Audra and C. Brereton . (He\·J York : Henry Holt & Co ., 1935) , 
p . 35. 
2. Ibid ., p . 38 . 
5 . Ibid . 
3. Ibid . 
6 . Ibid . 
4 . Ibid ., p . 35. 
81 
of it and branch out into infinite detail; thus , lih:e 
a u.ni ty 'Hhich encompasses and transcends a plurality 
incapable of ever equalling it, it contains any amoU11t 
of intetlectuali ty; it is :rJore than intelligence 
itself . 
Representations may arise out of such an emotive state; 
11it is, " states Bergson, "pregnant with representations , 11 2 
but such representations e.re not yet fully formed . Through a 
process of "organic development,11 they nay, hm·rever, reach 
maturity . 3 It 1·rm:tld appear that the organic development '\ihich 
Bergson here speaks about is analogous to the tern "intellectual 
expansion" vrhich he uses i n the Introduction. 4 
At the very least, intellect appears to be related to 
what we had previously te~ed the non- intellectual variety of 
intuition. Let us nm·r return to the problen of relating th..is 
variety of intuition 1·ri th the variety that arises after a long 
fnniliarity ·\'lith the superficial manifestations of reality . 
Hargaret Landes suge ests a 1my out of this dilei1Lla : 11 In all that 
he LBergsorii' says against the intellect as opposed to the 
i ntuitive method , he has in mind Kant 1 s conception of the 
intellect ."5 For Bergson, an intellect linited to necha:1ical 
. concepts has no thin.__ in cor.m:1on i'Ti th intuition . On the other 
1 . Ibid ., p . 55. 
2. Ibid., p. 35 . 
3 . Ibid. 
4. But notice, Bergson ' s exposition of creative emotion merely 
points out that intuition is related to intellection in this 
psychic state . He does not tell us hm·T they are related , nor 
does he state that intuition contains intellection. 
5. l1argaret Landes, 11 A Suggested i nterpretation of Bergson ' s 
Doctrine of Intuition," The Philosophical RevieH, Vol . XXXIII 
(1924)' p . 459 . -
hand 
whenever Bergson identifies intuition vii th the intellectual 
method he has in mind a conception of intellect quite 
different fron that of Ka:.'1t . But yet again , he very 
evidently knmringly holds this second, enlarged conception 
of the i ntellect as using concepts oth~r than the 
mechanical ones itJhich Kant enun era ted • .L 
A glance at Creative J:.1ind verifies Landes' position. 
Bergson tells us that the intellect \·rhich he deprecates is the 
intellect of "a dry rationalism made up for the most part of 
negations • • • a verbalisn ·Hhich still vitiates a large part of 
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knm'lledge . 112 Real knovrledge is obtained through intuition, but 
Bergsol} has no objection to calling the faculty vrhich can obtain 
such knovrledge 11 i ntellect 11 so long as the term "intellect" is 
redefined . 3 One form of i ntellect (intuition), uould have to be 
defined as opposed to and the inverse of the other f orn (Verstand ) . 
Bergson , t hen, distinguishes bet'\veen a pure intellect which can-
not kno1rr duration , and another type o ~ intellect \•ihich , if one 
chooses, can be called intuition . o.nd can knovr duration. But it 
seemed r.1ore appropriate to him , Bergson points out , to call this 
d 1 • d b • t • t • 4 I:-T t t t th -'-SeC On -~n y a neu name, ~n UJ. ~on . .~.e goes on o s a e - av 
at 
l . 
3 · 
5 . 
no point '\·rhatever , then, do vre di T'1inish intelligence; vre 
do not drive it avmy f rom any of the territory it has 
occupied up to the present; and , 1.:here it is completely at 
home, i:Ie attribute to it a power vrhich modern philosophy 
has generally contested . 5 
l1?1:.9. · ' P • 461 . 2. Bergson, CH, p . 91. 
.I:!2;1£. ' p . 92 . 4. Ibid • 
Ibid . , p . 93 . 
According to Professor r:ari tain, 11intui tion does not reason, 
does not discourse, does not conpose nor does it divide . 111 
Nevertheless, Bergson naintains that 11ny i n tuition is re-
flection . 11 2 Bergson and 1~ari tain are in conplete disagreement--
l:ari tain holds that Bergsonianisn is an B.J.""lti - i ntellectual 
philosophy, and that intuition does not reason; Bergson denies 
the charge and affirms vrhat Haritain denies him. Chapter V of 
this thesis , a critical evaluation, uill atterapt to deterDine 
the exac t relationship bet1:Ieen intuition . and intelligence in 
Bergson ' s philosophy. 
A few points nore ( already dealt vii th in various sections. 
of t lus thesis ) , need to be briefly repeated . There can be no 
doubt that the intellect is a necessary ingredient of the 
intuitive method . 11Intui tion , 11 Bergson states , 11"~:Tlll be cor:rrnuni-
cated only by intelligence . 11 3 While intuit - on is as wide as 
mind itself, the intellect mus t cone to its aid . HOi·rever , the 
intellect :r:mst nm:T nali:e use of 11the nost ~oncrete ideas 
those "l·Thich still retain our outer fringe of imag es . 114 
latter f orm of i dea is expressed tn~ough comparisons and 
metaphores . 5 
• • • 
This 
Chapter III of this thesis contained the relationship 
between intellect an·' instinct . In their original relationship, 
the one more nearly approximated the other . It uas also noted 
that Bergson considered this original relation ship as t he 
1 . riaritain , QJ2. · cit ., p . 68 . 2 . Bergson, CH , p . 103. 
3· Ibid., p . 48 . 4. Ibid . 
5. ~· 
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original fac1..1.l ty o£' intuition. Ilouevcr , i:1stinct end intelligence 
are still related in so far as they are conplementary uays of 
knovring . The sane may be said of intuition and intellect:. 
vfuile ~ntuition nay give us vn~at~ the intellect fails to 
gras-p , it vJOuld ap!) ear thc.t the i ntellect must be utilized in 
order t hat it see how the intellect itself fails to grasp i·Jhat 
intuition may give it . Ft1rther, vrithout intelligence, Bergson 
tells us the.t i'le i'Jould have rel,.ained riveted to the object of 
perception "~>'li thin the i ns tinctive faculty- - consciousness vrould 
never have arisen . \·iJ. ile i n tuition transcends t he intellect, 
11it is f rom intelligence that has come the push that has made 
it rise to the point it has ree.ched . 111 In conclusion , Professor 
Chevalier states that 
if by ' intuition 1 be understood a proces s \:hich is not: 
only distinct from the d iscursive intelligence but one 
i•Thich can dispense 'Hith it, then Bergson' s doctrine 
again , frau one end to the other, is nothing but a 
protest ag&inst such intuitionalism. 2 
5. Sumnary 
For Bergson , t he act of pure perception \lias t he vehicle by 
'\vhich a percipient could move from qualitative , inextensi ve 
psychic states to qtantitative, extensive matteriality. 
Pure perception '\·ras equated vii th instanta_1eous i ntuition. Hovr-
ever, both are theoretical co str ucts . Concrete perception or 
sinple intu ition contained the subjective elenent of memory. 
The question H&S h ovJ cou l d intuition , complicated bJ the 
1. Bergson , CE, p . 195. 
2 . Chevalier, gn. cit . , pp . 118- 119. 
subjective elenent , nen:ory, give one objective rJ.aterial reality? 
The exposition then turned to an investigation of the relation-
ship bet·ween rlT th!:1 and tension in matter and perception . 
The vlhole of matter has the ten ' ency of allovring the 
intellect to ca rve it up into i ndependent bodies \:Ti th .eternined 
outlines . Hm-rcver , matter. still conta ins a lir::ited degree of 
duration . Hatter, '\'lhen r egarded in terms of its internal 
continuity, i . e ., force, contains a r hythnic beat tendi ng 
towards pure repetition. Yet, it is not pure repetition; it is, 
in part , still qualitative . This is to be contrasted \·lith the 
duration of our conscious states '\·Ihich display a slm·rer r~1ythmic 
beat . IT ext, it Has seen t hat memory vias t 1e factor that intro-
ducec_ the concept o: tension . Diluted. , r hyt hnic reverberations 
of quo.li t e.t i ve n ove1:1ent bor ering on t he repetitious are 
s\·rallm-:ed up by r.1er:1ory into a contracted duration . Dissipated 
qualitative spread-outness, tending tm·rards quantitativeness , 
becomes contracte6 into an intenser life . From the perspective 
of perception , it is inpossible to reach the attenuate 
duration of r.1atter; concrete perception c c:...n only attain a_1 
intensified duration . Returning to the question o~ how intuition 
can obtain objective naterial reality, it ua!:i noted thc:.t 
homogeneity may be vim·Ted as a slackened ciuro.tion , i . e . , it is 
relatively lacking in tension . First , space has little to do 
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vrith a durational n e iun . Second , matter is not purely exten ed, 
nor is it geonetrical in kin ~ ; instead, it is sonething inter-
mediate betvreen divided e:::tension 8.nd pure i nextension. E..~tension 
is 11 tension vlhich is interrupted . 11 In terms of tension , the 
difference betueen instantaneous intuition and simple intuition 
is a difference, not in l:ind, but in the degree of tension 
present . Therefore, tension uas seen to be the mediating 
principle bet,:leen concrete )erception anu the qualitative vThole . 
Thus it is t hat sinple intuition can obtain objective material 
reality. 
In the final discussion of intuition and ~atter, conscious-
ness , .. ras relate to both. It Has pointed out that Bergson speaks 
about 11 ' iffer er:t kinds of consciousness . 11 This -vras necessitated 
by the fact that tension arises only 'Hhere some degree of 
consciousness is present . Thel,efore, it \Ias seen that uithin a 
durational scale of being, consciousness moves frorJ 11 n. latent 
consciousness " on its i deal honogeneous end to supraconsciousness 
on its purely qualitative ideal end . 
Las.t, t here '\'Tas an attenpt to present Bergson 1 s m·m 
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argument that his doctrine of intuition--indeed , his philosophical 
position itself --\·ras~ not anti - intellectual . T'Ho seemingly contra-
dictory varieties of i n t u ition uere e:::au i n ed as they v!ere found 
i n t h e Introduction-- intu ition as ;felt i:-:r::ecliacy and the 
i ntuition \·.rhich arises after a long analytical stu ~Y . An attempt 
\'Jas made to relate the former to i ntellection. It "'.·ras noted that 
in creative enotion they are related but just in vrhat vray re-
r!ained a nystery. The second type or variety of intuition uas 
found to fit in nicely vii th a dynan ic conception of reason . 
:Further, it uas noted t hat Bergson states tha t intuition CC4"1. be 
called intelligen ce as lone as t he latter terr:1 is redefined . 
Concluding , it vi~s found t~at the intellect does have a 
definite role in the intuitive 1:2ethod . 
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION 
1. Critica] Evaluation 
It was stated in the introductory chapter that~ the first 
part of this· chapter would be concerned vri th the adequacy 
of Bergson 1 s critique of the intellect, follmved by an 
examination of his doctrine of intuition and ending with 
an evaluation o£ the intuitive method. The latter will be 
based upon the conclusions reached in the previous tvro 
sections .• 
To a very large extent, the need for a doctrine of 
intuition rests on Bergson's critique of the intellect. There-
for, it is first necessary to determine if the limitations 
delegated to the intellect by Bergson are justified. A great 
deal of what Bergson has to say relates to the intellect's 
inaccessibility to the durational aspect of reality. For 
Bergson, willing is one with knowing: all of our ideas o£ 
reality and our definitions of itt must come after the exercise 
of our wilL, not before it. The intellectualist, on the other 
hand, maintains that the will is a case of knovrledge, and that 
'mat ·. we call 'will' is definable. That v.re can knovr the 
durational aspect of reality if vTe will to know it, Bergson 
ha~ nrr doubt. Thus, he states. that 
vrhen -vre put~ our being into our will, and our will_ 
itself into the impulsion it prolongs, we understand, 
we feel, that reality is a peipetual growth, a 
creation pursued without end. 
The problem in regard to knowing may be stated another: 
way. Reflective knowledge, for Bergson, is mediate lmowledge. 
It can be knovm that mediate kno\vledge, or refle-ctive 
kno'\'rledge, is limited if there is another mode of knovrledge-
which can apprehend the proce&s. of the former . There is, namely 
intuitive or immediate knowledge. Thus, Bergson is able to 
state that "there is a reality that is external and yet given 
immediately to the mind.n2 By: k:no-vring what this reality is by 
the use of immediate, intuitive knowledge, Bergson is then able 
to compare the findings with what reflective analysis can know 
of it; the limitations of reflective analysis may thus become 
readily apparent. This procedure appears in Bergson's works 
up until Creative Evolution. In Creative Evolution, Bergson 
seeks to corroborate his earlier views in regard to mediate 
and immediate knowledge tl1rough an empirical study of evolution. 
Here he traces the genesis of the intellect and that vague 
shadQ\;r which surrounds it -- instinct. He states-:, for example, 
1. Bergson, CE, p . 261. 
2. Bergson, IM, p. 49 . 
9C 
in the opening lines. o~ that: work, that 
The h-tstory of' the evolution of life, incomplete as>it 
yet is, already reveals to us how· the intellect has, 
been formed, by an uninterrupted progress, along a line 
\·lhich ascends_ through the vertebrat·e series up to man. 
It shm·rs . us in the faculty of' understanding an 
appendage of the faculty of acting, a mo~e and more 
precise, more and more complex and subtle adaptation 
of the consciousness of living bein!s to the conditions 
of existence that are made of them. 
-
It may be recalled, for example, that in Hatter and Hemory, 
Bergson stated that our mental functions "are essentially 
turned towards action. u2 Jmd in Time and Free Will he stat.es, 
for example, that mwe necessarily express ourselves by means of 
words and we usually think in terms of space. n3 Have these. 
been mere assumptions up until the appearance of Creative 
Evolution? Not for Bergson -- he start~ immediately with in-
tuition. It was pointed out earlier that the point from which 
Bergson starts .. and the point~ to uhich he continually returns is 
nthe intuition of duration. 114 But this is precisely the point 
in the argument between the voluntarist and the intellectualist: 
is there a fundamental, immediate variety of knowledge which is 
more compr-ehensive than reflective analysis? The burden of 
proof must lie \'Tith Bergson, especially with his critique of 
the intellect. If the intellect is limited in the way he says 
it is, if his account of the genesis of the intellect in 
Creative Evolution is adequate, if these can be accepted, then 
he has made a strong case for the need for intuition. Let us, 
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1. Bergson, CE, p. xix. Italics mine. 2. Bergson, 1·1!-o! , p. xviii. 
3. Bergson, TFW, p. xxiii. 4. Cited in Chevalier, 2E• £11., 
p. 79. 
however, assume that he hasn't. Does._this mean that intuition 
is an empty term? Not. necessarily. There still may be some 
worth in the use of intuition if Bergson's account of i~is 
adequate. However-, the intuitive faculty--if it may be called 
a faculty--is intricately related to the intellect in its 
evolutionary development. The crucial point to be noted is 
that if Bergson has not made an adequate case for their develop-
ment, then a great deal of what he has to say about both 
facultiesc is undermined. And, finally, depending upon the 
acceptance of these two account~, the adequacy of the intuitive 
method nay be judged. 
i. Bergson's Critique of the Intellect 
The follo\iing discussion will be limited to three crucial 
points: (1) Bergson's belief t hat scientific intelligence is 
a reduction to a dry intellectualism--specifically represented 
by his arguments in Time and Free Will and r:eview·ed in Chapter 
II of this thesis.; ( 2) his, insistence that intellectual! form 
results from its function--clearly spelled-out. in Matter and 
Memory and Creative Evolution, the arguments of which appear 
in part in Chapter II of this thesis but- more especially in 
Chapter III; (3) Bergson's development of the genesis of the 
intellect as. it appears in Creative Evolution--found in Chaptr~r 
III of this: thesis:. . 
9~ 
(1) Mistmderstanding of· the_ Analytic Hethod--Bergs.on, as 
early as·. Time and Free \<Till, expressed the belie-f that not only 
thought in general, but that science also is incapable o~ 
conceiving of rea]_ process or duration. He states, for example, 
that : 11science cannot deal with time and motion except . on 
condition of first eliminating the essential and qualitative 
elemen~-of time, duration , and of motion, mobility.ul Scien-
tific formulation depends upon the ability to establish di&tinct 
units which ar~ provisionally indivisible but. may be conceived 
as being further divisible. 2 Number is thought of as juxta-
position within a spatial medium in contradistinction to the 
continuity which may be imr:lediately intuited vri thin the self. 
From this, it follovrs that one instant of time added to another 
cannot. be the qualitative multiplicity found vlithin a durational' 
mediu~; here, the medium must be space for it is only in space 
that clear~cut distinctions are possible. Bergson goes 
further--along '\vith Kant , he assumes that -space is a llform of 
the sensibility" (although not necessarily so), and that the 
intuition of this medium "enables us to externalize our concepts-
in relation to one another, ~angl reveals to us the objectivity 
of things-."3 The clear-cut distinctions of language become 
possible and thus the possibility of social life.4 The impli-
cation is that all thought (contained within the broad realm 
1. Bergson, TFW, p . 115. 
3. Ibid., p . 236. 
2. Ibid., P• 82. 
4. Ibid . 
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of intellectualism), is equivalent to that of the mathematico-
physicist1s. vlhether one considers the symbols used in positive 
science, the perceptions of everyday life, or philosophical 
thought; Bergson finds that they have been cut out of a wider 
experience. The concrete richness of immediacy is lost and 
such a richness can never be recreated by adding concept to 
concept or symbol to symbol. Concepts are distinct, external, 
diagrammatic~ spatial and fixed. Symbolic elements cannot re-
constitute itrs. object1 , and 11pura duration ••• excludes all 
ideas of juxtaposition, reciprocal externality, and extension. 112 
Bergson's position is open to criticism. Professor Ralph 
Barton Perry is _. quite justified \'lhen he states that "there is 
an invetsrate liability to confuse a symbolized relation with 
a relation of symbols. 113 The el~ments or symbols contained 
within a f ormula are external to each other whereas that; which 
the formula represents may not be composed of external elements 
but, rather, interpenetrating ones. Therefore, it is v~ong to 
assume that the elements of a formula must have the same relation 
as that which the formula seeks to represent. ~ Inatead, and 
Bergson seems unable to understand this, ''the formula as a '\·Thole 
represents or describes a complex other than itself."l.r From 
1. Bergsnn, IM, p . 33. 
2. Ibid., p . 26. 
3. Ralph Barton Perry, Present Philosophical Tendencies (New 
York: Longmans, Green , and Co., 1912), p . 232. 
4- • .ill£. 
this, it follows that 11 continuity may be an arrangement meant by 
a discontinous arra.n.gement, of words. and symbols. nl Words and 
symbols . represent and refer to something other than themselves:. 
Never, for one moment, does a physicist, for example, think thatr. 
a particular symbol, gua symbol, "reconstitutes" the thing to 
which it refers. 
It is possible that spatial imagery can represent non-
spatial relations. Bergson himself makes use of such imagery. 
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For example, in his description of the qualitative multiplicity 
found vd thin duration, he states; that "several conscious states. 
are organized into a whole, permeate one another, £ ang} gradually 
gain a ric J: ontent-. 112. Bergson is quick to· point. out that 
the term 11severaltt is spatia] and that. "by the very language 
which I /J3ergso:i/ vras· compelled to use, I betrayed the deeply 
ingrained habit: of setting out time in space. 11 3 But. Bergson has; 
11betrayedn nothing;- the difficulty arises out of Bergson's naive 
identification between a symbol and its object. Only in this 
way couid he believe that the intellect 11reconstitutes 11 its 
object. And because Bergson mru{es this mistake, he speaks of 
our cinematographical kind of lmowiedge. He views thought as 
picturing and identifies our conceiving of a thing 1-ri th graphi-
cally depicting it, while, at . the same time, reverting himself 
to spatial i magery. 
1. Ibid., p. 234. 
3. ~-
2. Bergson, TFl.v, p . 122. 
The reduction of an image or symbol to the object it 
represents results in Bergson's holding that qualitative 
characteristics of an Oobject escape the grasp of the. intellect. 
Professor Perry points out. that if I conceive a thing as being 
~' this does not mean that it is merely ~ and cannot be con-
ceived as being b or .£•1 Bergson, Perry states, 11 consta.-·'lt]y 
argues a$ though the use of the· relational logic involved 
the reduction of everything to it.rr2 As far as Perry is con-
cerned, this results in a mis~tnderstanding of the analytic 
method.3 Time, for example, displays the property of order; 
however, this does not mean that time is mer·e. order. All that 
the analytic method proposes to do is to specify certain 
characteristics of experience that admit to order so that these 
characteristics may become comprehensibie. Therefore, 
the spacial representation of time is intended to be 
a representation of order; and to be a representation 
of tim~ in so far, and only in so fa~, as time is 
orderly It is not intended to suggest either tha~ 
time is nothing but4 order, or that time i ·s spacial like the representation. 
The mistake, then, that Bergs:on makes i ·s to hold that the 
intellectual or analytical method reduces everything ta o~derli­
ness and that the general intellect is caught \rlthin the confines 
of the quantitative. If it is found that there exist logical 
relations which can be abstracted from a multiple, complex 
subject matter, Bergson believes that the intellect thereby 
1. Perry, QQ· cit., p. 234. 
3. Ibid. 
2.~. 
4. Ibid., p. 256. 
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reduces such complexity to mean merely what-has been abstracted 
and that, thereby, the intellect is limited to such abstraction. 
Because scientific intelligence regards t hings quantitatively, 
does ' it mean that the human intellect proceeds the same vray? 
Bergson believes that _ this is so because of the spatial. form 
of the intellect. The form of the intellect is derived from 
its function and its function is geared towards action. To 
this \ve now turn our discussion. 
('2} Form of Intelligence Deduced from its Function--UiltiJl. 
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Bergson traces the genesis of t he intellect in Creative Evolution,1 
his proof that the intellect deals s.ole]y ivi thin the realm of a 
spatial medium rests upon his assumption t hat the form of the 
intellect arises· from it~ function. The function of t he 
intelle·ct is of a utilitarian nature. He states-, for example, 
that our. intellect is "enslaved to certain necessities of bodily 
life, and concerned with a matter vrhich man had to disorganize 
for..' the satisfaction of his vrants • 112 Further, perception does 
not have a speculative end, but, rather, it is turned tm•rards 
action.3: And the exigencies of social life demand that there 
should be "clearly characterized states ,LWhich7 will ansvrer · 
better.: the requirements of social life. 114 In short, the form of 
the intellect . aris:es: from its function which is essentially 
1. This will be dealt ·with in the follm·.ring section. 
2. Bergson, JI'IM, p. 179. 
4. Bergson, TFW, p. 139. 
3. Ibid., p. 13. 
practical. This is readily apparent when Bergson states that 
our intellect • • • is intended to secure the perfect 
fitting of our body ·to its environment, to represent 
the relations of external things among themselves--
in short, to think matter .l 
We regard the human intellect, on the contrary as: 
relative to the needs of action. Postulate action, 
and the very form of the intellect can be deduced 
from it.2 
ln order for the intellect to establish relations among 
material objects, the ngeneral frames of the understanding" 
evolved.3 The result, for Bergson, is the development . of the 
"mechanism of intelligence" or the mechanical categories. The 
mistake Kant made, according to Bergson, '\ITas: limiting all 
thought and consciousness to just such a realm, i.e., the 
spatial.4 For Bergson, the~ priori forms of the understanding 
were arbitrarily assumed by Kant, believing that "the intellect 
f_f.iJa faculty intended for pure speculation.n5' Kant asked how. 
were pure physics and mathematics possible, and, as a result, 
assumed the form of the intellect was priorly determined. For 
Bergson, the intellect is also delegated to the realm of the 
mechanical because o£ its function which is to think matter. 
Matter tends towards pur~ homogeneity, and, therefore, _it. is 
easily characterized through mathematical formulation. 6 The 
question which must be aslted is whether Bergsoh has also 
1. Bergson, CE, p . xix. 
3. Ibid., p . 167. 
5. Bergson, CE, p. 167. 
2. Ibid., p . 168. Italics mine. 
4. Bergson, TFVl, p. 232. 
6. "There is an order approximately mathematical immanent in 
matter, an objective order, 1tThich our science approaches in 
proportion to its progress."--CE, p. 238. 
prejudiced his conclusion by-limiting the f~tnction of the 
intellect to matter. By his doing just this, it . will be seen 
that the intellect is limited to mechanical concepts . 
Aside f rom limiting the function of t he intellect to matter, 
one mi ght well ask if the intellect's function can be determined 
apart from its form . Professor Stevrart asks. the same question 
in a more general way : if the intellect has evolved to satisfy 
the needs of man, can the needs of man be met by the knowledge 
of matter?1 His answe~ is in the negative . 
Let us first vie\o.J Bergson's belief t hat t he form of the 
intellect is arrived at by a knovTledge of its function . 
Professor Stewart states that ttfar from it being true t hat the 
form of intelligence may be deduced from its function, the 
function of intelligence reveals itself in its form . n2 All 
areas of rational experience must be examined. The nat ure of 
intelligence begins to reveal itself as it extends itself into 
all its achievements, scientific as well as moral and aes-
thetic.3 
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It Lintelligenc~ has, under the guidence of the concepts 
of purpose, of good, ana of beauty; the meaning of which 
is as clear to it as the concepts of space and of q~antity, 
constructed systems of ethics and art and religion . 
The true function of reason is discernible only vrhen 
human experience in its entirety--not merely the experi-
ence of the positive scigntist--is critically examined, 
and the f orm elucidated .. J 
1 . Stewart, Q2• cit . , p . 155. 
3. Ibid. 
5. Ibid., p . 156. 
2. Ibid . 
4. Ibid. 
'While there may be some quest ion as to vThether the conceP.ts; 
of purpose, good, and of beauty are as clear ta the mind as 
the concepts of space and quantity are to the scientific 
intelligence, Professor Stewart's position is adequate and his 
criticism of Bergson is vrell founded . Until all areas of 
rational experience are examined, it is a premature exami-
nation \·lhich undertakes to postulate the form of the intellect. 
The function of the intellect should not be limited at the start 
to one area of human achievement• 
The second and more general form of this ass~unption is that 
the needs of man demand only a knowledge of matter in orde~ for 
man to secure a firm fitting into his environment. One need 
only review the first chapter of Matter and Memor~ tcr realize 
that this is Bergson's position. . Professor Stevrart p-oints out. 
that Bergson thereby reduces man to the ]evel of the -brute for 
1 
all his needs are ansv1ered by a kno\·lledge of matter. 
In short, Bergson reduces ~an' s needs to the biological 
realm.. Certainly, while the satisfaction of these needs are 
important, to maintain that these needs transcend all of man t ;s 
other needs is, again, to prejudice the conclusions about man's 
rational nature. Therefore, not only does Bergson limit the 
function of the intellect to the realm of the mechanical, i . e . , 
as it relates to inert matter, but he also l imits man's needs 
to the biological realm. Further, there is a paradoxical _ 
1 . Ibid. , p . 157. 
IDO 
conclusion involved here •. 1 The intellect does not really 
perceive the ~tniverse as it really is--the universe endure~. 
Matter has not reached its ideal ]imit~-pure homogeneity. 
While matter tends towards extensiOJ.1i itis not completely ex-
tended.Professor Stev1a-r:t points out that ·while the intellect 
nis intended," according to ~ergson, 11to · secure the perfect 
fitting of our body to its environment," it is difficult to 
see how this is accomplished when the intellect really 
perverts the real nature of our surroundings. On the contrary, 
it vmuld seem that 11an intuitive grasp of matter is, .§:priori, 
to be perferred to the intellectual view of it because the 
former is more useful. 11 2 Knov-Ting the real nature of duration 
and matter would better enable us to cop~ 11ith our environment. 
(3) Genesis of the Intellect--In Chapter III of Creative 
Evolution, Bergson attempted to go further than he had ever 
gone before--he sought to prove empirically that the intellect 
was as he pneviously said it. was, i.e., limited to the mechani-
cal categories. OUr conception of intellectuality and materi-
ality has evolvedfrom their receprocal adaptation; in actuality, 
they are elements constitutive of a higher realm of existence, 
and it is to that realm of existence we must return ·~n order to 
see them issue forth~"3 It is the same inversion of the same 
movement (that is, inert matter moving in the opposite direction 
1. ~., pp . 157-160. 
3. Bergson, CE, p. 205. 
2. Ibid., p. 160. 
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of the ~lan, the unmaking of creativity), which results in 
an intellect .. 1-'Thich makes use of distinct concepts and matter 
which tends to break itself up into distinct bodies. 1 And, 
finally, Bergson states that ."intelligence, reabsorbed into 
its o"m principle Lthe higher form of existence from which it 
evolved, i.e., the life-forci? may thus live back its ovm 
genesis .tt2 
In Chapter III of Creative Evolution, Bergson tells us 
that consciousness or spirituality took two distinct directions : 
as it is manifested in instinct and in the intellect . If we 
are to relive the genesis of the intellect, we must return to 
the original state which underlies both of them, i.e., as near 
as possible to the psychical principle of creation.. Now it. 
would seem that there are three important methods of procedure 
in a critical evaluation of the above: (1) a critical analysis 
of the (lan and the ideal genesis of matter (much of which 
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must apply to the metaphores of the rocket sloughing off cinders 
LIDattei7, or the teakettle's steam becoming condensed Lroattei7), 
(2) a critical evailiuation of Bergson's procedural method as . it 
is involved here, and (J) a critical analysis of the parallel 
aspect of (l): the same manifestation of the tvro movements as 
it rela.tes to instinct and intelligence. In regard to (1), for 
our purposes no long analysis seems necessary. All that can be 
1. Bergson, CE, p . 207,. 
2. Ibid., p. flO. 
done is to ask questions the answers of which Bergson leaves 
to our idle speculation. For example, for what reason does 
the creat ive activity become interrupted? Hust matter (the-
spent cinders), suddenly begin to fall (that is, inverse the 
direction of the original movement)? Such questions are 
important; indeed, they point out extreme difficulties in 
Bergson ' s position. However, a more fruitful procedure would 
appear to be one which emphasized the second and third p·er-
spectives listed above . Let us then first examine t he way· in 
which Bergson seeks to corroborate his belief that the intellect 
is limited to the mechanical categori.es . 
The intellect, as Bergson conceives it, cannot-know life . 
That mechanical categories are too narrow to capture the full 
riclLness of life may be granted . Further, that a mechanical 
explanation of the evolutionary process is inadequate may also 
be granted. And finally, let, us even grant that there is a 
psychical-type force underlying the evolutionary procesa itself. 
However, t he question which must be asked is what can we know 
of this underlying force which is respon?ible for the develop-
ment from the lower to the higher forms of life? And, how· does_ 
one go about learning of its attributes? 
In the introduction to Creative Evolution, Bergson tells us 
that a theory of l{nowledge and a theory of life are inseparable 
for a theory of life,'\>rithout a theory of knowledge, \vould then 
have to accept a mechanical and conceptual interpretation of 
life .1 That this must happen results from the pr-e-existing 
1 . Ibid ., p . xxiii . 
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frames of the understanding \·Jhich distorts our conception of 
real process . Later on, Bergson tells us that because 
intelligence is geared to'\'mrds matter and instinct towardS" 
life, both must be ttsqueezedtt together to get the full range of 
being, and that, therefore, ttmetaphysics is ••• dependent upon 
a theory of knovrledge . n1 But it is also found that the double 
form of consciousness results from the double form of the real 
and that, therefore, a "theory of knovrledge must be dependent 
upon metaphysics . u2 He goes on to say that each of these t\vo 
perspectives (metaphysical and epistemological), lead to each 
other, are enclosed in a circle, "and there can be no other 
center to the circle but the empirical s tudy of evolution."3 
It is, then, an empirical study of evolution that vlill 
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show us how consciousness, in its movement through matter, either 
focuses itself on matter (and thus accounts for the intellect), 
o~· focuses on its ovm movement (and thus accounts for intuition). 
Which of the t\'10 faculties undertakes such an empirical study? 
If it is intelligence, it can never grasp t he meaning of life. 
According to Professor StevJart, "it must be intelligence \vhich 
undertakes an empirical study of evolution, 114 and, therefor·e, 
all that \ve can lr.nm¥ of the psychic force underlying evolution 
is an "unexplained remainder, II something which can only be 
interpreted in light of \vha t vTe lmovi of our ovm psychic nature.5 
1 . Ibid . , p . 196 . 2 . Ibid . 3 . l.l>1£. 
4. Stevrart, .QJ2.• cit., p. 168 . 5. Ibid . 
Therefore, "the empirical study of evolution throws no ne\v 
light on the nature of that psychic force . n1 
However, it must be pointed out that Bergson, in using 
the term 'empirical,' has a special meaning in mind. In 
An Introduction, he tells us that "true empiricism" approaches 
its study "by a kind of i ntellectual auscultation,"2 i . e . , it 
proceeds by making use of intuition. Such an empiricism, 
Bergson goes on to say, "is the true metaphysics . "3 If this be 
the case, what does it mean to say that metaphysics and a theory 
of lmm·rledge are each dependent upon the other, are enclosed 
in a circle of thought , and that there can be no way of under-
standing such a circle except through an empi~ical . study of 
evolution. SUch a study turns out to be an intuitive study, 
and Bergson is begging the question: he is making use of 
intuition to prove that there is an intuitive faculty which is 
one 'i'Tith life, and \vhich further presupposes that the intellect 
is a limited faculty and cannot know life . His conclusions 
are therefore prejudiced . Indeed, an "empirical study of 
evolution" can shed no new light on the force underlying life, 
its dual manifestation, and, therefore, the evolution of the 
double form of consciousness e~emplified in intellect and 
intuition. There can be no) doubt Bergson believes he has;- in a 
later work, he states (in regard to the conclusions reached in 
Creative Evolution), 11\·Te stated nothing that could not in time 
1 . Ibid. 2 . Bergson, D1, pp . 36-37. 
3· Ibid., p . 37. 
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be confirmed by the tests of biolo-g:y:.nl 
Before turning to the third point (the evolution of instinct 
and intelligence and its relation to the~), that:was noted 
at the beginning of_ this section, t here are tvro more points that; 
ma~,r be made . Bergson dates the appearance of man on earth W:i. th 
the appearance of his inventive ability. It is then that: human 
intelligence· emerged and man might just as well be called Homo; 
faber. 2 Bergson then goes on to trace the development of the 
intellect, particularly as it relates to the fashioning of 
artificial instruments and, hence, the emergence of f ormal 
knovTledge . There is little to quibbXe about this illuminating; 
account . However, it will be seen that Bergson has again started 
with a limiting conception o£ the nature of man--his conception 
of man as. Homo faber . Certainly man (as far as anyone knows), 
has: al\<rays displayed a sense of duty and one could well argue 
that the appearance of man on earth \vas \'!hen he emerged as. a 
moral individual.. In any cas~, by limiting the rational nature 
of man to a merely mechanical understanding, Bergson has . again 
prejudiced his conclusions i"n regard to the nature of the 
intellect . 
It vras stated earlier that Bergson asks us to live back the 
genesis of the intellect. According to Professor Perry, there: 
are two ways of unifying experience : 
1 . Bergson, TSMR, p . 244. Italics mine. 
2 • . Bergson, CE, p ., ]5'3. 
carry analysis through, and discover the connections 
of the parts., and the articulate structure of the 
'\vhole. The other is to reverse the operation, to 
carry it back to it~ vanishing point .l 
Bergson choos.es to carry analysis backr he claims we are capab]e 
of apprehending, in the i mmediacy of experience, a unity which 
is both interpenetrating and incapable of being articulated. 
It is this unity which gives birth to intuition and to the 
intellect . . In the above analysis, it , was shown that Bergson 
sought to trace the development of the intellect t hrough an 
empirical study. NO'\·T it may be seen that he bids · us to relive 
the genesis of the intellect and transport ourselves back 
(literally speaking) to that stag e preceding its birth. In our 
discussion of his trempirical tt· approach, vie sought to point out 
that Bergson uses \vhat he defines as an intuitional method 
(that is, he always starts with the intuition of duration) , and 
begins by limiting the intellect at the ~ery start. By the next 
approach--the tracing the genesis of the intellect--he carries 
analysis back, relives and becomes re-absorbed into the very 
principle underlying the intellect. 
It is to be noted that the terms 'living' and 'knowing' 
are synonymous for Bergson . Our discussion of intuition and 
duration in Chapter IV of this thesis may be recalled . As '\<Te 
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intuit, matter·, '\ATe move in the direction of matter; the self tends 
to become spatialized; t he self starts to become its object. 
Further, as we intuit duration, the self strains and contracts, 
and the self moves in the direction of supra-consciousnes~. 
1. Perry, ££• £11•, pp . 237-238. 
108 
In either cas:e, it is the self. that changes. Bergs.on has: fkiled, 
it would appear, to discriminate. bet'\veen the form of a. s:err:· 
and the content. o~ a Sel~. Therefore, if Bergson bida us to 
rslive the genesis of the intellect, if he bids us to entev· intQ 
its underlying principle., it is the vrhole self '\•lhich must enter 
into the psychical unity at the bottom of life. 
vfuat then happens to cognition and what is the value of 
such an experience? 1, aa an identifying self, would seem to 
loose my identity a& I trace or relive the genesia of my 
intellect. \ihen the vrhole self becomes "reabsonbed't into the 
"indistinct fringe rt surrounding the intellect, I become, I ,2m 
duration. If Professor Perry is correct in holding that Bergson ' s 
pracedure is to car ry analysis ba~k to the point where cognitive 
exp·erience almost, if not completely, vanishes,, we a-re left with 
"a perfect, simplicity, an ineffabi.e uni ty111 in which the experi-
ence and the object of experience are lost to us aa thinking, 
conscious beings. 
Hm-·rever, it '\rill be remembered t ha:t Bergson maintains that 
there is another kind of lmovTledge, metaphysical knowledge, and 
another way of knowing, intuition. Let us then examine the third 
perspective outlined at the beginning· of this s£ction--Bergson 1'~ 
development of the relation between instinct and intelligence, 
particularly in regard to the double form of consciousnes-s . The 
contrasting of these t'\vo faculties is another way in which 
Bergson attempts to point out t he limitations of the intellect . 
1 . Perry, Ql2.·· cit . , p . 238 . 
The elan, finite in nature, in it~ impulsion through 
matter, endeavored to overcome the necessity representative of 
matter . The psychical force is manifested in instinct while 
its- dissipation is manifested in intelligence; they ttrepresent 
two divergent solutions, equally fitting, of one and the same 
problem, ul i •. e., tvro ways of satisfying the demands of life. 
But Bergson does not stop here. Not only are they two, modes o~ 
acting, but they also 11 i mpiy- t\vo radically diff erent kinds of 
lmO\vledge . 112 What must be objected to is Bergson's insistence 
upon calling instinct knovrledge. And along with this, his 
unique theory of ttnullified consciousness." '!Representation," he 
states, "is stonped up by action.n3 Instinct is action; if it 
could free itself from immediate action, it \-rould be conscious. 
While instinct is unconscious, it is a nullified consciousness, 
to be discriminated from a consciousness which is completely 
absent. Instinct, then, is knowledge which is acted and 
unconscious . 
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Instinct is usually regarded as a form of behavior; it seems 
highly unlikely that it can be called knovrledge at all. The 
term 1 instinct'r usually refers to a purely biological realm. 
The thought of a thinking subject implies that the attribute of 
consciousnes be present . 4 Bergson maintains that consciousness 
1. Bergson, CE, p. 158. ~. Ibid. 
3. Ibid., p . 159. 4. Stevrart, QJ2.• ill·, p. 172. 
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'\·muld be present if the subject v1ere not caught up in action; 
thus, Bergson propmses to show that there are two forms of 
consciousness, differing in degree rather than in kind and 
standing out f rom the same background--ttconsciousness. in general." 
Professor Ste'\·r.ar t states. that "this contention for a merely 
relative distinction between unconscious· and cons~ious ln1ow-
ledge • •• is introduced to buttress up a preconceived theory. 111 
He goes on to state that 
Consciousness is not a concrete something ,.,hich has 
an independent existence of its own; it is, taken by 
itself·, a mere abstraction; it is a quality, a.Tl attribute 
of a thinking subject, and '\ve know no t hinking subject 
which does not possess this attribute, just as, inversely, 
we can form no clear idea of consciousness which is not 
an attribute of a thinking subject . 2 
In conclusion, let us vie'v the development of the inteli.ect 
as it relates to the inverse movement of t he elan. It was- pointed 
out earlie~ that Bergson was unwilling to admit that matter dies. 
and is born again, that it is pure repetition-- he changed his 
view to an enduring universe in Iv1atter and Hemory and Creative 
Evolution~ Matter is pure homogeneity only as an ideal limit . 
Now look at the intellect . The intellect, although it evolves 
from the same inversion of the same movement of t he ~' does 
conceive of matter as pure homogeneity; it spatializes time; its 
concepts. are contained within a homogeneous medium. \llhy should 
it have gone all the way, i . e . , to. this ideal limit, vlhile 
Bergson changed his former vievr about mat ter as it is- contained 
in Time and Free Will' Because Bergson maintains that while 
1 . Ibid . , p . 173 . 2. Ibid. 
there is a developing reciprocal influence between the two, the, 
intellect has taken the cue that~ matter tends: to-vmrds pure 
extension, and the i mpetus o£ this conception of matter drives, 
mind tm·rards its ideal conceptual limit. Or, stated another 
vmy, "this space is already possessed as an implicit idea L11 its 
,L'the intellect•·y ovm eventual detension, that is to say, o.:r its 
0'\•1!1 possible extension, ul and matter is t he factor 'vhich brings 
out of the implicit idea its explicit character in a thinking, 
conscious subject. 
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Once the mind is in possession of the form of space, Bergson 
continues, it is used "like a net . vri th meshes • • • "\vhich, throvm 
over.·· mat ter, divides it as the needs of our action demand. 112 In 
the last analysis, then, it is the pragmatic bent of mind that 
engender~ the mind ' s spatial form . 
To say that matter tends towards pure homogeneity, but is 
not pure homogeneity, but, nevertheless, gives mind t he trim-
pulsion" to go to its ideal limit still does not answ·er: the 
question why mind has chosen to accept this i mpetus . If the 
ansvmr. is that mind does so to ans,·rer the needs of action, then, 
again, the form of the intellect is deduced from its function 
and Bergson •·s tracing the genesis of the intellect has added 
nothing new to corroborate his previous position. If, on the 
other hand, it is because vie all seek clear-cut distinctions, 
then this is to say that mind, generally speaking, is synonymou!t 
with a scientific, quantitative perspective . Again, Bergson 
1. Bergson, CE, p . 221. 2. Ibid., pp . 221-222 . 
omLts the mora~ and aesthetic side of man, and he is guilty 
of reductionism. 
Bergson himself rejects the above conception of the 
intellect . However, he refuses to concern hir self vtith any 
other theory regarding the intellect and closes the door to 
a more coherent vie'\·T of idealism. Ideas are not conceived as 
standing in an integrated, organic relationship., but, rather, 
as existing out~ide one another . A similar problem that faced 
Locke faces Bergson , viz ., the need to account for the birth of 
certain conplex ideas (in this case, space) , which caP~ot arise 
from compounding simple, juxtapositional ones . Professor 
Stetvart makes the follovTing point: if honogeneous, ideal space 
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is infinitely divisible , . and if this divisibility results from 
a reciprocal relation t·li th matter , hO'\·l does the intellect form 
the concept of space as a ~tinuous whole?1 From mere division , 
the ideas of a continuous whole cannot be generated. 
ii . Intuition 
The following discussion vlill be centered in three areas: 
(1) Bergson ' s identification of ideal time with space, (2) the 
relationship of the self, consciousness and cognition in the act 
of intuition, and (3) an examination of the varieties of 
intuition. Before proceeding into such a discussion , a general 
statement of vrhat may be regarded the core of the argument 
u_~derlying Bergson ' s doctrine of intuition may be in order . 
I.f ·what follot·rs is gra_'tlted to be the core of the 
1 . Ste\·rart, QI?. • cit., p . 190 . 
argunent, then it is hoped that the battle lines will have been 
clearly delineated and that in light of this delineation the 
critical evaluation which then follows will be readily compre-
hensible. 
As it was noted in t he intronuctory chapter of this thesis, 
of supreme importance is Bergson's critique of the intelle~t . 
11~ 
The adequacy of his critique ,.;as examined in the previous section 
and must be rejected. Hm•rever, let us assume that his account. 
is acceptable . Is: there another way of knovling? It is Bergson ' s 
contention that there is another vray--the '\vay to true knowl.edge 
is not one vn1ich is dependent upon the mediacy of ideas, and 
where there is a subject- object relationship but., rather, thJr.ough 
"lived coincidencert of the subject· and the object . In short, 
by thrusting ourselves into the imne iacy of experience prior 
to the intellectual process (that is, prior to the introduction 
of the categories), we attain r.eal knovlledge . 
Professor Lee, in an article entitled '~sthetics and Episte-
mology,11 criticizes Croce ' s conception of intuition. It is also 
applicable to Bergson . Concepts belong to knowledge, are 
propositional and involve universalsr however, intuition involves 
particulars, and cap..not be considered lmovTledge at all . l There 
is no doubt t hat Bergson uses intuition to mean a grasp o~ the 
particular . For Lee, a particular cannot be designated as 
lmmvledge: the term ' particular' means little to a conscious 
being ttnless it is differentiated from other particulars . 2 
1 . Harald N. Lee, "Esthetics and Epistemology,u The Journal of 
Philosophy, (1939), 36, p . 284. 
2 . Ibide 
Professor Blanshard makes a similar point·- He states: that-
'\vhat must not be done is to say that vie begin with 
the sensing of bare particulars in which nothing ia 
identical with anything else, and that 'i·re somehow 
find identities as '"e go on. I dentities that are not 
there cannot be found.I 
In sum, if anything is to be predicated out of the complex 
of imn1ediate e)~erience, the intellect must have some foothold 
there. 2 No such foothold is found in Bergson's accoLtnt of 
intuitive kl10'ivledge. Indeed, \·That is usually called l:;:nmvledge 
must be transcended; we must break out of the circle of thought 
that the intellect enclo.ses us 'iv:ithin and, by violent action, 
plunge into that vague nebulosity surrounding the intellect. 
Let us go so far as to grant Bergson that a certain fel~ 
particularity can be discerned vrithin the immediacy of experi-
ence vii thout the intervention of the understanding. This may 
be compared to what Kru1.t calls judgments of p-erception . 3 These 
are to be discriminated from judgment_s· of experience . ccording 
to Kru1t, the former do not require the intervention of t he 
categories and, therefore, are not objectively valid- -they are. 
subjectively valid . 4 The latter- introduce special concepts of 
1 . 
2. 
3· 
4. 
Brand Blanshard, The Nature of Thought, Vol . , I (London : 
George Allen & Unwin Ltd . , 1955), p. 63 . 
In the following discussion, it will be seen that from the 
intuition of duration little,if anything, can be predicated . 
Bergson locks one into a solipicism of the moment~ 
Immanuel_ Kant, Prolegomena to Any Future Netaph~sics, re-
vised trans. of 1-1ahaffy- Carus (Nevr York : The Li eral Arts 
Press, 1951), p . 45. 
Ibid. 
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the understanding, thus : enabling us to make objectively valid 
j'Q.dgments: of experience. While one may disagree '\·lith Kant 's 
present~tion, Bergson does not· account at all for a way in which 
a percipient can discern particulars except to say that they are 
felt. By '\·Thorn'? By a nnifying and identifying self'? What Kant 
seems to be intimating in the above account is that at that 
level of i mmediacy in 'lrlhich there are judgments of perception, 
such judgments take place on an associative, automatic level 
where no direction by the highest nnitiea of thought are 
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necessary . If Bergson bids us to return to such a level of experi-
ence, then it appears that he asks us to take a retogressive step 
in knovrledge . Clarity of thought disappears . 
Professor Brightman maintains t hat at t hi s leveL of immedi~cy 
conation may be present, but it is not an effort directed tovmrds: 
1 td lb . h " 1 a se ec e goa y our own conscJ.ous c oJ.ce. Brightman calls 
this level, "the level of nnanalyzed synoptic i mmediacyu and 
it is not Ul~til the next unity of experience is considered--
nthe level of analyz_ed immediacy (Sein) "--that man nbecomes avmre 
of distinctions in his experience.tt2 In the positions stated 
above, there is no conscious avrareness of particulars !1Q.!: is 
there objective validity at this level of experience. 
(1) Identity of Ideal Space and Time--Before cons i dering 
duration, an analysis of Bergson ' s view of conceptual time and 
space i s in order . While the follo\nng discussion could have 
1. Edgar Brightman, Person and Reality, Ed-. by Bertocci & Ne'\'Jhall 
(NevT York: The Ronald Press, 1958), p . 61 . 
2. Ibid. 
been presented in t he preceding analysis of Bergson•·s view of 
the intellect, it has direct bearing here in so far as Bergson 
holds that because conceptualized time i s identical to conceptu-
alized space, the need for ~n intuitive faculty is necessary. 
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For example, in Creative Hind, Bergson states t hat in the 
history of philosophy most philosophers"did not see t hat intel-
lectualized time is space."l To a certain extent, this vie\v has 
already been i mplied in the previous section--the intellect of 
the mathematico-p~ysicist is the same as the intellect in gene~al , 
and the juxtaposed symbols of the physicist ca1L~o t refer to a 
complex t11e elements of which stand in an interpenetrating re-
lationship . Both views are to be rejected . 
For Bergson, space is a "hm::ogeneous and empty medium, 
infinite and infinitely divisible ••• it is only conceived . "2 
Over against this conception i.e have duration \·Thich is qualitative 
heterogeneity , vrhich is lived and not thought . \men I seck to 
count the successive states such as I find in my m·m conscious_-
ness, it is necessary to hold one synbolic representation in 
mind as the next u_nit: of succession is added to the previous 
one. Qualitativeness gives :ay to quantitativeness •. The medium 
in ivhich this takes place is no longer real ti:ne, but conceptu-
alized time, homogeneous in character and infinitely divisible . 
As soon as time is made measurable, it must: ntherefore /J)ecomfil 
a homogeneous magnitude."3 
1 . Bergson, CH, p . 34. 
2. Bergson , CE, p. 172. 
3. Bergson, TFW, p . 107. 
Wl~ile it nay be that in order to conceive of a temporal 
order the mind must translate successive states into terms of 
space, it does not necessarily i mpl y t hat 1·re are capable only 
of conceiving of a temporal order ·~:rhich is a synonom for a 
ll? 
spatial order . Bergson resolves the one order into the other . 
When '"e speak of a temporal order, distinctions of past, present 
and future must be made. For Bergson, distinctions can only 
be made in an ideal meditun, and there is only one ideal medi~-­
space, homogeneous ~nd empty . 
In the first place, if conceptual space is an empty homo-
geneous medium as Bergson ·\'lould have us believe, then it is 
void of qualities . Can the intellect conceive of such an entity? 
If all the concrete facts of experience are emptied, it seens 
inconceivable that anything, let alone a concept of empty space, 
remains . 
Professor Stewart believes that while ideal space may be 
homogeneous in all its parts, it, nevert:1eless, has the character 
of extensiveness or spread-outness in relation to the matter 
which fills it and should therefore be conceived as qualitative 
homogeneity . 1 While ideal time may be homogeneous, nevertheless, 
there is "'rlithin this homogeneity succession and flovr. 2 row if 
we speak about these two qualitative characteristics contained 
'·rithin these t"Vro order, it will be seen that the intellect can 
discriminate bet1·1een them; '\·lhile it is necess.ary to order both 
1 . Stewart, Q2• cit . , p . 214. 
2 . l.bid . 
space and time so that they can be conceived, if \·re speak about 
them as both belonging to an empty homogeneous medium it i~ 
difficult to U11derstand why the name of space is applied to 
them at all . If such vrere the case, space would have no 
extensive character, no distinctive. feature except empty, 
pure homogeneity , an impossible conception . 
A more descriptive way of pointing out that the intellect 
can discriminate bet\v.een space and time is presented by 
Professor Steviart . 1 When we count moments in time, \ve count in 
ordinal numbers•-vre speak about a first, a second, a third, and 
so on. When counting points in space, we use numerals, i . e . , 
one, two, three, and so on. In the first case, vrhen we say 
"first, " "second," at the instant '\-re say "second" the "firsttt 
has gone . In the second case, tvhen t·re say "one" or "tvro,11 both 
are present simultaneously. In other tvords, \·re do conceive of: a 
progress or succession in the first case where we do not in the 
second . That intellectualized time necessitates a relation to 
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a' spatial manifold cannot be denied, but that "intellectualized 
time is spacett can be denied . If t he above criticism is correct, 
then there are not t\10 profoU11dly different t·rays of knmving a 
thing, 2 one being the intellect, the other being intuition. 
In so far as being able to distinguish real process, the 
intellect can and does succeed . 
1 . Ibid . , pp . 211- 212 . 
2. BerEson, D-1 , p . 21 . 
(2) Pure Duration, Consciousness and Cognition--Berg_son 
believed that consciousness in man arose \<Jhen real activity gave 
\·ray to virtual activity. In the opening pagesc of Hatter and 
Hemory, Bergson traced the development of consciousness--.from_ 
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a highly complex motor- mechanism contained in the nervous system 
of man, he moved to indetermination o.f responses and the deve.lop-
ment of our ability to make several choicesin regard to our 
reaction to a particular response; henc~, perception along with 
memory arose, a..'1d v.Jith it consciousness as we kno-vr it in man . 
However, when Bergson speaks about the intuition of duration, 
he repeatedly asks us:· to return to the i mmediacy of experience 
and live or feel duration rather than think it . For exrunple, in 
Hatter and Hemory he distinguishes between t-vm vrays of approach-
ing duration : (1) there is "the duration wherein \·Te see ourselves 
acting~," and (2) a trduration \vherein vie act . t!1 Nm·T the first 
vim.'7 of duration is not an intuitive approach . Here \ve find a 
tt-duration ·whose elements are dissociated and juxtaposed . n2 In 
the second approach to duration--the intuitive approach--\'Te find 
true duration, i.e . , "vrherein our states melt into each other . n3 
The point to be noted is that on Bergson's O\VJn account, as 
we return to t he immediacy of experience and to a fund8.!'!l.ental 
activity, consciousness tends to diminish to the point of its 
disappearance. Certainly, t here is no interruption in the 
1 . Bergson, Iv!Ic1, p . 181. 
2. Ibid . 
3 . Ibid. 
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sucession of duration; yet, in order for consciousness to arise, 
there must be an interruption. Bergson seeks to escape from the 
trap he has· caught himself in by postulating another conception 
of consciousness--'' consciousness in general ••• which must be 
co-extensive ,,rith universal life."1 But if this is . the conscious-
ness of intuition, then it too must be rejected . The original 
state of conaciousness, prior to its evolution, approximated ~ 
consciousness in general . Bergson states that "on the side of 
intuition, consciousness foLtnd itself so restricted by its 
envelope that intuition had to shrink into instinct . 1!2 And 
when Bergson spea.'k:s about instinct in Creative Evolution, '\ve 
find that it is an unconsciow activity. 
There seems to be one nore device left to Bergson: instinct, 
if it could become conscious, could give us the very invrardness 
of life . In man, the intellect is the uluminous nucleus" that 
intuition surrounds:-. rmd intuition, as a faculty of lmo·Hledge , 
is present in man because the illuminating consciousness, 'lvhich 
is a characteristic of intelligence, is able to introduce such 
a consciousness into the dark area that surrounds the intellect. 
The intellect is transcended and left behind when consciousness 
is introduced into the instinctive faculty• Thus, Bergson 
species about an expansion of consciousness and states that 
it is fro~ intelli~ence that has come the push that ha& 
made it L~ntuitionf rise to the point it has reached . 
Ji thout intelligence it "Vrould have remained in the form 
of,instinct, riveted3 to the special object of its practical interest . 
1. Bergson, CE, p . 204 
3. ~., P• 195. 
2.. Ibid., p . 2.00 . 
This device must not be allovJed either . Professor Stewart 
battles against such a vim-r vhen he states that 
It is incompetant to reply t hat once havL~g become 
conscious, man may cease to exercise his intelligence, 
and yet continue to utilize the light of consciousness 
in an intuition, for this argunent i m)lies tha~ an 
attribute fan exist apart from that of which it is an 
attribute . 
The introduction of consciousness i n to t h e intuition of 
duration mus t be rejected . lvhat then happens to cognition vlhen 
Bergson bids us to enter into a duration wherein vle find the 
melting of one state into another? His appeal is to the felt 
i mmediacy of experience . Just as Bergson i dentifies conceptual 
space vTith conceptual time, he identifies cognition with feeling 
and the exercise of vlill . It i.<Tas pointed out above that such 
feeling is a lir..;. i ting conception; if vle could ever reduce our-
selves to such a level of experience, it vrould be of a purely 
subjective nature . It vmuld appear that f or Bergson such feel-
ing can exist for us above and beyond the introduction of a 
faculty of judgment . No longer \'lOUld Bergson have us utilize 
the faculty of judgment or have us believe that lmouledge implies 
a subject- object relationship, but, rather, h e bids us to enter 
into a nevi \vay of lmmdng in i.·Thich subject tends to unite v7ith 
object, a relationship, by the vray, i.·rhich he maintains is 
"consequently inexpressible . 11 2 The more one tends to coincide 
i.'Ii th \'!hat is unique and inexpressible i n the intuition of an 
undifferentiated flux, the more is cognition reduced . \'lith the 
1 . Ste\rart, .QJ?. • cit . , p . 227 . 
2 . Bergson, ll~ , p . 2~. 
disappearance of the clear light of consciousness and of the 
fa.culty of judgment , cognition also disappears . 
In the previous discussion of the intellect, it vras shm.m. 
t hat t here are tvro \·rays, according to Professor Perry, in which 
the content of experience may be rmified: one \ray was· to 11 carry 
analysis through, and discover the coP_Ylection of the parts, and 
t he articulate structure of the ,.ihole 11 ; 1 the other way \·.ras~ to 
carry analysis back until one reached the simpl e unity of which 
Bergson speaks. Such simplicity, however, results from the 
elimination of cognition, 11 and the experience, what there is of 
it, is of no cognitive significance.u2 Professor Ste\·rart leans 
toward a similar position: Bergson speaks about an interpene;.. 
tration of parts. in regard to psychical duration; that mere 
parts conceived through the mechanical categories cannot give us 
t he meaning of psychic life as a whole may be granted, but it is 
something else to maintain that concepts must be left behind.3 
They do add to our knovrledge . There is nothing vJrong vli th first 
12~ 
making a careful analysis of personal consciousness and then 
considering abstracted parts i n relation to t he whole, i . e ., 
relating t hem to a higher unity within a conscious· subject. Thus, 
It is not by letting go this lcnowledge and stepping into 
another department of knovrledge vlhich excludes concepts 
that we shall perfect our knowledge of the organism, but 
by regarding this mechanical interpretation under a higher 
idea, that of purpose or end. \·le lcnovl an organism truly 
as ,.,e knovr t he parts which "~:Je have isolated not merely as 
parts, but as parts f~ctioning i n the activity of the 
individual as a vlhole . 
1. Perry, QQ• cit., p . 238. 
3. Ste\·Tart, 2.£• cit., p . 32lt. 
2. Ibid. 
1;.. Ibid. 
What conclusions may be reached fron the above discus_sion? 
To maintain , as Bergson oes, that a "vision" is obtainable 
in imnediate consciousness must be rejected . By stepping out 
of the intellect, Bergson leaves consciousness and cognition 
behind . If consciousness is considered to be a ~rime attribute 
12~ 
of a thinking subject, then the removal of consciousness involvea 
the removal of the thinking subject . To speak about . a duration 
that vTe can knovT through feeling means little., for such feeling 
has no cognitive significance . Further, to speak about duration 
as being "inexpressible ," and t hen to speak about 11 i nterpenetratin€ 
parts " is a gross contradiction. If duration can be knmvn to, a 
rational being only through the use of intuition, then duration 
can have no meaning for such a being as man. 
(3) 'rhe Varieties..- of Intuition--Bergsonian intuition, accord-
ing to Professor Capek, nay be defined as 11t he effort to re-
capture ••• introspective data in their undistorted i runediacy. 111 
For Capelc, emphasis is to be placed upon the term "effort of 
intuition" which designates the return to an undistorted im-
mediacy. 2 HovTever, emphasizing the \•lord "effort , 11 in order to 
explain Bergsonian intuition, is far fron an adequate procedure 
Professor Luce points out t'.vo kinds of ttefforts of i ntui tion 11 : 
one geared to a selfa-wareness:, "a self in~entification vTith the 
m.ind element in perception, 113vihile another has to do with the 
1 . Capek, ~· cit., p . 25. 2. ~., p . 26. 
3 . Luce, ££• £11., p. 66 . 
physical elements of perception, or t he objects of perception. 1 
In Bergson• s. Introduction, one finds that the first fe,·r 
pages do indeed deal vri th an account of external perception; 
at the same time, there is an account of the intuition of our 
ovm personality, or our 11nind element" as Luce puts it . This 
last vie''l of intuition is perfectly in accord \'Ti th Bergson 1 s 
statement, in Creative Hind , that intuition also "represents 
the attention that the mind gives to itself, over and above, 
while it is fixed upon matter , its object . 11 2 This last 
quotation helps to clarify vrhat vrould othervrise be a violent 
abstraction--Bergson , in the Introduction and in Time and Free 
Will, does tend to speru~ of the self as an intuited object 
in isolation to any interaction w·i th external reality . 
So far, . intuition may relate to bro different efforts and 
to two different objects . Intuition may apply to mind itself, 
or the external objects of perception. Bergson, in the 
Introduction, states that intuition can be defined as a "series 
of acu; all doubtless of the same kind , but each of a very 
particular species • 113 The question is vrhether the tvro "efforts " 
noted above differ in kind , or merely differ in a relative 
v1ay. Bergson vrould have us believe that they are merely 
1 . Ibid. 
2. Bergson, GH, p . 92. Italics mine . 
3. Bergson, n1, p . 4-6 . 
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differences in degree , i . e ., they are "species" of intuition 
Ho'\lrever , it would appear that they are really different in 
kind . 
FurtheE, while Bergson spe~~s of an intuition of an 
external object which is clear to us, he also speak s of intu-
ition as an "intellectual ascultation, 11 an intuition in -vrhich 
-vre "feel the throbbing of its Lthe self 1y soul . 111 Here, 
no images can be used; certainly, t h e clear images that 
the intuition of matter (as discussed by Bergson in J. atter · 
and emory), gives . us are here of no avail . When speaking 
of the intuition of our inner life, Bergson tells us that its 
continuity "cannot be represented by images.. 111 P..:re these 
t1 .. ro applications of intuition "of the srune kind , 11 differing 
merely as particular species, or are they, in truth, different 
kinds of intuition~ 
Greater difficulty arises -vrhen one considers that 
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intuition i.·rhich results only after one has had "a long fellowship 
'\•lith 
1. Ibid . , PP • 36~37. 
2 . Ibid . , p . 27 . 
[the? superficial manifestations " of reality . 1 Here , intuit:Lon 
arises after intellection , not before. This type of intuition 
stands in contradistinction to an immediate intuition. Bergson 
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refers to an "original synthesis 11 i n his essay entitled 
"Philosophical Intuition.'\ vJhile there is s.till an element of 
spontaneity contained in this latter form of intuition, it, 
nevertheless, refers to "thought . 112 Indeed, Bergson, in endeavor-
ing to answer the charges of anti-intellectualism and the sharp 
dualism bet1·1een intuition and the intellect, states that "my 
intuition is reflection. n3 Hmv-ever , as it "VTas pointed out 
previously , Bergson ' s conception of the thought process in 
regard to intuition is quite different from t he general usage 
given it, especially that given by the rationalistic schools . 
vJhat the intellectualist and what Bergson mean by 1 refledtion 1 
are t-vro different things . Bergson pays lip service to intellectual 
intuition, but such intuition is for the most part toned do11n 
and hardly given any lengthy account . The categories of the 
understanding are responsible for an abstract unity and 
multiplicity, belong to a spatial intellect and have nothing in 
conmon vii th intui tion. lt The "dry rationalism" v.Jhich Bergson 
believes he is attacking appears to be all inclusive of any 
rationalistic post ion. The tw·o strains of intuition, one prior 
to intellection and ru1other occuring after intellection, must be 
interpreted as being tvro different kinds of intuition. 
1 . Ibid . , p . 61 . 
3. Ibid., p . 103. 
2 . Bergson, Cl , p . 126 . 
lt . Bergson, CE, pp. 281- 282 . 
The former refers to the non-rational naterial of intuition 
lJhile the latter r efers to the content of t ho ·ght . The former. 
gives us a unique, concrete pnrticular (\·Thether through images 
in regard to matter, or a felt i nr.1ediacy in regard to the self), 
'\'Ihile the latter is referred to as a "synthesis " and relates 
to a process or procedure of thought--that which can give us 
11knovrledge of the nind by the mind . 111 
In Creative 1-Iind , Bergson h i1:1self alludes to f our different 
possible meanings of i ntuition as t hey '\·Jere presented by 
rofessor Iioffding in his lectures on Bergson. 2 Bergson neither 
states 1·rhat t h ese f our vie1·rs '\vere, nor does he adequately 
ansvTer Hoffding . All t hat he states is t 1at as long as one uses 
the intellect to characteri~e intuition, onewill find more than 
a fe"VT meanings . 3 Let us novl exan ine vrhat Hoffding believes to be 
the four major historical vie"~:TS of intuition a s they are fou..'>ld in 
the history of philosophy . 
1 . "Concrete intuition . 11l;.. For Hoffding , t his forn of' 
perception results as soon as I open my eyes . It 
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is spontaneous , includes sensation , memory and 
imagination, t hree elen cnts ' ·rh ich are indistinguishable 
in their relation to t he object of perception until 
critical reflection begins . ? Here intuition is of 
an individual whole or gestalt, but such individuality 
is of an unanalyzed nature . 
1 . Bergson, CM , p . 92. 
2 . Ibid . , p . 38 . 
3. Ibid . 
lt. Harald Hoffding , Hod ern son, 
trans . by Alford Has on 1915) , 
p . 255 . 
5. Ibid . 
l2E 
2. "Practical intuition. 111 Such int~ition refers to judgment or spontaneous decision. One may suddenly 
find a conviction, for example, that certain principles 
seem "to follovr of themselves." ttit is a s~ontaneous 
synthesis of experiences and observations. 1tj 
3. ttAnalytical intuition . )t This type of intuition relates 
to the imneditate apprehension of identity and differ-
ence existing b~t'\.>Teen tvro images of sensation, memory, 
or imagination . Again, like the previous type of 
intuition, it relates to an act of thought . 11Intu}.tion 
here means the i mmediate kno-v;ledge of a relation. 110 
In the first kind of intuition presented above, 
intuition had to tlo with the i mag es themselves; here 
it has to do with their relation and not the images 
themselves , qua image . 
4. nsynthetic intuition. 11 7 This type of intuition refers; 
to the i rrll!lediate _erception of a totality, 11 a compre-
hensive glance" in 1.-1hich the content of 8 the previous intuition is no'\tr grasped in a totality. The greater 
the comprehension of identity and mifference, the 
greater is the possibility of grasping a sharply de-
fined totality. Synthetic intuition stands as the 
highest form of all the previously stated types of 
intuition. For Spinoza, according to Hoffding, this 
type of intuition "sees concrete existence in its 
individuality, and at the sane time as· a whole, as a 
folding together of the general la"VIS by vThich it has 
inner-· connection v.ri th the rest of existence . tt9 
Bergson ' s conception of intuition, according to Hoffding, 
more nearly approaches the second type because of the quality of 
spontaneous decision. 10 He further believes t hat t here is a 
certain similarity between Bergson's metaphysical intuition and 
the fourth type . 11 But here, no strong analogy is possible for 
Bergson has not given us any method for deepening and amplifying 
our perception . In other vJords, leaving out the second type, one 
1 . Ibid . , p • 256 . 2. Ibid. 
·3· Ibid. ~4 . . Ibid ., .p . 2~7 . 
. 5. Ibid . , p . 256 . 6. Ibid . , 257. 7. Ibid . , p . 258 . 
8. Ibid . 9. Ibid . 10 . Ibid . , 259 . 11. Ibid . 
moves, according to Hoffd: ng, from concrete intuition, through 
analytical intuition,and ultimately, one is able to achieve 
synthetic intuition~ It may be seen that Bergson has completely 
left out the third type of intuition--analytical intuition. 
Bergson places emphas-is on the first and second typ·es, leave~ 
out · the third and alludes to the fourth. Further, these three 
types of intuition stand in a confused relationship •. Bergson's 
intuition seems to be all t hree at once, all functioning at 
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the sane level, i . e., "~:r.ithin the level of the immediacy of 
experience. For Hoffding, the richer concrete intuition is. and 
the more rigorous the process of analytical intuition is perform-
ed in discriminating identity and difference , t he more i mportant 
and meaningful synthetic intuition vlill be . 1 
Tvro other variationson the theme of Bergsonian intuition may 
be noted : there is the intuition related to the instinctive 
faculty and intuition '"i thin the setting of a durational scale of 
being . In Creative Evolution, -vre are told that instinct become 
conscious is intuition. While intelligence cru1 seek, it can neveF 
find what instinct already has found . All that is ~eeded is the 
bringing to consciousness of a faculty that we already have . 
Bergson asks us to project consciousness into the realm of 
instinct . The instinctive faculty thereby becomes an intuitive onE 
1 . The types of intuition presented by Hoffding, it must be 
emphasized, are not in t hemselves Bergson's. Hoffding find~ 
them in the history of philosophy. notable difference is 
the prime importance Bergson attaches to the effort of intu-
ition which is found lacking in Hoffding 1 s four types . For 
example, for Bergson there cannot be t he spontaneous perception 
found in 11 concr,te irituition, 11 occuring as soon as I open my 
eyes . Nevertheless, Hoff ding 1-s:.: vievl of various levels of intu-
ition is vrell taken . This factor, found lacldng in Bel!gson • s. 
account, results in confusion •. 
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This form of intuition appears to be quite diff erent from the 
forms presented above . Seen fr..om this perspective, the effort 
of intuition relates to a renascence which changea the character 
of a faculty already existing back to i:That it was in its original 
state • . Its original state , it nay be recalled, was intuition, 
but cons.ciousness found itself so restricted that it became 
instinctive . With the evolution of the consciousness. of the 
intellect, all that is now needed is a ~e-activation and the 
further development of introducting consciousness into the exist-
ing instinctual faculty . 
Finally , i ntuition may be related to a durational scale of 
being . Our mm durational selves , it vrould appear , have a place 
\vithin such a scale . Through an increase or decrease in the 
effort of intuition (depending upon vmich end of the scale one 
might vrish to move) , one is brought into contact ·Hith other 
m&Jifestations of being . In the I ntroduction , Bergson speaks. 
1 
of adva.J.!cing 11 tm·rards a more and more attenuated duration . 11 
Hm·Teve~·, in Hatter and l emory , Bergson states t hat " the duration 
lived by our consciousness: is a duration 1dth its Olm ' determined 
' 
rhythm, ' n2 and that 11in our duration--the duration vrhich our 
consciousness perceives- -a given interval can only contain a 
limited number of phenomena of '\'Thich \•re are aware . u3 Therefore , 
'\·Then Bergson speaks of our advancing tm·rards an attenuated 
duration , one can only \'ronder how this is possible . Indeed, it 
1 . Bergson, D·1 , p . 48 . 2.. Bergson, 111· , p . 2.01 . 
2. I bid., p . 202 . 
would seem to be ru1 impossibility because oi' our ovm ndetermin-
ed rhythm" of duration., 
Summarizing, tv10 different efforts of intuition can be 
found in Bergson ' s doctrine of intuition. Effort can be 
directed tmvards the experiencing self , or tm·rards t he external 
objects of perception. The former appears to be a kind of 
felt imnediacy, ·vrhile the latter· appears to be some'\vhat. mor.e 
distinct and precise . Further, one type of intuition 
apparently relates to the content of thought . Its function ia 
the achievement of a "synthesis " of thought . Another type . 
appears to depend little upon reason--Bergson places emphasis" 
upon the vmrds 11felt n and ulived . 11 Apparently, the latter· 
type of intu~tion directly relates to non- rationa] material , 
'\~1ile the former relates to thought . Four levels of intuition 
'\vere examined. Bergson , it vras found, cannot account for an 
intuition capable of achieveing an immediate lmmvledge of 
relations . Nevertheless , Bergsonian intuition is somehow 
able to obtain a knowledge of particulars and is somehow 
related to reason . All levels appear to function on the same 
level of imnediacy . The introduction of consciousness into 
an intuitive faculty was seen to be another variation on 
the theme of intuition~ And finally, intuition, conceived 
within a durational scale of being , appears to be yet another 
development. The relationships among cognition, consciousnes$ 
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and duration vary in all of these varieties· of intuition. 
Bergson does not attempt to relate these varieties in any v:ray 
except to say tha:t the Ufinal effort 11 of intuition is al-vmys 
on the level of immediacy. Are there other efforts, or perhap~ 
kinds, of intuition at different levels of experience? Bergson 
does not tell us, and his doctrine of intuition ends in 
confusion. 
iii . Evaluation of the Intuitive Hethod 
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In his examination of Bergson's nethod of intuition, Professol 
Luce states that "the inability of the conceptual node of thinking 
to express duration is the starting-point of Bergsonianism,u1 
This appears to be an adequate judgment on Luce ' s part .. Hm·Jever, 
vrhat does- "the conceptual mode of thinl-ing" mean for Bergson? 
Indeed, this point needs clarification. Hargaret Landes: suggests-
that rrin all that he L-Bergsorii says: against the intellect as 
opposed to the intuitive method , he has in mind Kan~'s conception 
of' the intellect . 11 2~ That this is the case seems to be verified 
by Bergson himself .when, in Creative Hind , he tells- us: that his 
critique of the intellect ,.ras an attack upon the dry rationalism 
of his day, one that reflected a Kantian perspective . In that. 
same work, Bergson also states that by intuition, he means 
reflection.. Exactly what Bergson means· by ref lection is rather 
difficult to resolve . Reflection is certainly not vievred from 
1 . Luce, ~· cit . , p. 4. 
2 . Landes, ~· cit ., P• 459. 
a rationalistic perspective, especially 1:rhen the faculty of 
judgment is completely unrelated to t he imnediate apprehension 
of experience . To a certain extent, one should be weary of 
Professor Luce ' s statement cite above . One the one hand , 
Bergson l ays himself open to the charge of anti-intellectualism 
ru1d on t he other hand he seeks readmittance i nto t he enemy camp . 
• This must not be allovJed. Professor Luce also states that 
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the method of intuition is complementary to the represen-
tation of duration . If durat i on means nothinb to the thirucer, 
intuition \·rill seem to him unnecessay, and the debate about 
method hollovr . l 
~lhile one can, vri th certain qualifications, agree 1:ri th 
Luce ' s first statement, this second one is open to complete 
disagreement . Can 1 t a thinker find sor:1ething -vrorth while in 
Bergson's conception of duration and yet reject intuition and 
the intuitive method? Certainly, Bergson 1 s ·brillient analysis 
of the durational self has much to offer the thin1cer:·. Can the 
t hirucer come into contact "Vrith such a self only by '\-ray of 
Bergsonian intuition? Hm·rever inadequate his account may be, 
Bergson himself suggests t hat 11rcason 11 may be the key to such an 
encounter . True, in Creat ive Hind , Bergson uses the term 're-
flection' and 'intuition' interchangably. There seems to be 
nothinG v~ong in calling for an expansion of mind if by mind 
Bergson means t he rejecting of a completely closed, formalized 
science vri th a single system of relations, or a. metaphysics \vhich 
contains a completed, single system of things . 2 Certainly, 
1 . Luce, Q2• cit . , p . 5. 
2 . Bergson, I H, p . 57 . 
philosophic and scientific systems need not be structured like 
HGreek temples . rrl Science, for example , can be and is av.rare of 
t he dynamic character of the universe . Science does nake use of 
probability theories . 
Bergson seems completely taken by the Kantian conception 
of the understanding; he seems to equate all endeavors of reason 
·v;i thin a Kant ian framevmrk . For example, he states in the 
Introduction that "it s eems to us , even at this present date, 
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that the Kantian criticism applies to .§]J. metaphysics and to all 
science," although "it applies more especially to the philosophy 
of the ancients . 112 This seems strange \·Then, in a fevl pages pre-
ceding these statements, Bergson states t hat modern science begins 
at the time when mobility was examined in and for itself, when 
Galileo observed a ball rolling dovm an inclined plane . 3 And, 
he also states that modern mat hematics is a.n atter::pt to substi-
4 
tute the being made for the ready- made . Does the Kantian 
criticism, at the time vJhen Bergson vzrote the Introduction, then 
apply to all science? And does, for example, Kantian episte-
mology act as a critique of Hegelianism or is it not the other 
vray around" It appears that Bergson has not explored all the 
possibilities in the realm of reason. His appeal is to intuition, 
a faculty opposed and complementary to the intellect . 
Bergson presupposes a consciousness as wide as life . 
1 . Ibid . 2 . Ibid . 
3 . Ibid . , p . 54. 4. Ibid., p . 52 . 
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Consciousness is not taken as an attribute of a thiP~ing subject 
but, rather, as something that can exist outside of my identifing 
it as Bl consciousness . Consciousness can be vridened, Bergson 
believes, by the use of intuition ; t i1e intellect can be transcend-
ed because vre are not 1:1erely pure intellects. theory of life 
is supposed to teach the thiiL~er how the Kantian fraoes of the 
understanding have come to be and hm·r they are to be surmounted . 
Thus, a theory of life and a theory of knm·rledge are inseparable. 
Intelligence is 11 charged 11 1·li th matter; instinct is "charged" 
1rith life . Both reflect a double form of consciousness because 
of the double form of the real . Because of the existence of a 
double form of consciousness, metaphysics is dependent upon a 
t heory of lmovTledge; because of the double form of the real, a 
theory of kno'\'Jledge is dependent upon metaphysics •1 The vmy 
out of this circle is 11 the empirical study of evolution. 11 2 
Reason vmuld seem to be the method of procedure in such an 
undertalcing, not intuition. 
Scientific discovery is no doubt dependent upon some form 
of insight or i ntuition . There is no reason why such insight 
or intuition cannot be contained vrithin an intellectual frame-
uork . Physics, states Bergson, 'touches the absolute" so long as 
its general form is concerned . 3 That is, so long as its view of 
matter is theoretical; but as soon as it becomes applied physics, 
i . e . , mathematical formulae are introduced, it "over-accentuates 
1 . Bergson, CE, p . 196 . 
2 . Ibid . 
3· ~. , p . 217 . 
the spatiality of matter . 111 As long as these formulations refer 
to something that stands in an interpenetrating relationship, 
and as long as the physicist realizes this, it vmuld seem that 
intuition is of no value to him. Intuition 'tvould loose the 
scientist the 11utility and exactituderr of his science . 2 
Can the philosopher also stand to loose exactitude? Bergson, 
on the one hand, believes that he can for in its place he gains 
"range and extension."3 On the other hand, intuition is supposed 
to give us the unique , internal quality of the object . Hmv is 
it possible, then, that the philosopher can gain range and 
extension of his subject matter while loosing exactitude but, 
nevertheless, gain the particular as it absolutely exists? 
Further , it was pointed out, Bergson discredits the unifying 
principles of the understanding and elevates the simple unity of 
imnediacy . It is at this point that Bergson maintains that all 
philosophers vtill agree vrlth each other . The appa~ent agreement 
results, it "Vrould seem, from the loss of most, if not all, 
cognitive significance in experience . Further , if the philosopher 
is to make use of Bergsonian intuition, he must certainly have a 
clear conception of exactly vThat this i ntuition is. Bergson can-
not give a clear description of it . There seem to be various 
kinds of intuition used at various levels, all blending into one 
and opening the door to confusion •. 
1 . Ibid ., p . 226 . 
2. Bergson, D1, p . 52 . 
3 . Ibid. 
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Bergson tells us that t he mind must do violence to itself, 
reverse the direction of its habitual operation of thinl{ing, and 
"has perpetually to revise, or rather recast, all its .categories . rrl 
By recasting the categories, Bergson means mal:ing use of "fluid 
concepts ." vJhat are these concepts? Hovlhere does Bergson exactly 
describe '\·That he neans by them . If one ·wishes an intuition of 
the duration self, does thfus call for a recastinc of the 
categories? It \'Tould seem se . But yet , Bergson states that "if a 
man is incapable of getting for himself the intuition of the consti· 
tutive duration of his O\"m being, nothing vrill ever give it to 
him, concepts no more than images . 112 v.Jhat t hen happens to the 
intuitive method? It breaks down. 
The intuitive method is that "Vlhich practices the inversion o.f 
the habitual operation of thinking (or, if you will, the recasting 
of the categories), in a "methodical mw_ner . "3 The object of 
metaphysics is to perform qualitative "differentiations and inte-
grations . "l.r At \vhat level of experience are these differenti-
ations and integrations to be performed? Are they to be performed 
by intuition? If intuition only gives us the particular, it seems 
difficult to conceive of intuition as the integrating or relating 
faculty . As it 'l.·ras pointed out in the previous section , Bergson 
does not provide for an intuition 'l:rhich deals '\vi th the imD.ediate 
grasp of relations, i . e . , "analytical intuition. " 
In conclusion, reason must come to the aid of intuition. In 
1 . Ibid . , p . 51 . 
3 . Ibid . , p . 52 . 
2 . Ibid. , p • 27 . 
l.r . Ibid . , p . 53 . 
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this Bergson -vrould agree . His method, hm·rever, for accomplish-
ing this is rather tenuous . This results from set ting intuition 
outside the intellect . The t1·10 never really do meet although 
Bergson attenpts to relate them by holding that they fall vri thin 
the realm of general consciousness . This vie'd of consciousness 
was previously rejected by us . If Bergson ' s critique of the 
intellect is rejected, if his doctrine of intuition proves 
inadequate , then the intuitive method falls apart . 
2 •. Summary 
The need for a doctrine of intuition arises fron Bergson1's 
belief that the intellect is incapable o-f col.!lprehending duration 
or real process.. Therefore , a critique of Bergson •~ s vie1v of the 
intellect· 1.vas in order . First , Bergson ' s viei:T of the analytic 
method was examined . It was pointed out that Bergson holds nind 
in generaL as being synonymous· vTith the mind 1 s quantitative 
perspGctive in science . No one would deny that science proceeds 
quantitatively . However , '\vhile Bergson maintains that the 
synbols of scientific forLmlation are juxtaposi tionai. and 
quantitative , it does not follm·r necGssarily that t h e complex-
which a particular foruula represents also stands in a juxta-
positional and quantitative relationship . The formula as a '\·Thole 
must be viewed in relationship to its referent . Further , spatial 
inagery can represent or refer to sor.:et'1ing which is non- spatial . 
Thought , 1·rhile not limited to s~Jatial inagery, may make use of 
such i magery in order to articulate something which is non-spatial . 
Finally, 1-rhile one may , fo:r e:x:a.r2ple , order time , this do es not 
mean that time is nothing but order . 'VD.1ile a spatial repre-
sentation of time represents order, this does not in any way 
presuppose time is spatial like its representation; it only 
means that time admits to order . 
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Second, until Bergso~ traces the genesis of t he intellect in 
Creative Evolution, his assumption is that the form of the 
intellect can be deduced fron its function . Bergson limits the 
intellect to the realm of biological pragmatism--man seeks the 
perfect fitting of his body into his environnent . The intellect, 
in seeking such a fitting, is limited to a lmm'lledge of matter . 
Hm·Tever, the function of t he intellect reveals itself in its 
form . All areas of rational achievement must be examined, not 
merely the scientific realm. .All of man's needs are not ansvrered 
by a lmo\rledge of matter; ethical and Lloral considerations must 
be examli1ed. Further, the universe yet endures . If we conceive 
of matter e.s pure hor.ogenei ty, it n.ust be ass1..uned that vre are 
mislead;- if vle assume other hUJ:lans act determinately, that the 
self is a substantialistic , determined entity, we are again mis-
lead . We fail, then, of truly fitting our body into our 
environment for, certainly, a lmovrledge of the real nature of 
the universe and other selves is of upmost importance to us . 
Therefore , paradoxically enough , an i~tuitive grasp of matter 
\'lOuld seem to be :oore useful than an intellectual grasp of matter . 
Third, Bergson seeks to prove ttempirically11 t hat t he intellect 
is limited to the mechanical categories by tracing the genesis 
of the intellect . But t he intellect can never l:JlO\v duration. 
An empirical study of evolution leaves us with an enexplained 
remainder because the intellect !!lust fail in any attempt at 
kn.o\·ling real grovrth and development . vie can postulate an 
internal force underlying evolution, but vlhat can itle knmv of it'? 
Nothing, for it is the intellect that undertakes such a study. 
If it is an intuitive faculty that undertakes such a study, 
then Bergson is begging the question for he first must prove 
14o 
that the intellect is lini ted in the vmy he says it is., and this. 
he has not. done . He has not legitimately accounted for the 
conditions necessary for the development of an i ntuitive faculty, 
i . e . , the double form of the real and the double form of 
consciousness . 1\nother condition necessary for the development 
of intuition is a mechanical intellect . Bergson arbitrarily 
lir.1i ts ma..n to Homo faber . Further , if one ·Here to carry an.alysis 
back to the simple unity underlying experience, cognition vrould 
vanish . The felt unity of the ·i mmediacy of experience has little 
meaning as the I beco~es re- absorbed into the principle under-
lying the intellect . But, for Bergson, consciousness resulted 
from action "stopped up ." Nevertheless, Bergson asks us to 
return to an unconscious real~ (where thought is to be one "\<Ti th 
action), which has the potentiality for consciousness, i . e ., 
nullified consciousness . This doctrine was rejected . Conscious-
ness is an attribute of a t h inl{ing subject . It is incomprehensi-
ble that consciousness can be abstracted and projected into 
another side of the self . · 
Begir1ning the discussion of intuition, it "\·:as noted that 
Bergson appeals to a felt imraediacy of experience vTithout 
benefit of the intellect . The impossibility of knm·Iing a bare 
particular within this innediacy "~:ras also · noted . A unifying 
and an identifying self , .. ras found to be abs"ent . \'lithout such 
a self, cognition appeared ii1possible . 
Consciousness and cognition \1ere- re- e:x:a.mined, this time 
from the perspective of intuition and not intellection. 
nconsciousness in general 11 \ .. ras again rejected . The duration 
\·Therein "C;Te act (and not vrhere we see ourselves acting), is a. 
return to pure activity where the highest unities of the under-
standing are found lacking . That consciousness can be projected 
into immediacy was also rejected. 
llr.J 
There seemed to be no way to reconcile the intuition which 
arose before intellection and the intuition which arose after it . 
The former applied to matter and pure duration , while the latter 
applied to the content of thought . Further difficulty arose in 
that the former also contained t'\·10 different kinds of content--
images in relation to matter and a felt particularity in relation 
to the dl.:trational self . Also , our ovm duration \·ras found to have 
a udctermined rhythm. n Therefore, it '\·ras hard to conceive of the 
self intuiting, or movin~ either in the direction of supra-
consciousness or matter vThen both are vieued as existing ·Hi thin a 
durational scale of being . 
Four historical levels of intuition uere presented by 
Ho.ff ding . Bergson, it ~:ms noted, leaves out "analytical 
intuition, u i . e ., the innediate 1mowledge of relations . Bergson, 
by failing to recognize such an intuition, iffi left vdthout 
i dentity and difference . This accounts for his difficulty in 
relating an adequate knm·ring process \.Ji th i r:unediacy. Further, 
the other three levels_ of intuition -were all found to exist on 
the s ame level in Bergsonian intuition. The .result is conrusion. 
One other variation on the t heme of intuition \·Tas_ no.t.ed : the 
intuition which results from a rebirth of a previously 
develop.ed faculty--instinct . In this case, the effort of 
intuition was_ seen to refer to a faculty that is already in 
touch vii th the internal processes of life . For Bergson, instinct 
imp-lies kno:\'rledge . This vie·w was rejected by us. just as Bergson ' 's 
vievr of a nullified consciousness was rejected .. 
Because Bergson ' s critique of the intellect was rejected 
along with his doctrine of intuition, t he intuitive method had 
to fail . Bergson endeavored to equate all rationalistic episte-
mology in terms of a formal Kantian system, \'lhile, at the same 
time, maintaining he vms· not anti- i ntellectual . But the dichotony 
bet"reen. intuition and intelligence in Bergson 1 s system v1as too 
great from t he start and their redonciliation an i mpossibility. 
The philosopher was supposed to gain range and extension of 
his subjedt matter while loosing exactitude . Can a philoaophica] 
method af ford to loose exactitude? Yet, while loosing exactitude, 
the philosopher was able to gain, through intuition, an object 
as it absolutely exists 1 vlliile the philosopher must make use of 
intuition, no adequate doctrine of intuition is offered . All that 
intuition offers is confusion. Further, what does the recasting 
of the categories call for? How is metaphysics as a science 
to achieve qualitative udifferentiations and integrationsn 
vfl1en intuition merely gives one the unique particular? The 
intellect cannot grasp such qualitative differentiations. 
TI1ere is no analytical type of intuition. vfuich faculty, then, 
performs such an integrating function? The intuitive method 
must also be rejected . 
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ABSTRACT 
Problem. This thesis represents an attempt: to understand 
and evaluate Bergson1's doctrine of intuition, and its use in 
an intuitive method . Various definitions· of intuition, along 
with a continual re- amplification of possible meanings, are 
scattered throughout . most of Bergson ' s works . There are 
times when contradictions appear to occur . Therefore, the 
first goal of this thesis is an attempt to fit all of the 
possible meanings of intuition into a coherent scheme . In 
addition, for Bergson, the use of intuition implies a method, 
and, therefore, the second goal of this thesis is an attempt. 
to determine of what value Bergson ' s intuitional method is to 
philosophy. The adequacy of Bergson' s intuitive method is 
contingent upon an adequate development of intuition and a 
fair critique of t he limitations of the intellectual faculty . 
Therefore, Bergson ' s critique of the intellect is carefully 
examined . Further, while the object of intuition is duration, 
duration may be related to the self, to life and to matter . 
This thesis considers the use of intuition in these three realms . 
The intuition of the self . For Bergson, an intellectualist 
view of the self can only lead to its fragmentation . On the one 
hand, and particularly in An Introduction to Metaphysics, the 
intuition of the self appears to be a return to a felt im-
mediacy of experience, an immediacy prior to intellection, 
prior to analysis .. On the other hand, near the conclusion of 
that same work, Bergson notes that the intuition of the self 
can arise only after painstaking analysis. These two· apparently 
conflicting views of intuition are strains that weave through 
most of Bergson's works. 
A dynamic conception of reason appears related to 11ihtel.:. 
l .ectuali sympathy" or intuition. Implicitly;;, the intuition of 
the self is alread~ the exercise of the intuitive method . 
When the movement of thought proceeds from reality to concepts, 
reversing the usual processes of thought, and is exercised in 
a methodical manner, the intuitive method is achieved. Bergson 
suggests that a dialectical development pursues. However, a 
continually renewed effort of intuition is necessitated by the 
fact that the movement from intuition to thought falsifies the 
original int~uition. Again , Bergson appeals to an intuition 
prior to intellection, prior to analysis... The tension betvreen 
the two strains of intuition returns:. 
The intuition of life. Here, Creative Evolution provide~ 
the chief point of reference. An examination of the method-
ology underlying this work points; out two line of procedure : 
first·, an empirical study of evolution; second, verification 
of the findings of such a study through the use of the intui-
tive method . According to Bergson, an empirical study of 
evolution reveals the limitations of the intellect in regard 
to vi tal process·es and, at the same time, the advantages of 
instinct. In the first stage of the development of the 
Hergsonian critique of the intellect, the contention is that 
the form of the intellect. can be deduced from its function. 
Since its function is turned towards the manipulation of 
matter , the intellect assumes a mechanical form . The col-
lateral development of man ' s intuitional faculty is dependent 
upon Bergson' s theory of general consciousness . The intro-
duction of consciousness into the instinctive realm unlocks 
the potentialities of the intuitional faculty . The intuition 
of life is achieved . 
In his second procedural method , Bergson -traces the 
genesis of the intellect . By slovrly s.lackening the durational 
tension of the fundamental self , one can understand how 
intellect and matter move in the same direction, the inverse, 
or interruption , of the original impulsion of consciousness . 
The intuition of matter . The relations of intuition, 
duration, consciousness, matter and perception are treated on 
the basis of material contained in Matter and Memory . Pure 
perception and instantaneous intuition are theoretical con-
structs; concrete p~rception and simple intuition are function-
ing constructs>. Instantaneous intuition lacks the durational 
tension indicative of consciousness as it is lcnown in man. 
The same relative lack of durational tension is the distinguish-
ing mark of matter . The reason that Bergson concerns himself 
with theoretical and functioning intuitional constructions is 
to point out . that the difference , from a durational perspective, 
between matter and spirituality is one of degree . An attenu-
ated effort of intuition, vievred from a durational medium, 
brings one close enough to obj~ctive materiality so that it can 
be accurately envisioned . The duality bet\!reen the representation 
of matter and matter itself is overcome . 
Conclusions:·. Three important areas of controversy are 
exami ned in relation to Bergson's critique of t he intellect . 
First, Bergson mistakenly vievrs t hought as a picturing 
process~ and identifies our conceiving of a thing with graphi-
cally depicting i~, while, at t he same time, reverting himself· 
to spatial imagery . Bergson confuses a symboliz.ed relation 
with a relation of symbola. Because of this, Bergson miscon-
strues the analytic method . Second, Bergson's contention 
that the form of the intellectt can be deduced from its 
function LS rejected. The function of t he intellect reveals 
itself in its form, and all areas of achievement, scientific 
as '\•Tell as moral and aesthetic, must fir s t be examined . 
Bergson, in limiting the function of the intellec~ to 
materiality, prejudices his conclusions. about the intellect . 
Third, in the ideal genesis of t he intellect, Bergson asks: 
us to return to t he original psychical activity of life . 
Such a return can only lead to an ineffable unity \·ri thin the 
immediacy of experience . Further, Bergson does not dis~ 
criminate betvreen t he form of the self e..nd t he content of the 
self. 
Bergson's doct rine of intuition is next evaluated. 
Exactly hmv. a bare part icular can be discerned within the 
immediacy of experience is questioned. Further, because 
Bergson erroneously identifies ideal space with time, an 
intuitive faculty is necessitated i n order to introduce real 
time . The attempt to inject consciousness, an attribute of 
a thinking subject, into the instinctive f aculty is also 
rejected . Perhaps the most telling criticism of Bergsonian 
intuition is. t hat its many variations all fU11ction on the 
same level of immediacy; at the same time, an intuition 
which could achieve an imoediate knowledge of relations is 
found lacking . Without a well developed critique of the 
intellect and without an adequa~ely developed doctrine of 
intuition, the intuitive method is of little value to 
philosophy. 
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